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DUHEM’S BALANCING ACT: QUASI-STATIC REASONING IN
PHYSICAL THEORY
Meghan Danielle Dupree, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2014
The celebrated philosopher-physicist Pierre Duhem appears to maintain virtually contra-
dictory views. On the one hand, he claims that science does not aim to explain natural
phenomena, where he assumes that an “explanation” strives to reveal the natural world
underpinnings hiding “behind the veil” of observable phenomena. Despite these strong
disavowals, he also insists that successful scientific theories should converge on “natural
classifications” which allegedly provide “hints concerning the true affinities of things.” But
won’t such relationships also lie “behind the veil”? These warring inclinations have created
significant exegetical confusions, leading his interpreters to classify him as an antirealist, a
realist and everything else in between. Duhem is clearly trying to get across some important
methodological lesson about science. But what is it?
The trick is to align his philosophy more closely with the forms of physics he endorses. On
this basis, I argue that Duhem’s disavowals of “explanation” actually represent arguments
against a dynamic laws picture of science: the doctrine that science must seek laws that
track material systems according to the basic patterns of D-N explanation. He argues that
many of natures most important hidden quantities (e.g., entropy and potential energy) were
not discovered in a dynamical manner but were instead uncovered by stringing together
relationships in the quasi-static manner employed in thermodynamics. Indeed, it is the deep
relationships of the latter subject of the latter subject that supply paradigms of the “natural
classifications” that Duhem seeks.
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Once one follows through the details of his recommendations, employing concrete scien-
tific examples, one realizes that Duhem’s reflections on the scientific method greatly enlarge
our appreciation of what the many varieties of “good science” can look like. This chal-
lenges many dogmatic presumptions about the scientific methodology that still prevail in
contemporary philosophy of science.
v
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1.0 A PUZZLE ABOUT NATURAL CLASSIFICATIONS AND
EXPLANATIONS
Pierre Duhem, a physicist and chemist working at the turn of the twentieth century, wrote
extensively on the nature of scientific theory. His scientific work focuses on thermodynamics
and its relationship to other fields such as chemistry, fluid dynamics, and electricity and
magnetism [Martin1991, 2]. Interpretations of Pierre Duhem’s philosophy of science are
as numerous as his scientific works. He is an inspiration to positivists1, instrumentalists2,
motivational realists3 and realists4 alike, while others claim his philosophy of science flows
not from observation of scientific practice but instead from religious dogma5.
It is unsurprising that Duhem’s writings give way to a plethora of readings — his philo-
sophical texts are full of poetic prose which fails to specify the scientific results that ground
his model of science. He argues that science does not explain, but also claims that scientific
theories converge on a natural classification.
. . . physical theory is not an explanation, but a simplified and orderly representation group-
ing laws according to a classification which grows more and more complete, more and more
natural [Duhem1954, 55].
Problematically, the natural classifications that Duhem describes appear to meet the
criteria for the explanations he disavows. On the one hand, Duhem insists science does not
take us behind the veil, but in the next breath he exclaims it gives us pieces of the “true





5[Brenner et al.2011], [Deltete2008]
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this chapter I will explore this tension by unpacking Duhem’s claims about explanation and
natural classifications.
To begin, Duhem claims that an explanation reveals the essential structure of nature.
To explain (explicate, explicare) is to strip reality of the appearances covering it like a veil,
in order to see the bare reality itself [Duhem1954, 1].
Although Duhem attempts to define his notion of an explanation, he does so by invoking
the vague phrase ‘bare reality itself’. To clarify Duhem’s definition of explanation, it helps
to consider his assumptions about the nature of perception and the limits of the human
intellect.
The human intellect does not have direct knowledge or immediate vision of the essence of
external things. What we know directly of these things are the phenomena that arise from
them and the sequence of these phenomena [Pierre Duhem1996, 31].
The observation of physical phenomena does not put us into relation with the reality hid-
den under the sensible appearances but enables us to apprehend the sensible appearances
themselves in a particular and concrete form [Duhem1954, 7].
On Duhem’s picture, the world we observe is heavily mediated by our senses. There does
exist some fundamental “reality” which causes our perceptions to have the qualities that they
do, but we do not observe this reality. Instead, our intellect only receives the “appearances”
presented by the senses. Based on this distinction between reality and appearances, to go
“behind the veil,” as Duhem maintains a theory must do in order to be explanatory, is to
describe the world as it is apart from our sensual apprehension of it — a true explanation
must unveil the fundamental causes of our perceptions.
Duhem presents the acoustic theory of sound as one example of a scientific theory which
poses as an explanation. Acoustic theory gives an account of the phenomenal aspects of
sound according to changes in the vibratory patterns of waves. Concerning acoustic theory,
Duhem writes
. . . these abstract notions — sound intensity, pitch, timbre, etc. — depict to our reason no
more than the general characteristics of our sound perceptions; these notions get us to know
sound as it is in relation to us, not as it is in sounding bodies. This reality whose external
veil alone appears in our sensations is made known to us by theories of acoustics. The
latter are to teach us that where our perceptions grasp only that appearance we call sound,
there is in reality a very small and very rapid periodic motion; that intensity and pitch
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are only external aspects of the amplitude and frequency of this motion; and that timbre
is the apparent manifestation of the real structure of this motion . . . Acoustic theories are
therefore explanations [Duhem1954, 8].
We experience auditory sense data in the form of different sounds. We can categorize this
data according to the properties which distinguish one perception of sound from another.
For example, we observe that some sounds are louder than others. Loudness is a measure
of a sound’s intensity — how strongly a sound appears to a particular observer. But while
predicates such as ‘loud’ effectively characterize our observations of sounds, they do not take
us “beyond the veil” because such properties cannot be attributed to “the sound itself.”
In contrast, acoustic theory models and describes the behavior of the waves that cause
the sound. It reduces the concept of intensity to the amplitude of a wave, allowing us to
refer to the true properties of physical bodies rather than to the phenomena we experience.
Acoustic theory explains intensity by describing the essential nature of the physical bodies
which produce auditory phenomena.
To summarize, I offer the following characterization of explanation a’la Duhem:
Duhemian Explanation (DE): A scientific theory provides an explanation if it presents
us with a non-sensual (“behind the veil”) description of the entities which cause the phe-
nomena we observe.
Duhem stresses the importance of an appeal to fundamental entities and the particularly
causal nature of explanations. To those familiar with some of the contemporary literature
in philosophy of science, these sound like rather stringent demands on what ought to count
as an explanatory theory. However, the explanations to which Duhem refers are what we
would currently consider to be metaphysical explanations. This is evident in his description
of what he calls a “perfect theory” — a unified and explanatory theory of everything.
. . . [the] ideal and perfect theory . . . would be the complete and adequate metaphysical
explanation of material things. This theory, in fact, would . . . be the very expression of
the metaphysical relations that the essences that cause the laws have among themselves.
[Duhem, Ariew, and Barker1996, 67-68].
Perhaps it is more appropriate to call the explanations that Duhem describes metaphysi-
cal systems. A metaphysical system is a complete ontology of the fundamental nature of the
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world and a list of fundamental laws; were we able to access such a metaphysics, we would
surely have an explanation of the laws and regularities that govern the appearances.
Were science to provide us with explanations, then an ideal scientific theory would be
identical to the perfect theory Duhem describes. However, Duhem denies that science pro-
vides us with such explanations:
A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions,
deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely,
and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws. [Duhem1954, 19]
On the basis of such disavowals of explanation, many scholars read Duhem asantirealist or
instrumentalist. Instrumentalism about science is a form of pragmatism - a scientific theory
true just in case it works (i.e. allows us to make predictions about observable phenomena).
Science is an instrument that we use to manipulate and interact with the world, but it does
not provide us with any new knowledge about the nature of the world.
Such a view is held in contrast to realism. Realists assert that the claims of scientific
theories are straightforwardly true; scientific theories are sets of propositions and truthfully
describe the world in which we live. Although antirealism is considered the denial of realism,
the two views are actually the poles of a rather large continuum. Some philosophers are
realists about parts of scientific theories — holding that some parts of physical theory are
true while others are merely pragmatic. Precisely which parts of theories are taken to be
true vary quite radically over the diverse versions of selective realism.
Traditionally, Duhem has been construed as a firm antirealist and one of instrumen-
talism’s great forerunners. This analysis of his work is linked heavily to his disavowals of
explanation.
For example, Nancy Cartwright argues that Duhem’s position is almost identical to
van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, and she relies on allegedly Duhemian worries for
support of her antirealist evaluation of theoretical laws. The most famous component of van
Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is his claim that accepting a scientific theory does not
include a commitment to the existence of unobservable entities in the theory. In his words,
Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory
involves only a belief that it is empirically adequate (van Fraassen 1980, 12).
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A theory is empirically adequate if it “fits together with” the observable data — that is, if
all of the predictions a theory makes about observable entities prove true.
Cartwright attributes this view to Duhem, and takes him to oppose both theoretical
laws, and theoretical entities that are postulated but unobservable.
Duhem has no quarrel with phenomenological laws, which can be confirmed by inductive
methods. What he opposes are theoretical laws, whose only ground is their ability to
explain [Cartwright1983, 88].
Cartwright further suggests that Duhem’s arguments rely on his rejection of inference
to the best explanation. In contemporary terms, Duhem rejects the key premise of the no-
miracles argument. The no-miracles argument is an argument first formulated by by Hilary
Putnam in “What is Mathematical Truth?” [Putnam1975]6. Putnam claims that if our
theoretical laws aren’t at least approximately true descriptions of the world, the success of
science is miraculous. Supposing that the success of science is not miraculous, it follows
that theoretical laws must be at least approximately true. According to Cartwright, Duhem
denies that the best explanation of the success of science is the accuracy of its laws.
Duhem rejects theoretical laws because he does not countenance inference to the best
explantation. Neither van Fraassen nor Duhem are opposed to ampliative inference in
general. They make a specific and concrete attack on a particular kind of inference which
they see as invalid — inference to the best explanation — and thereby on the scientific
realism to which it gives rise [Cartwright1983, 88].
According to Cartwright, because Duhem does not accept IBE, he also denies the realism
associated with the no-miracles argument.
Like Cartwright, David Stump professes that Duhem holds some version of antirealism.
He, too, bases this assessment of Duhem on the aforementioned anti-explanation passages.
Duhem argues that science should be seen as instrumentally adequate, not as explanatory
. . . Duhem is antirealist about both entities and theories . . . [Stump1989, 338-340].
Both Stump and Cartwright takes Duhem’s disavowals of explanation as claims about the
entities in our scientific theories. When Duhem rejects that science explains, he is rejecting
the view that our scientific theories are true in a non-deflationary sense.
6For a further discussion of the no-miracles argument see [Matheson1998], [Psillos2013], and
[FrostArnold2010].
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Although it’s easy to see how Duhem’s claims about explanation lend themselves to
an antirealist reading of Aim & Structure, the same text contains claims about natural
classifications which resist any clear antirealist interpretation. For example, Duhem asserts
. . . the more complete [physical theory] becomes, the more we apprehend that the logical
order in which theory orders experimental laws is the reflection of an ontological order, the
more we suspect that the relations it establishes among the data of observation correspond
to real relations among things, and the more we feel that theory tends to be a natural
classification [Duhem1954, 26-27].
Here, Duhem suggests that as theories continue to grow and progress, we begin to suspect
such theories are natural classifications — classifications which reflect the ontological order
of “bare reality itself.” He further insists that
[Physical theory] assumes, while being completed, the characteristics of a natural classifica-
tion. The groups it establishes permit hints as to the real affinities of things [Duhem1954,
30]
and
. . . the order in which theory arranges the results of observation does not find its ade-
quate and complete justification in its practical or aesthetic characteristics; we surmise, in
addition, that it is or tends to be a natural classification . . . [Duhem1954, 335].
These declarations are unsettling in conjunction with Duhem’s disavowals of explanation.
Surely the “real affinities of things” lie behind the veil of appearances and are part of “ bare
reality itself.” But won’t such classifications fit the mold of an explanation? How can it be
that science fails to explain but manages to naturally classify?
To summarize, I characterize Duhem’s notion of a natural classification as follows:
Natural Classification (NC): A natural classification is a classification that provides us
with the natural divisions and classifications of “bare reality itself.” Such divisions are part
of the nature of bare reality, and not contingent upon the world of appearances.
Antirealists typically assert that the claims of physical theory fail to describe the world.
More specifically, antirealism is often formulated as the belief that scientific theories do not
contain any information about the world beyond the experimental laws they are constructed
to represent.
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We observe certain regularities such as “water freezes at 273.16 K.” These regularities are
experimental laws. The antirealist asserts that our theories restate and simplify collections
of experimental laws, but fail to provide physical insight beyond the data already collected.
Duhem denies this version of antirealism by maintaining that theory converges on a natural
classification; if our theory provides us with hints of the non-phenomenal nature of things,
it does more than just represent experimental laws.
Cartwright and Stump support deflationary readings of Duhem’s claims about natural
classifications. Cartwright thinks that the kinds presented by a scientific theory are extremely
“rough” and the kinds themselves are not unified by a “real” intension.
Duhem believes that phenomena in nature fall roughly into natural kinds. The realist
looks for something that unifies the members of the natural kind, something they all have
in common; but Duhem denies that there is anything. There is nothing more than the
rough facts of nature that sometimes some things behave like others, and what happens to
one is a clue to what the others will do [Cartwright1983, 95].
Stump emphasizes Duhem’s assertion that science can only approximate a natural clas-
sification, arguing that because scientific practice can never uncover a complete natural
classification, theoretical laws are neither true nor false and the use of theories is primarily
instrumental.
In contrast to Cartwright and Stump’s deflationary readings, philosophers such as Paul
Needham and Andrew Lugg argue that the passages concerning natural classifications en-
courage a realist reading of Duhem. Needham argues that Duhem is a moderate realist,
primarily on the grounds of Duhem’s comments about natural classifications. Needham
takes natural classifications to be explanatory in a more contemporary sense (although they
are held in contrast to Duhem’s notion of an explanation), and he takes Duhem’s insistence
that science is a natural classification as an assertion that claims in a scientific theory are
straightforwardly true.
I shall emphasize features [Duhem] stressed which are simply not accommodated by the
usual instrumentalist, antirealist interpretation of his philosophy . . . I would call his notion
of incorporation in the natural classification, illustrated by classical thermodynamics, an
explanation; . . . and I see no reason to think he did not hold successful natural classification
as the truth . . . My thesis is that he was a moderate realist in the sense of maintaining that
whatever statements are regarded as meaningful parts of the body of scientific theory are
held to be true [Needham1991, 102-103].
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According to Needham, Duhem’s allegedly antirealist assertions are specific claims about
the formal mathematics used in developing scientific theories. Only statements that have
empirical content can be classified as true or false, and, Needham claims, Duhem is pointing
out that some statements in our scientific theories have only mathematical (and not physical)
content. The claims that do have physical content, however, should be read as “true” in
a realist sense. However, Needham ignores the passages where Duhem explicitly considers
explanation in order to focus on his comments concerning natural classifications and the
approximate nature of experiment. While Needham’s interpretation is quite interesting,
and certainly a step in the right direction, it fails to account for Duhem’s firm rejection of
explanation.
Andrew Lugg maintains that Duhem is a convergent realist. Scientific theories approxi-
mate the truth — as science progresses, the theories it provides are closer and closer to the
truth. While Lugg agrees with Stump’s analysis that theories can only ever approximate
the truth, he denies it implies antirealism. On the contrary, while Duhem concedes that
theoretical laws grow ever closer to perfection, he also asserts they already contain some
true information beyond what can be captured by experimental laws. Lugg writes:
If anything Duhem espoused a version of what is nowadays called convergent realism. As
we have seen he held that physics — left to its own devices — yields information about the
nature of the world and that we are entirely justified in believing that its ontological claims
are for the most part close to the truth . . . For him “physical theory confers on us a certain
knowledge of the external world which is irreducible to merely empirical knowledge” and
there is no avoiding the fact that a purely instrumentalistic physics would be of “meager
importance” [Lugg1990, 417].
While Lugg and Needham take seriously Duhem’s claims about natural classifications,
they make little effort to explicate his views on explanation. Needham suggests Duhem is
referring to the formal elements of theories when he refers to explanation, but this fails to
account for Duhem’s insistance that science does not go behind the veil. According to Lugg,
‘the butt of [Duhem’s] criticism is the view that physics provides ‘definitive explanations’;
he was not against thinking of physics as directed towards the discovery of ‘provisional
representations” [Lugg1990, 4]. Still, this doesn’t account for Duhem’s strong insistence
that science does not aim to produce an explanation.
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More recently, authors have begun to acknowledge the difficulty of the tension in Duhem.
According to Psillos, these difficulties are dissolved by attributing to Duhem an early version
of structural realism. In his book Scientific Realism, Psillos alleges that the “essences beyond
the veil” to which Duhem refers are, in fact, unobservable entities. Recounting the confusion
about Duhem’s work, Psillos notes
Is Duhem’s position realist? It’s difficult to say, really. On the one hand, Duhem resisted
to the very end, refusing to subscribe to atomism and other theories which posited unob-
servable entities. On the other hand, however, his adherence to natural classifications may
be plausibly seen as a realist-enough position, given that Duhem understands ‘natural clas-
sification’ as revealing real relations among unobservable entities [Psillos1999, 38, emphasis
his].
Psillos cashes out tension in Duhem as follows: To reject that science provides a DE is to
deny the existence of the unobservable entities in our best scientific theories, while to posit
that theory converges on a NC is to admit that the relations between the unobservables
in our theory reflect the actual relations between entities. Psillos suggests this position is
similar to John Worrall’s formulation of structural realism.
Worrall insists that to prove science successfully progresses, we must find a continuous
thread between the differing models a theory uses over time. He claims to locate such thread
through a view he calls “structural realism”. On this picture, even though our scientific
theories are strictly false, and cannot be expected to posit the right entities in an ontology,
they experience predictive success because they approximate the structure of the natural
world. For example, Worrall comments about quantum mechanics:
The structural realist simply asserts, in other words, that, in view of the theory’s enor-
mous empirical success, the structure of the universe is (probably) something like quantum
mechanical [Worrall1989, 123]
In Duhemian terms, we assert that the classification provided in scientific theory is
something like a natural classification, even though the theory is strictly false. To cast Duhem
as a structural realist is to accept both Cartwright’s claim that Duhem took theoretical laws
to be false and Lugg’s assertion that Duhem affirms scientific progress.
But ascribing structural realism to Duhem breeds an additional set of problems. From
an exegetical standpoint, it’s a stretch to suggest, as Psillos does, that when Duhem refers to
the “essential nature of bodies” he is denoting unobservables. The observable/unobservable
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distinction, which has become a central point of contention in contemporary philosophy of
science, does not appropriately map on to Duhem’s disavowals of explanation and endorse-
ments of natural classifications. This is a point I will illustrate fully in §4. Furthermore, to
call Duhem a structural realist gives us only nominal insight into his view. Structural realists
differ drastically concerning their definition of “structure,” and to say Duhem is a realist
about structure is not informative. In many ways, describing Duhem as a structural realist
only returns us to our original problem: Duhem appears to be realist about something and
antirealist about something else, though we haven’t a clue how to clarify the “somethings.”
The tension, then, is that Duhem denies that science aims at DE, where a DE is a
peek “beyond the veil” at the true nature of physical bodies, and simultaneously insists that
science aims to reflect a NC, where a NC is a peek “beyond the veil” at the classification
of physical bodies according to their nature. But isn’t a NC a type of DE? What is the
difference between a scientific theory which aims at a DE, and a theory which aims at a
NC?
The confusion is further intensified by Duhem’s attitude towards atomism. Insisting that
science ought to be autonomous from metaphysics, much of Duhem’s work is devoted to the
separation of physics and metaphysics.
[Physics] must be able to constitute itself through a proper method independent of any
metaphysics. This method, which permits the study of physical phenomenon and the dis-
covery of laws that connect them, without recourse to metaphysics, is the experimental
method . . . The experimental method rests on principles evident in themselves and indepen-
dent of any metaphysics [Duhem, Ariew, and Barker1996, 34, emphasis his].
Duhem repeatedly argues that our metaphysical opinions must not constrain the devel-
opment of physics in any way. Additionally, he often criticizes atomism — the view that
matter is ultimately reducible to rigid atoms and the interactions between them. He claims
that atomism reflects a metaphysical opinion that ought not influence the development of
scientific theory. However, many of Duhem’s contemporaries came to ground their belief in
atomism on experimental results and advancements in theoretical physics.
One example of experimental confirmation of atomism is the explanation of Brownian
motion provided by Albert Einstein. In the early 19th century, Robert Brown used a mi-
croscope to observe the way molecules found in pollen grains traveled through water. No
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existing scientific account could predict the trajectories of the molecules. However, in 1905,
Albert Einstein published a paper titled “U¨ber die von der molekularkinetischen Theorie der
Wa¨rme geforderte Bewegung von in ruhenden Flu¨ssigkeiten suspendierten Teilche7” which
explains the trajectory of the molecule on account of the motion of the atoms composing
the fluid [Einstein1905]. For most scientists, this served as sufficient proof for the existence
of atoms8.
Still, Duhem maintains his anti-atomist position in the 1906 publication of Aim & Struc-
ture, and did not rescind his injunctions against atomism in any publication before his death
in 1916. Why did Duhem, an otherwise respected member of the scientific community, refuse
to accept what his contemporaries welcomed?
Some philosophers, such as Cartwright, rely on Duhem’s separation of physics and meta-
physics to explain his spurning of atomism. Cartwright claims Duhem rejects atomism
because he denies the validity of inference to the best explanation. Therefore, even though
Einstein explained Brownian motion by reference to atoms, we should not infer that such
atoms exist and cause this motion.
However, not only does Duhem deny atomism, he often suggests that science should
pursue a “peripatetic mechanics” — that is, a neo-Aristotelian approach to science which
includes the Aristotelian distinction of “quality and quantity.”
To attempt to reduce all the properties of substances to shape and motion seems a chimerical
enterprise, either because such a reduction would be obtained at the price of complications
that would scare our imagination away, or even because it would be in contradiction with
the nature of material things.
And so we are now obliged to accept into our Physics something other than the purely
quantitative elements treated by geometers, to admit that matter has qualities; . . . we have
to refasten our theories to the most essential notions of Peripatetic Physics [Duhem1980,
105, emphasis his].
Duhem certainly rejects the tenant of atomism that all natural phenomena can be re-
duced to “shape and motion.” But this stems from a technical worry, which I address in
Chapter Five. Although Duhem resists atomism, at no point, which I am aware of, does he
7“On the movement of small particles suspended in a stationary liquid demanded by the molecular-kinetic
theory of heat”
8For a further discussion of Brownian motion, see [Renn2005].
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explicitly deny the existence of atomic particles. Instead, he denies that the whole of natural
phenomena can be explained by a theory of atoms and their trajectories through space.
Specifically, Duhem worries that atoms won’t be able to account for thermal phenomena.
This is why he argues that we need a physics including qualities, or non-additive properties
of matter.
Between the magnitude of a quantity and the intensity of a quality there exists an essential,
profound distinction. Every quantity of specified magnitude can be obtained by adding one
of other various quantities of the same kind and of smaller magnitude, which are its parts.
There is nothing similar in the category of quality; . . . juxtapose as many bodies as you
will of which the heat intensity is that of boiling water — you will not make a body whose
heat intensity is that of red-hot iron; heap up snowballs as you may, said Diderot, you will
not be able to heat up an oven [Duhem1980, 3].
The distinction to which Duhem points does a great deal of work in classical thermody-
namics albeit under a different name — “qualities” are called intensive properties “quanti-
ties” are called extensive properties. Extensive properties increase or decrease depending on
the size of a particular system. A well known example of an extensive property is mass. The
mass of a system increases as the size of a system increases. If you add a cup of water to a
container of water, the mass of the system will increase. By contrast, intensive properties are
properties of systems that do not depend on a system’s size. A good example of an intensive
property, which is mentioned by Duhem, is the property of temperature. If you add a cup
of boiling water to a container which already contains boiling water, the temperature of the
system will not increase.
Duhem asserts that fundamental physical theories must include qualities in order to
properly account for the phenomena. In light of the importance of these qualities, he suggests
that scientific theory hints at a modified Aristotelian metaphysics. In fact, contrary to
Cartwright’s suggestion, it appears that Duhem invokes some form of inference to the best
explanation.
If we rid the physics of Aristotle and of Scholasticism of the outworn and demoded scientific
clothing covering it . . . we would be struck by its resemblance to our modern physical
theory; we recognize in these two doctrines two pictures of the same ontological order,
distinct because they are taken from a different point of view, but in no way discordant
[Duhem1954, 310].
But if Duhem thinks physical theory provides evidence for an Aristotelian picture of
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metaphysics, then he is not, as Cartwright suggests, opposed to inference to the best ex-
planation. Duhem thinks there is significant metaphysical import to be found within the
confines of scientific theory — but he denies that a theory provides us with a metaphysical
system. It is evident that Duhem is trying to convey an important insight about the scientific
method and its relationship to metaphysics, but nailing down just what he’s trying to point
towards proves quite difficult.
This difficulty leads to a kind of puzzle: what does it mean to say that science does not
aim at explanation but does converge on a natural classification? What is the difference
between an explanation and a natural classification? The varied interpretations of Duhem
focus on either his disavowals of explanation or his discussion of natural classifications, but
fail to give an adequate account of both.
1.1 TOWARDS A BROADER CONCEPTION OF PHYSICAL THEORY
I suspect that contemporary difficulty in interpreting Duhem stems from current biases about
how scientific theories evolve. Many contemporary philosophers assume that in order for a
theory to be fundamental and/or explanatory, it must provide us with continuous trajectories
of the entities which it describes. That is, the general structure of physical theory is to find
differential equations which govern how an object evolves over time, provided that we input
the appropriate initial conditions.
But, as Duhem was right to point out, much of science, even much of physical science,
does not work this way. This dynamic laws picture of science ignores important technical
worries about how to treat friction: the force which is caused by one surface coming into
contact with another surface. For example, when a pendulum swings through the air, the
contact between the particles in the pendulum and the air causes the pendulum to slow
down. Likewise, if a ball is sliding on a surface, the friction caused between the ball and the
table effect the velocity of the ball.
While friction is thought to result from electromagnetic forces in the particles that inter-
act, these alleged interactions are far too complex to calculate. Therefore, to appropriately
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describe phenomena, scientists are forced to rely on empirical methods, based in observation,
in order to predict how friction will effect a system (rather than calculate this based on the
fundamental principles of electromagnetic reactions). One way to get around the worries
caused by friction, is to construct theories based on observations of systems in static states
rather than systems in motion. This involves rather complicated methods of ignoring time,
and further ignoring the continuous, dynamic motion of a system over time. Duhem refers to
these methods as “virtual modifications” — and he believes they are at the core of scientific
theory.
In this dissertation, I will illuminate these complicated methods and use them to shed
light on debates in contemporary philosophy. In the next chapter, I connect Duhem’s notion
of explanation with prevalent views in analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science. I
provide a brief survey of the literature regarding scientific explanation, focusing on a thread
that traces from Russell’s notion of causal processes to the causal mechanical model of
explanation.
First I argue that the explanations Duhem wants to reject are similar to “causal lines”
employed by philosophers attempting to distinguish naturally occurring causal processes from
non-causal processes. Such “causal lines,” which allegedly appear in physical theories, are
time-evolution trajectories of various systems and their components. It is usually assumed
that any good physical theory will provide laws that generate time-evolution trajectories; I
refer to such laws as dynamic laws.
Advocates of causal mechanical models of causation, such as Salmon and Dowe, claim
that an explanation of some event E will describe the causal processes (or causal lines) that
lead up to and constitute that event. In other words, it will cite the dynamic laws that
provide a story of how the system ended up in its current state.
I argue that the kind of explanations Duhem worries about are explanations that invoke
dynamic laws, such as those advanced in the causal mechanical model. That is, Duhem
denies that science’s primary aim is to uncover explanations of the sort Salmon and Dowe
suggest. Instead, Duhem argues, science aims to “classify” phenomena by uncovering delicate
relationships between important, natural quantities that are often obscured in the search for
dynamic laws.
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Duhem’s frustration with the dynamic-laws strategy, along with his distinction between
explanations and natural classifications, is best illuminated by looking at several case studies
in the history of physical theory. First I will consider the evolution of classical mechanics
and Lagrange’s use of a statics-first approach, and then turn to the development of thermo-
dynamics and the discovery of entropy.
Lagrange’s formulation of classical mechanics provides a detailed example of how varia-
tional principles and virtual modifications play a role in a physical theory. Prior to Lagrange,
classical mechanics relied on a vectorial representation of classical mechanics (still commonly
taught today). The most common sketch of the vectorial approach relies on Boskovichian
point-particles. The location of a point particle is represented by a position vector extending
between the particle and the origins of the coordinate system. The motion of the particle is
defined by a specific equation, and the velocity of the particle is the time derivative of the
function, and the acceleration is the second time derivative of the function. This is com-
monly referred to as the vectorial approach because the position, velocity, and acceleration
are all represented by vectors.
Were we to look for causal mechanical explanations in classical mechanics, they would
be found by tracing the causal lines depicted in vectorial mechanics. That is, we can use
these vectors to define a detailed trajectory for each particle in our system, tracing out the
motion of the particle which is caused by the applied force. Or so it seems. In practice,
however, the application of this equation is surprisingly tricky due to worries that arise from
boundary conditions and friction.
Lagrange provides a way out of these complications by applying a statics-first method-
ology that invokes hypothetical displacements rather than dynamic laws. This statics-first
approach allows us to latch on to the important quantity of action. The derivatives of action
are conjugate variable pairs, which allow us to track the conserved quantities in our system.
These pairs actually allow us a peek into the “true affinities of things” without providing a
detailed time-evolution trajectory of the particles in our system. In this sense, Lagrange’s
classical mechanics classifies without explaining.
Another helpful example of how the search for dynamic laws can obscure the discovery
of important physical quantities is the history of entropy.
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Entropy was discovered through the study of the Carnot cycle — a cycle which is tra-
versed by a theoretical engine called a Carnot engine. The Carnot cycle is intended to
represent the way that heat is converted into mechanical energy. The state space in which
the Carnot cycle takes place is a dense series of equilibrium states. This is one reason why
the cycle is considered an idealization: were a real engine to traverse a Carnot cycle, it must
remain in equilibrium throughout the cycle.
Equilibrium states are states where a system is at rest. Therefore, it is impossible for
a system to move, continuously, from one state of rest to another. In the same way I must
interrupt my personal equilibrium to move from my couch to my bed, there will be a period of
flux in any physical system as it moves from one state of rest to another. Such “intermediate
states” are disregarded in the Carnot cycle — which is why the cycle is discontinuous with
respect to time.
Because of such discontinuity, descriptions of the Carnot cycle fail to meet the criteria
of the dynamic laws strategy and the demands of the causal mechanical model. The state
space of thermodynamics does not reveal any “causal lines,” nor does it provide us with
continuous time evolutions of how heat disperses. Nevertheless, it was through a careful
study and revision of the Carnot cycle that engineers discovered the concept of entropy —
which has proven to be an important physical quantity.
In the same way that the derivatives of action provide us with conjugate variable pairs
in Lagrange’s formulation of classical mechanics, entropy couples together with temperature
to define the internal energy of a system. Temperature plays the role of a generalized force
while entropy plays the role of a generalized displacement, and the product of the two is
used to determine the internal energy. This is structurally similar to the use of virtual work.
Once again we see how problematic frictional forces can be avoided by relying on a statics-
first method which unveils important, previously unrecognized quantities such as entropy.
These quantities allow us to classify physical phenomena, but, because they do not describe
our system in terms of continuous time-evolutions, fail to provide “explanations” of the sort
process theorists demand.
After a careful consideration of these two case studies, I return to Duhem’s philosophical
writing and resolve the suggested tension in his work.
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I argue that Duhem’s disavowals of explanation are not intended as antirealist fodder,
but instead signify his criticism of the dynamic laws approach. I unpack several passages
where Duhem describes explanation in science, and reinterpret his seemingly vague and
poetic prose as pointing towards important technical concerns such as problems that arise
in coupling and the obscuring nature of friction.
Finally, I explore the implications of Duhem’s distinction for contemporary philosophy
of science.
I consider Cartwright’s arguments that the use of such “idealization” in science merely
reveals that “the laws of physics lie” and science does not provide us with knowledge about
the natural world. I suggest, instead, that such laws are true and explanatory because they
reveal delicate relationships between quantities, such as the conservation of energy, which do
cause the observable phenomena to behave as it does, even if they do not provide detailed
descriptions of this kind of behavior.
Duhem’s project is important because it provides an alternative model for science. It is
quite plausible that science can advance, progress, and provide important information about
the natural world without producing fundamental dynamic laws. If this is right, as I indeed
argue, philosophers ought to have an open mind about the direction in which science is likely
to progress and what counts as a fundamental theory.
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2.0 ON EXPLANATION
In the previous chapter, I present the following puzzle: Duhem denies that physical theory
explains — specifically eschewing the view that science provides us with a complete meta-
physical theory, while maintaining that science provides us with natural classifications that
reveal peeks at the fundamental nature of reality.
In this chapter I have two goals — to connect Duhem’s criticisms to particular views in
contemporary philosophy of science and metaphysics, and to provide a more detailed account
of the “explanations” he rejects. I will direct Duhem’s criticisms towards “ideal DN texts”
and “causal process theories,” arguing that both are versions of what I call a dynamic laws
strategy. In spelling out the assumptions at work in these views of explanation, I will also
articulate the aspects of such accounts that Duhem finds problematic.
2.1 DEDUCTIVE-NOMOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS OF EXPLANATION
Contemporary discussion of scientific explanation originates with Hempel’s deductive nomo-
logical (DN) model. On DN models of explanation, a particular phenomena (called the
explanandum) is deduced from a series of premises (called the explanans)1. The explanans
are general scientific laws and the initial conditions of the system. For example, a DN
explanation might proceed as follows:
Explanans: Water freezes at 273.16 K.
Explanans: This water reached a temperature of 273.16 K.
Explanandum: This water is frozen.
1For a full account of the DN model, see [Hempel1965].
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For a DN explanation to be valid, the sentences containing the explanans must be true
and the explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans [Hempel1965]. The
form of valid DN explanations is intended to mirror a valid derivations in deductive logic.
These explanations are nomological, because they depend on the invocation of true natural
laws. Hempel managed to formalize the na¨ıve view of scientific explanation: it is the job of
science to uncover true, natural laws and the phenomena we observe is grounded in some
combination of these laws. That is, each event can be explained by an appeal to some subset
of the natural laws and a system’s initial conditions.
While Hempel’s account effectively captures philosophical intuitions about science, it
lacks the precision required to answer many philosophical questions. Specifically, Hempel’s
account fails to define what counts as a “true natural law.” Scientific practice operates at a
plurality of scales: psychologists are interested in laws and regularities of human behavior,
while neuroscientists are interested in the laws which govern neuron firings in the brain. This
same hierarchy of scales can be seen in physics: scientists working on fluid mechanics tend to
ignore the behavior of individual atoms, while atomic physicists often ignore the motion and
behaviors in the nucleus of the atom — leaving this work to the nuclear physicists. Physical
theories at each scale provide laws about the behavior of the material studied. Are all of
these natural laws? Are any of them?
A popular trend in philosophy is the assumption that the true, natural laws are the most
“fundamental ones” — that is, the laws “at the bottom” are the only laws which count. The
reasoning for such a view is rarely made explicit, but the argument runs roughly as follows:
1. A true, natural law must be without exception and inviolable.
2. If the behavior of matter at the “bottom level” of the universe is determined by nat-
ural laws, then this behavior is independent of the apparent laws at any other level of
observation2.
3. The “bottom level” includes basic pieces of matter and whatever forces or fields these
pieces interact with.
4. Everything is composed of these basic materials.
2(1) is thought to entail (2) by means of the following reductio: Suppose (2) is false. It then follows that
the behavior of matter at the “bottom level” is contingent upon some higher level laws. But if this is true,
then the laws at the fundamental are either are not inviolable. Therefore, (2) must be false.
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5. Therefore, knowledge of the basic materials and the laws which govern them provides us
with a complete, physical story of the evolution of the universe.
To those who accept this argument, or some similar version of it, it follows that the
only true, natural laws are those which govern the basic elements of the universe. For
example, Douglas Kutach argues that all phenomena is ultimately derivable from the laws
of fundamental physics.
. . . there are some fundamental laws of physics that govern the behavior of all particles
and fields and . . . ordinary macroscopic objects are merely aggregates of these fundamental
microscopic parts [Kutach2013, 20].
But if philosophers like Kutach are right to think that the only candidates for natural laws
are the laws of fundamental physics, what about the wide variety of apparent explanations
that science provides at a much higher level? Or, what about ordinary explanations that
don’t seem to include natural laws whatsoever?
For example, consider the following explanation:
Explanation Pittsburgh (EP): The water froze because I left it in my car overnight
during the winter in Pittsburgh.
This seems like a reasonable explanation, but it fails to exemplify the DN model because
it doesn’t explicitly state any true laws of nature. One attempt to get around these worries is
the suggestion that such apparent explanations are only placeholders for true explanations.
For example, on Hempel’s view, explanations like this are mere sketches of more accurate
DN explanations that employ natural laws in their formulation3. Peter Railton argues that
so-called explanations, such as EP, are actually summaries of an “ideal DN text” — a text
that contains a complete DN explanation for each particular phenomena4 ([Railton1978],
[Railton1981]). In fact, almost all scientific explanations lack the detail needed to exemplify
a DN explanation, and are therefore “summaries.” Railton’s ideal text contains a complete
3The first example of an explanation is also a sketch, albeit a better one. ‘Water freezes at 273.16K’ still
lacks certain information (e.g. how we define water, how homogenous the temperature of the water is) that
a complete explanation would include. These allegedly “incomplete” laws, like ‘water freezes at 273.16’ are
often referred to, rather flippantly, as ceteris paribus laws.
4Railton actually refers to an ideal “ideal D-N-P text,” where the P includes explanations that rely on
probabilistic laws. I will set this aspect of his ideal text aside here, as the only thing it adds to this discussion
is difficulty.
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listing of the laws and initial conditions that contribute to the water freezing in the car (e.g.
facts about the particles in the water, the insulation provided by the bottle and car, the
thermal exchanges between the car and its environment, etc.). According to Railton, science
is successful insofar as it approximates these ideal explanations. The closer that a particular
explanation gets to a complete DN explanation, the more “explanatory” it is.
Railton’s account is not systematically reductive — it is not the case that macro laws can
clearly be deduced from micro laws. Instead, he thinks that these macro level explanations
convey “partial information.”
It is hardly novel to speak of sentences providing information about complete texts in this
way: presumably we employ such a notion whenever we speak of a piece of writing . . . . as
a summary, paraphrase, gloss, condensation, or partial description of an actual text such
as a novel. Unfortunately, I know of no satisfactory account of this familiar and highly
general notion . . . nor can I begin to provide an account of my own making5 [Railton1981,
240].
According to Railton, Hempel’s account of explanation appropriately characterizes complete,
fundamental explanations. In contrast, the explanations provided through scientific research
reveal only summaries or paraphrases of these texts. Moreover, these fundamental texts
take on a certain kind of structure: the laws they provide are, presumably, initial value
problems — differential equations which take initial conditions of a system as an input, and
output the system’s trajectory through time. The suspected structure of this fundamental
DN text can be further illuminated by consideration of the popular “causal process theories”
in philosophy of science.
2.2 CAUSAL PROCESS THEORIES
Causal process theorists profess to find clues about the nature of causality from “the actual
practice of science,” rather than raw conceptual analysis. Sundry forms of causal process
theories are united by the hypothesis that physical theories detail processes that occur in
nature. That is, physical theories tell the story of the path a system travels through time.
5For an argument as to why it is actually impossible to provide this sort of account, see [Wilson2011]
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These paths are thought to be either causal or non-causal.
Bertrand Russell is considered a forefather of causal process theories. Russell built his
account of causation in science on a notion of “causal lines6.” Causal lines are series of events
which are connected in such a way that we can infer information about the events at the end
of the series from information about events at the beginning of the series. Moreover, Russell
argued that such lines are continuous, because they reflect the persistence of a particular
object through time.
A causal line may always be regarded as a persistence of something, a person, a table, a
photon, or what not. Throughout a given causal line, there may be constancy of qual-
ity, constancy of structure, or gradual changes in either, but not sudden change of any
considerable magnitude [Russell1948, 455-457].
Recent defenders of causal process theories, such as Salmon and Dowe, think that the
causal lines Russell describes are world lines through Minkowski space time. The world lines
of interest — that is, those Salmon and Dowe consider to be causal processes — are those
in which some important quantity can be tracked.
The Salmon-Dowe account of causation reduces cause to the transmission and conser-
vation of a quantity (such as energy) from one system to another. To illuminate how such
quantities are tracked, Salmon uses an example about a baseball breaking a window. The
linear momentum of the baseball just before it impacts the window is equal to the total linear
momentum of the shattered pieces of glass after the window is broken. Because momentum
is conserved between the baseball and the shattered glass we can conclude that the baseball
caused the window to shatter. Salmon articulates how we can be sure it was the baseball
that causes the window to shatter and not a nitrogen atom that hits the window at the same
time:
“ . . . the interaction constituted by the nitrogen molecule and the shattering window, mo-
mentum is not conserved. Take the window to be at rest; its linear momentum is zero.
The linear momentum of the nitrogen molecule when it strikes the window is not zero, but
fairly small. The total linear momentum of the pieces of the shattered window after the
collision is enormously greater than that of the incoming molecule. In contrast, the total
linear momentum of the baseball as it strikes the window is about equal to the momentum
of the pieces of glass and the baseball after the collision. So if we talk about causes and
6The view I describe here is Russell’s later view, concerning what he takes to be a scientific notion of cause
which is something like a distant cousin of the philosophical notion of cause that he criticizes in [Russell1912].
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effects, we are justified in saying that the window was broken by the collision with the
baseball, not by the collision with the nitrogen atom” [Salmon1994, 304].
Roughly, the Salmon-Dowe account claims that X causes Y if and only if some relevant
quantity is conserved in the interaction of X and . While Salmon and Dowe provide a more
precise definition of the notion of cause, I am primarily interested in the general paradigm
which the view assumes, rather than the specific details of the account.
According to causal process theorists, our best scientific theories provide us with processes
— or, in more specific terms, time-evolution trajectories7. On Salmon and Dowe’s picture,
scientific theory tell us the continuous paths that conserved quantities travel.
As it turns out, the supposition that physical theories provide continuous trajectories
places a rather rigorous constraint on what scientific theories must do — a constraint so
rigorous that it rules out a large number of theories that are currently in use in scientific
practice. Physicists often use methods for predicting the behavior of systems which do not
provide us with continuous trajectories. Mark Wilson provides many examples of these alter-
native methods in his paper Physics Avoidance. Wilson argues that we are quite frequently
able to get a hold on certain philosophical notions (like cause) by appealing to different
techniques invoked in applied mathematics. Moreover, many of these useful mathematical
treatments of physical systems do not provide us with continuous trajectories, nor do they
rely on “laws” which come in the form of initial value boundary problems.
For example, Wilson discusses the strategy frequently employed in scientific practice of
searching for a system’s equilibrium conditions. I will delve into this example in much more
detail over the next two chapters, but the short story is that practitioners of science often
aim to describe where a system might come to rest rather than describing the path the system
will take to rest. To illustrate this idea in ordinary thinking, Wilson uses the example of
Jack and Jill falling down a hill. If asked to predict where they will land, the answer is often
“at the bottom of the hill.”
This type of reasoning reflects formal mathematical tools used to determine a system’s
end state — a practice often used in science to avoid trying to describe a system’s evolution.
7Salmon actually remains agnostic about whether these theories include trajectories over time: he thinks
it’s possible that time just is a reflection of a causal ordering. Nevertheless, these trajectories must be
continuous.
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Although such strategies are often employed in the practice of science, they fail to provide the
“causal lines” demanded by process theories of causation, and also elude the expectations
for scientific theory outlined by an ideal DN text. Both Railton and Salmon are making
a similar mistake — they ignore a wide subset of scientific practice, ruling it superficial,
because it fails to conform to their a priori expectations of what scientific theories must be
like.
I suggested in the first chapter that Duhem defines an explanation as something like a
“metaphysical system.” Ideal DN texts and continuous time evolutions fit quite nicely into
Duhem’s picture of a metaphysical system. To understand how, it’s helpful to think about
Duhem’s own notion of an ideal theory.
2.3 AN EXPLANATION IS A PERFECT THEORY
Duhem’s concept of an explanation is heavily influenced by his views on the relationship
between physics and metaphysics. In Physics and Metaphysics, he defines physics as the
experimental study of inorganic matter and metaphysics as an investigation of its essences.
To conform to contemporary usage, we give the name physics to the experimental study
of inanimate things, considered in three phases: the observation of facts, the discovery
of laws, and the construction of theories. We regard the investigation of the essence of
material things, insofar as they are causes of physical phenomena, as a subdivision of
metaphysics. This subdivision, together with the study of living matter, forms cosmology
[Duhem, Ariew, and Barker1996, 30].
By this distinction, the study of material phenomena is the business of physics, while the
study of the causes of this phenomena belongs to metaphysics. Duhem also thinks there is
a separate field of study involving organic matter and its essence. This, in conjunction with
metaphysics, is what he calls cosmology.
For Duhem, physics consists in the observation of facts, the discovery of laws and the
construction of theories. It’s important to note that he is referring to “experimental laws”
rather than the more metaphysical notion of a “natural law.” Experimental laws describe
regularities which are observed in experimental contexts.
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He further elucidates the distinction between physics and cosmology in Physics of a
Believer.
If the physicist and the cosmologist study at the same time the laws of chemical combina-
tion, the physicist will wish to know very exactly what the proportion is among the masses
of the bodies entering into combination, under what conditions of temperature and pres-
sure the reaction may take place, and how much heat is involved. The preoccupation of
the cosmologist will be quite different: observation shows him that certain bodies, viz., the
elements in the combination have at least apparently ceased to be, and that a new body,
viz., the chemical compound, has appeared; the philosopher will strive to conceive what
this change of mode of existence really consists in. Do the elements really subsist in the
compound? Or do they persist in it only potentially? Such are the questions he will wish
to answer [Duhem1954, 300].
For Duhem, the process of science is largely descriptive: scientists seek to provide an
increasingly detailed account of how physical changes occur and the precise conditions under
which they happen. These accounts are composed of experimental laws — laws which
describe the regularities observed in experiment. Cosmologists, on the other hand, are
interested in far-reaching general truths. Rather than know precisely what proportion of
elements make up a specific mixture, they wish to know if this mixture is a unity or an
aggregate, if it is one thing or many things.
Cosmologists seek an explanation: a detailed account of general natural laws and the
objects they govern. Duhem refers to such a theory as a “perfect theory” which “would
be the complete and adequate metaphysical explanation of material things”. It is this type
of explanation that Duhem denies is provided by science [Duhem, Ariew, and Barker1996,
68]. Were it the case that the experimental laws of science paralleled the cosmologist’s idea
of a natural law, then certainly science could straightforwardly answer the questions of the
metaphysician. More specifically, were science to furnish us with an ideal DN text, which
contained a detailed picture of all the basic elements and the deterministic paths they follow,
physical theory would make a clear cut contribution to metaphysics — from such a theory,
we would be able to derive metaphysical truths. Duhem discusses such a derivation as it
pertains to cosmological questions about freedom of the will.
How would one go about deriving from the principle of the conservation of energy and
from other analogous principles the corollary, “Free will is impossible”? We should observe
that these various principles are equivalent to a system of differential equations ruling
the changes of state of the bodies subject to them; that if the state and motion of these
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bodies are given at a certain instant, their state and motion would then be determined
unambiguously for the whole course of time; and we should conclude from this that no free
movement can be produced among these bodies, since a free movement would be essentially
a movement not determined by previous states and motions [Duhem1954, 286].
Were we to have an ideal DN text, which could tell us the direct path of any particular
body given any special set of initial conditions, then free will could be ruled out because all
the states of the system could be determined by the differential equations which govern it8.
Essentially, these “law-like” differential equations would demand that a system behave in a
certain way. If that were the case, then how could we consider the system to be free? It’s
behavior would be fully determined by the laws. However, Duhem denies that the scientific
theories we possess can be used to derive these conclusions of grandeur.
Now, what is such an argument worth? We selected our differential equations or, what
comes to the same thing, the principles they translate, because we wished to construct
a mathematical representation of a group of phenomena; in seeking to represent these
phenomena with the aid of a system of differential equations, we were presupposing from
the very start that they were subject to a strict determinism; we were well aware, in fact,
that a phenomenon whose peculiarities did not in the least result from the initial data
would rebel at any representation by such a system of equations. We were therefore certain
in advance that no place was reserved for free actions in the classification we had arranged.
When we note afterwards that a free action cannot be included in our classification, we
should be very na¨ıve to be astonished by it and very foolish to conclude that free will is
impossible [Duhem1954, 286].
In this example, Duhem emphasizes that the law of the conservation of energy represents
observed data — and this data follows determinate patterns. Therefore, this data can
appropriately be represented by a system of differential equations. But this does not mean
these differential equations are metaphysical laws — that they dictate, rather than describe,
the behavior of inorganic objects. Because they are not metaphysical laws, we can’t think
of them as explanatory. Rather, they describe the behavior of a chosen set of objects within
certain limits.
Duhem is not denying that these laws are true — he merely denies that we can understand
them as metaphysical laws. In the literature on natural laws, many philosophers have argued
that the laws of science are not “real” laws because they are not universal, they do not have
8Duhem is setting aside the possibility of compatiblism — the view that free will is compatible with a
deterministic universe.
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unrestricted scope, etc. For example, Nancy Cartwright has argued that the laws of physics
“lie” because they appear general but are, in fact, highly contingent laws which depend
on the fixing and holding of numerous external conditions9. But, on Duhem’s view, this
presupposes a metaphysical picture of what a law must be like. It’s true that metaphysicians
wish for broad, universal laws — laws which will allow us to deduce particular instances of
phenomena when given the correct initial conditions. However, Duhem thinks this is an
unrealistic and inaccurate portrayal of how the laws in science work: moreover, just because
experimental laws are not metaphysical laws, it does not mean they are “false” or “inaccurate
representations of the world.”
A related point about entropy also helps clarify Duhem’s point.
In the middle of the last century, Clausius, after profoundly transforming Carnot’s principle,
drew from it the following famous corollary: The entropy of the universe tends toward
a maximum. From this theorem many a philosopher maintained the conclusion of the
impossibility of a world in which physical and chemical changes would go on being produced
forever; it pleased them to think that these changes had had a beginning and would have
an end; creation in time, if not of matter, at least of its aptitude for change, and the
establishment in a more or less remote future of a state of absolute rest and universal death
were for these thinkers inevitable consequences of the principles of thermodynamics.
The deduction here in wishing to pass from the premises to these conclusions is marred in
more than one place by fallacies. First of all, it implicitly assumes the assimilation of the
universe to a finite collection of bodies isolated in a space absolutely void of matter; and
this assimilation exposes one to many doubts. Once this assimilation is admitted, it is true
that the entropy of the universe has to increase endlessly, but it does not impose any lower
or upper limit on this entropy; nothing then would stop this magnitude from varying from
-∞ to +∞ while the time itself varied from -∞ to +∞; then the allegedly demonstrated
impossibilities regarding an etemal life for the universe would vanish. [Duhem1954, 287-
288].
Clausius managed to prove that entropy increases and tends towards a maximum. Many
philosophers take this to mean that the universe must reach a definite end. Duhem first
argues, above, that such a conclusion is too hasty and does not properly take into account
the scientific findings. However, this is not the real substance of his concern. His main
objection to this reasoning is that it assumes the experimental laws of science have an
unrestricted scope — that the experimental laws scientists discover should be considered
true without qualification.
9For more on Cartwright’s view, see [Cartwright1983].
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But let us confess these [above] criticisms wrong; they prove that the demonstration taken
as an example is not conclusive, but do not prove the radical impossibility of constructing
a conclusive example which would tend toward an analogous end. The objection we shall
make against it is quite different in nature and import: basing our argument on the very
essence of physical theory, we shall show that it is absurd to question this theory for
information concerning events which might have happened in an extremely remote past,
and absurd to demand of it predictions of events a very long way off [Duhem1954, 288].
According to Duhem’s understanding of physical theory, experimental laws all have lim-
its: they are true within a limited scope. While we might be able to get a handle on how a
system will evolve locally, it is often very hard (if not impossible) to make sense of how such
a system will behave over a prolonged period of time. This worry is especially clear in the
context of chaotic systems such as weather. While chaotic systems are still considered to be
deterministic, the slightest change in initial conditions can cause an exponential difference
in the state of the system as it evolves through time. Hence, we can’t make any predictions
about how the weather is going to behave three months from now — even if we think there
is some kind of determinate answer to it.
Of course, someone such as Railton would argue that an ideal DN text would provide us
with precisely the detail needed to specify the initial conditions in a way that we could track
the evolution of even the most chaotic systems. Duhem does not deny such a theory could
exist or even be true: he merely denies that this sort of theory is what science provides us
with. Rather, science works to describe, in as much detail as possible, the real regularities
observed in experimental contexts. Science aims to describe and classify experimental laws.
2.4 DYNAMIC LAWS VS. CLASSIFICATIONS
I began this chapter by presenting two popular views of scientific explanation at work in con-
temporary philosophy of science — Railton’s “ideal text” hypothesis, and world line analysis
via causal process theorists. Both of these accounts presuppose that the goal of science is
to provide us with differential equations which, when paired with the appropriate initial
conditions, will reveal how quantities evolve over time. To Salmon, Dowe and Railton, such
differential equations are “true natural laws,” meeting Hempel’s stipulations on acceptable
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premises in DN explanations. I will refer to accounts which presuppose this view of scientific
theory as dynamic laws strategies. According to the dynamic laws strategists, science seeks
to uncover true, dynamic laws of the sort described above.
However, Duhem denies that science aims to provide us with explanations — where
explanations are theories that furnish us with these explanatory, dynamic laws. I argue that
Duhem’s disavowals of explanation are really arguments that science does not attempt to
furnish us with metaphysical laws, such as these dynamic evolutions, nor does it proceed
towards an ideal DN text.
His disavowals of ideal DN explanations notwithstanding, Duhem insists that science
does more than represent the data. Good theories order the results of observation in a way
that hints at the real affinities of things, tending towards “natural classifications.” Questions
about how these orderings organize data and what Duhem means by a natural classification
have caused a great deal of exegetical confusion. In the next chapters, I will provide two case
studies which illuminate this distinction. For now, I merely wish to foreshadow the results,
and demonstrate the contrast between DN explanations and natural classifications through
a discussion about the pendulum.
2.5 THE PENDULUM
A pendulum is a simple machine that consists of a mass, called a bob, on a string attached to
a pivoting point. When the bob hangs directly beneath the pivoting point, it remains at rest
unless disturbed. This rest position is known as the pendulum’s equilibrium state. When
the bob is moved to one side or the other, a restoring force presses the bob back towards its
rest position.
In elementary physics class, pendulums are often used to illustrate the conservation of
mechanical energy via exchanges between kinetic energy and potential energy. Kinetic energy
is the energy associated with the motion of the bob (i.e. its speed), while potential energy
is the energy associated with the bob’s disposition towards movement (i.e. its height). As
the pendulum moves away from its equilibrium position, the potential energy increases and
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Figure 1: An example of a simple pendulum.
the kinetic energy decreases. In contrast, when the pendulum moves towards equilibrium,
the kinetic energy increases and the potential energy decreases. The pendulum is used to
emphasize that kinetic energy is continuously exchanged with potential energy.
But, in truth, we witness this posited interchange only approximately in any real life
set up, for numerous frictional effects continually drain away kinetic energy before it can
be completely reconverted back into potential energy. In fact, this apparent loss explains
why the conservation of energy, in its modern understanding, wasn’t recognized as valid
until the 1840s (earlier writers thought that the energetic losses needed to be carried away
as the kinetic energy of small particles, which isn’t true). Actual losses of potential energy
are caused by frictional forces such as air resistance. This causes the overall mechanical
energy of the system to decrease, showing that the energy is not perfectly conserved in such
exchanges.
There are two ways a scientist might approach the pendulum, which correspond to
Duhem’s distinction between explanations and natural classifications.
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2.5.1 The dynamic laws picture of the pendulum
To provide an adequate DN explanation — that is, give a detailed account of everything that
occurs over time in our system —, we will need to carry out a fully adequate dynamics laws
modeling. On this picture, we try to straightforwardly write down differential equations that
will capture the exact motions of the bob over time. But such a feat is not easily obtained.
We cannot write down differential equations that perfectly describe the motion of the bob
because pendulums, like all real-world systems, face the effects of friction in its various
forms (e.g. air resistance, the extension and mass of the cord on which the bob swings, three
dimensional motion, contact between the string and the pivot, etc.). To uncover an ideal
DN explanation, we must quantify all of these forces and explain how they interact with our
bob10.
Even if we were able to mathematically describe the motion of the bob, the equations
used would obscure the exchanges between potential and kinetic energy. From a dynamic
point of view, it appears as if nothing is actually being conserved as our pendulum moves
through time. The pendulum loses mechanical energy — this is why it eventually comes to
rest11. As Duhem puts it, potential energy is a very abstract concept — identifying it proved
no small task. We must be careful not to underestimate the subtleties of the notion.
To deal with the complications of describing the actual motion of the pendulum, scientists
generally disregard the effects of friction and employ “simplifying assumptions” about the
system. They assume that the pendulum is completely isolated, the string the bob hangs
from is massless and remains taut, motion can only occur in two dimensions, and the system







sinθ = 0 (2.1)
where g is the acceleration due to gravity, l is the length of the rod connected to the mass,
and θ is the angle between the rod and its initial position.
10Another problem that arises in this context concerns constraint forces. I’ve decided not to address
constraint forces here, for the purpose of simplicity. However,it should be noted that some of the forces we
have to take into consideration are co additionally problematic because they function as unknown quantities in
our problem rather than as determinant forces. For a deeper discussion of constraint forces, see [Wilson2011].
11This is also why perpetual motion machines are impossible.
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Philosophers refer to such pendulums as “idealized,” but that deflationary terminology
doesn’t render the exchanges between kinetic and potential energy storage their proper
due. We now believe that those back-and-forth exchanges capture nature’s most intimate
workings, whereas the “corruption” of friction merely represent the inevitable “noise” that
intrudes as soon as we insert any physical system into a natural environment. Duhem’s focus
on “natural classifications” represents an insistence that science’s principle task is to uncover
these deeper patterns of exchange, rather than embark upon a quixotic voyage to model the
friction-laden bobs of unfettered nature with wholly accurate equations, such as a dynamic
laws picture suggests.
But what kind of investigative methodology is likely to result in “natural classifications”
of the sort we seek? Duhem proposes a novel answer, based upon his deep historical studies
of prior discoveries of abstract quantities similar to potential energy.
2.5.2 Duhem’s approach to the pendulum
Rather than generate differential equations which describe the trajectory of the bob, Duhem
suggests we consider “freeze-frames” of the pendulum in each of the states it will pass
through. We can experimentally determine the static force needed to hold the mass in place
at each point in a trajectory, and its speed as it passes through that point. We can then
create a series of static “balances” between kinetic and potential energy along the general
path of the pendulum.
The kinetic energy and potential energy vary in such a way that the total mechanical
energy stays the same, making the total energy a conserved quantity. Scientists experimen-
tally determine the balances of potential and kinetic energy for any particular position of
the pendulum. These static results are strung together to determine a frictionless trajectory
for the pendulum. Imagine creating a beaded necklace: each bead represents one state of
the pendulum and the string is the index of time on which the beads are organized.
Frictional forces arise when a system is in motion. Duhem suggests we create an imagi-
nary frictionless history for the pendulum in which frictional effects get suppressed through
gentle “quasi-static” shifts between one stage and another. Such shifts are called quasi-static
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Figure 2: An illustration of Duhem’s perspective of the pendulum. In each state of the
pendulum, the dotted line represents the potential energy and the solid line represents the
kinetic energy. The total energy remains the same.
because we imagine the system moves from one state of rest (or equilibrium) to another. We
imagine the pendulum moves through a series of static states. This strategy for depicting
the trajectory of the pendulum allows us to capture the motion of a pendulum without con-
sidering the energy lost to friction — opening our eyes to critical changes between quantities
like potential and kinetic energy. By contrast, if we aim to provide DN explanations of the
pendulum’s trajectory, crucial relationships between conserved quantities become obscured.
This is because a DN model attempts to trace the actual path of the pendulum, along which
energy is not conserved.
The continuous motion of the pendulum described by equation (1) is a virtual motion:
it does not represent the actual trajectory a pendulum follows. Duhem refers to these
virtual motions as virtual modifications. Rather than write such virtual modifications as
“idealizations” which can only “approximate” truth, Duhem argues that such modifications
help physical theory to capture the deeper tendencies of nature.
In the next two chapters, I provide a more detailed examination of how these quasi-static
processes play a significant role in the development of physical theory.
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3.0 LAGRANGIAN MECHANICS
3.1 MOTIVATION FOR LAGRANGE’S MECHANICS: CONSTRAINTS IN
THE POINT MASS SETTING
To understand Lagrange’s formulation of classical mechanics, it is helpful to first consider
the point particle formulation of Newton’s laws (often referred to as Newtonian mechanics







where mi is the mass of some particle i, r¨i is the second time derivative (or acceleration) of
i, F
(e)
i is the external force on i, and Fji is the force of another particle in the system, j,
on i. Theoretically, this set of differential equations allows us to calculate the behavior of a
system of particles if we know the forces applied to them (and the masses of the particles).
The physical idea is that the force acting on a particle in any definite direction is equal to
the product of the particle’s mass and acceleration in that direction. The framework these
calculations occur in is referred to as the point-mass setting because particles are represented
as point masses : rigid, distinct, extensionless mathematical points.
On this view, the Newtonian formulation of classical mechanics appears to be a success-
ful and relatively simple dynamic laws approach to describing the behavior of mechanical
systems. Just find out what forces are acting on your particle, and you will be able to predict
the behavior of a particular point mass1. Moreover, because this is an initial value boundary
1In practice, however, when the system is larger than three particles, the differential equations become
unsolveable and no trajectory can be predicted
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problem, you will have a special kind of knowledge about the behavior of the particle: you
can predict the trajectory of the particle as it evolves through time.
The ability to predict the particle’s trajectory through time is related to the signature
of the ordinary differential equations involved in representing Newton’s laws. The solutions
to these equations are well-defined initial value problems. All this means is that when you
specify a point in the domain of the function (in this case the position and velocity of the
particle), the equation provides the evolution of the particle over time.
Due to the signature of the ODEs involved in the point mass setting, and the simplistic
nature of the primary equation used to represent the motion of a system of particles, this
treatment of Newton’s laws is initially enticing to philosophers. However, to capture and
describe the motion of most systems of particles in the actual world involves complicated
methods which are more involved than straightforward mathematical solutions to ODEs.
One of the first things the scientist attempting to apply Newton’s laws to any specified
system must consider is the effect on the motion of the particle that will occur as a result of
the systems constraints.
A constraint is another physical system that interacts with the system of particles that
we are interested in. For example, consider a bead whose motion is constrained to a slanted
surface, a gas in a container, or a system of molecules bound together as a rigid rod. In all of
these cases, the otherwise “pure” trajectory of each particle is at least partially determined
by external constraints on the system. The na¨ıve way of thinking about constraint forces
suggests that they are just another external force on the system. Their presence doesn’t do
anything to negate the previously suggested equation of the system; they merely indicate a
new set of external forces. However, a careful examination of how such forces are calculated
shows this picture is inaccurate.
One classic textbook summarizes the situation by saying
. . . one might obtain the impression that all problems in mechanics have been reduced to
solving [a] set of differential equations. One merely substitutes the various forces acting
upon the particles of the system, turns the mathematical crank, and grinds out the answers!
Even from a purely physical standpoint, however, this view is oversimplified. For example,
it may be necessary to take into this account constraints that limit the motion of the system
[Goldstein, Poole, and Safko2002, 12].
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To handle constraints in the point mass setting, additional equations must be introduced.
For example, if a mass is constrained to move around in a circle, we would introduce the
equation
x2 + y2 = r2, (3.2)
which describes the spherical shape of the surface the mass is constrained to. This equation
describes the boundaries of motion for our mass. Unfortunately, such equations present
themselves as additional information which needs to be solved for rather than determinate
forces whose sum dictates the trajectory of each particle. As Goldstein writes,
[The equations of constraint forces] are among the unknowns of the problem and must be
obtained from the solution we seek. Indeed, imposing constraints on the system is simply
another method of stating that there are forces present in the problem that cannot be
specified directly but are rather known in terms of their effect on the motion of the system
[Goldstein, Poole, and Safko2002, 13].
Part of the reason why these constraint forces are indeterminate is their reactionary
nature; the way in which they interact with the system depends in part on how the system
interacts with the constraints. They are not determinate forces whose value is always the
same, but forces of reaction which vary depending on the force that is exerted by the system.
Mark Wilson discusses this problem in his paper “What is Classical Mechanics Anyway?”
[P]oint mass mechanics only tolerates forces that approximately implement standard con-
straints. Why? For starters, no array of point particles exerting plausible forces can hold
our “bead” to any fixed geometrical contour such as [a wire] W . . . Now suppose that we
were able to arrange a schedule of forces arising from the wire W that could bind bead b
traveling at velocity v perfectly to W’s unyielding surface. Can these same forces perform
the same chore if the velocity of the bead had instead been v*? To do that, the forces will
need to be velocity sensitive (because W must exert stronger forces upon a faster b to pull
b to its requisite destination) [Wilson2012, 25].
Wilson points out that whatever these constraint forces are that bind the bead to a
string, they operate in a way that adapts to the changing velocity of the bead. No matter
how quickly the bead goes, it will still follow the contours of the wire exactly. This is why
Goldstein suggests that constraint forces are only known in terms of their effect on the
motion of the system, and as a result provide difficulties for mathematic descriptions of the
motions of systems of particles.
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Not only does the vectorial approach make problems that invoke constraints difficult
to solve, it relies on a notion of force that is inconsistent with the Newtonian approach.
Regarding the “velocity sensitive” constraint forces that hold a bead on a wire, Wilson
writes
[C]ustomary point mass interpretations of Newton’s third law forbid forces of this character
. . . Forces of a permissible type can hold b near to W, but only at the cost of some complex
wobbling [Wilson2012, 25].
In addition, Wilson points out that such point-mass approaches to constraint forces don’t
take into account the friction that occurs between the mass and the constraint, e.g. the bead
and the wire. In light of such worries about constraints, the point-mass setting becomes
increasingly unsatisfactory.
To surmount the . . . difficulty . . . that the forces of constraint are unknown a priori, we
should like to so formulate the mechanics that the forces of constraint disappear. We need
then deal only with the known applied forces [Goldstein, Poole, and Safko2002, 16].
The numerous difficulties that constraint forces cause for the point-mass setting calls for
a different approach to classical mechanics — an approach that can do away with all of
the microscopic constraint forces between individual point masses and instead focus on the
general forces which are applied to the system.
Lagrange’s mechanics does precisely this: it allows us to derive predictions based on
the external forces alone. However, when we move to Lagrange’s mechanics we abandon a
dynamic laws approach in search of a more abstract and general classification of physical
phenomena. In the next two sections, I will spell out precisely how this works.
3.1.1 Generalized Coordinates and Configuration Space
Before introducing the principle of virtual work, it is important to consider the mathematical
structure in which Lagrange’s theory takes place. Lagrange relies on generalized coordinates.
Generalized coordinates are an abstraction from the geometrical concept of Cartesian coor-
dinates. On the standard picture of Cartesian coordinates, we can specify a point in space
according to its position along three different axes (x, y, z). The position of a particle on any
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However, sometimes it is useful to describe the trajectory of a point in spherical coordi-
nates (r, θ, φ). We can then express the relationship between the spherical coordinates and
the rectangular coordinates by means of a coordinate transformation, which depicts each
rectangular coordinate in terms of the spherical coordinates:
x = r sin θ cosφ
y = r sin θ sinφ
z = r cos θ
(3.4)
We can rely on our geometrical intuitions about the relationship between spherical coor-
dinates and rectangular coordinates in order to point us towards the more abstract concept
of a generalized coordinate. Generalized coordinates are any set of coordinates by which we
can uniquely specify the state of the system. They needn’t correspond to a particle’s physical
location, as is the case with Cartesian coordinates and spherical coordinates. The idea of a
generalized coordinate just is a coordinate by which we specify our system. We then consider






Any parameters which specify our system can then be chosen as the general coordinates.
For example, if we are interested in the configuration of a rigid body, we can choose just
six general coordinates to specify it (three pertaining to location and three pertaining to
rotation), ignoring all of the particles which compose it. Notice that the microstructure is
irrelevant with respect to the coordinates we choose to specify the system.
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In the same way that a triple of Cartesian coordinates specifies a point in Euclidean
space, generalized coordinates specify a point in a generalized configuration space. The
dimension of the configuration space corresponds to the number of generalized coordinates
used to specify the system. In Lagrange’s mechanics, the number of coordinates needed
corresponds to the number of degrees of freedom for a specific system. A degree of freedom
is just a way in which the system is free to move (e.g. a system constrained to non-rotational
movement on a flat surface has two degrees of freedom; it can move freely about a plane).
The generalized coordinates used to specify a system are represented in a generalized
configuration space as a single point (because the dimensions of the configuration space cor-
respond to the number of coordinates). However, it should be evident that the configuration
space we refer to here no longer maps directly to physical space; it is a mathematical ab-
straction used for the purpose of computing the evolution of a system. In describing the
generalized configuration space, Cornelius Lanczos writes
[T]he position of a rigid body — with all the infinity of mass points which for it — is
symbolized as a single point of a 6-dimensional space. The 6-dimensional space has, to be
sure, nothing to do with the physical reality of the rigid body. It is merely correlated to
the rigid body in the sense of a one-to-one correspondence [Lanczos1964, 13].
3.2 LAGRANGE’S STATICS AND THE PRINCIPAL OF VIRTUAL WORK
Lagrange’s formulation of mechanics begins with statics: the study of the equilibrium con-
ditions for a system. According to the vectorial approach, a system is in equilibrium when
each individual point-mass is in equilibrium. That is, a system is in equilibrium when the
sum of the forces on each individual point-mass is zero. It’s not difficult to see why this
understanding of statics, though intuitively simple, is quite problematic in practice. If one
aims to discover the conditions of when some rigid body (e.g. a lever) is in equilibrium, one
needs to be able to calculate the forces on each individual particle in the rod in order to
find the conditions of equilibrium. Lagrange provides a much clearer way of formulating a
system’s equations of equilibrium, based on the principle of virtual work sometimes called
the principle of virtual velocities. Lagrange expresses the principle as follows:
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If an arbitrary system of any number of bodies or mass points, each acted upon by ar-
bitrary forces, is in equilibrium and if an infinitesimal displacement is given to this sys-
tem, in which each mass point traverses an infinitesimal distance which expresses its vir-
tual velocity, then the sum of the forces, each multiplied by the distance that the indi-
vidual mass point traverses in the direction of this force, will always be equal to zero.
Furthermore, the small distances traversed in the direction of the forces are considered
positive and the distances traversed in the opposite direction are considered negative.
[Lagrange, Boissonnade, and Vagliente2010, 23]
The intuitive idea is that a system is in equilibrium when any infinitesimal displacement
of the system in a direction that is consistent with its constraints (e.g. moving a lever up or
down rather than breaking it in half) will be arrested by the other forces in the system. To
grasp some physical idea of what this suggests, consider the fact that if you lightly tap one
side of a balanced scale, the scale will return to its originally balanced state because the other
forces will restore the system to a state of equilibrium. However, the displacements of interest
to Lagrange are not actual displacements but virtual displacements; these displacements are
virtual because they do not occur in time, a fact I will explain momentarily.
To provide a sketch of the difference between the vectorial and Langrangian approaches
to equilibrium problems, it helps to consider an example. A seesaw exemplifies a typical
system considered in the context of constraints: the system of a class one lever and fulcrum.
The seesaw is subject to a variety of macroscopic constraints. The board that lies across the
fulcrum is rigid. A long, flat plank (the lever) is pinned to the fulcrum at the center so it
cannot slide along the horizontal axis. A standard problem in statics asks us to suppose we
place a weight, m1 at some distance l1 from the fulcrum. If we want to balance the seesaw
with a different weight, m2, how far from the fulcrum shall we place the weight?
The vectorial approach tells us the system will be in equilibrium when the sums of the
forces on on each and every point mass composing the lever are equal to zero. In contrast,
the method of virtual work defines the equilibrium state for the seesaw according to the
macroscopic properties of the system. Specifically, if you apply an infinitesimal displacement
(consistent with the constraints of the system) to some part of the lever, work will be done
by the other forces to compensate for this displacement bringing the total work to zero. The
principe of virtual work relies only on the forces applied to the system in order to determine
the state of equilibrium, rather than taking into consideration the forces acting on each
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individual point mass.
For example, suppose Jack and Jill are sitting on this seesaw and we displace Jack ever
so slightly. If the seesaw is in equilibrium, we imagine an equal and opposite displacement
of Jill to occur.
If Jack and Jill are not in equilibrium, then when some infinitesimal displacement occurs
other forces will not compensate and keep the system in equilibrium. Hence, we know that
the system is in equilibrium when the sum of the virtual work for any infinitesimal virtual
displacement is 0. If we want to find the forces that will keep a system in equilibrium, we
look for the forces that, for any virtual displacement, the sum of the virtual work vanishes.
At this point it’s important to discuss what makes the displacements of interest “virtual.”
To explicate this idea, I will rely on the system of the lever discussed in the previous example.
Although I have only considered the approaches to the lever that are provided by vectorial
mechanics and Lagrangian mechanics, it is important to note that the question of how
to balance a lever long pre-dates either of these theories. The law of the lever was first
formulated by Archimedes, who noticed the relationship between the effective force applied to
the lever and the distance from the fulcrum at which the force was applied [Dijksterhuis1956].
The law of the lever states that our seesaw is in balance when the product of Jill’s weight
and distance from the fulcrum is equal to the product of Jack’s weight and distance from
the fulcrum.
m1gl1 = m2gl2. (3.6)
The law of the lever depends on the effective force of turning moments. A moment is a
force with which the lever turns about the fulcrum. Moments are calculated by taking the
product of the magnitude and direction of the force applied to the lever and the distance from
the fulcrum at which the force is applied. In the case of Jill, the force applied to the lever is
the force of her weight. However, the magnitude of the force of her weight depends on the
state of the seesaw. When she is in equilibrium with Jack, the force of her weight (and the
force of Jack’s weight) are applied along the y-axis in the direction of gravity. If the seesaw
moves out of equilibrium, the direction of the force applied by Jill (and, consequently, the
magnitude of the force) will change to reflect Jill’s position on the seesaw. This is because
the force of gravity is reduced when a mass is on an incline, as opposed to parallel with the
41
surface of the earth.
Now what does this have to do with virtual work? Remember, we calculate the virtual
work by looking for the location on the seesaw Jill needs to sit so that the work done to
create any infinitesimal displacement of her will be compensated for by the work done by
Jack’s weight, bringing the sum of the effective forces on the system to zero. Now if we
actually displace Jill ever so slightly, causing the lever to be at an incline, part of the force
of Jill’s weight will be used to keep her pressed against the lever, and the full gravitational
force of Jill’s weight will no longer be applied to keep Jack in balance2. But we are interested
in the point on the seesaw Jill ought to sit at when the full force of her weight is applied in
the direction of gravity. Therefore, we stipulate that the displacement is virtual because we
ignore the loss of force that would be caused by an actual displacement.
In some ways, virtual displacements are similar to extremely isolated experiments — or
the behavior of a system in a vacuum. However, they go beyond physical isolation, and
instead mathematically isolate individual variables — allowing us to change them without
changing other variables which depend on them. Although we can mathematically create
these displacements, such changes in our system could never occur in time simply because
of the complexities introduced by the changes in surrounding forces.
3.2.1 The Principle of Virtual Work
To introduce a rigorous formulation of the principle of virtual work, it is helpful to introduce
the language of vectorial mechanics and assume that the external forces F1, F2, . . . , Fn act
on points of the system specified by P1, P2, . . . , Pn. The virtual displacement of these forces
will be denoted by
δR1, δR2, . . . , δRn (3.7)
.
R1 is the displacement caused by the application of F1 to P1. These displacements
must be consistent with the constraints of the system. The constraints are factored into the
equations of virtual work due to our choice of coordinates. We are able to reduce the number
2I am forever indebted for Mark Wilson for elucidating these principles to me on multiple occasions.
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of coordinates we need to represent our system according to the ways our system is free to
move in terms of the given constraints.
The principle of virtual work states “the given mechanical system will be in equilibrium
if, and only if, the total virtual work of all the impressed forces vanishes [Lanczos1964, 75]:
δW =
∑
Fn · δRn = 0. (3.8)
Translating this into the language of generalized coordinates, it becomes
δW =
∑
Fn · δqn = 0. (3.9)
The general idea is similar to the suggestion from the point-mass setting that a particle is
in equilibrium whenever the forces acting on that particle vanish. However, it generalizes this
equilibrium idea for a single particle to a system of particles. The system is in equilibrium
whenever the forces impressed on the system are equal to zero. Since we know, for example,
that the particles in a rigid rod are already in some kind of internal equilibrium — that is,
we expect the rod to remain rigid and not suddenly break in half — we ignore the smaller
scale behavior of the particles which compose the rod. We can ignore all of the interactions
between the individual point masses that compose the system.
As Lanczos writes,
We now come to the physical interpretation of the principle of virtual work. According to
Newtonian mechanics, the state of equilibrium requires that the resultant force acting on
any particle of the system shall vanish. This resultant force is the sum of the impressed force
and the forces which maintain the given constraints. These latter forces are usually called
the “forces of reaction.” Since the principle of equilibrium requires that “impressed force
plus resultant force of reaction equals zero,” we see that the virtual work of the impressed
forces can be replaced by the negative virtual work of the forces of reaction [Lanczos1964,
76].
.
What Lanczos calls the “forces of reaction” are what we have called the forces of con-
straint. The principle of virtual work tells us that whatever force we impress upon a system
will bring that system into equilibrium when it is equal to and consistent with the forces
caused by the constraints on the system. Reconsider the issue that Wilson suggests with
the bead on a wire. The point-mass formulation of the bead on a wire requires us to posit
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theoretically impossible velocity-sensitive forces that adjust depending on the velocity of the
bead3. Here, however, the forces of reaction are built into the equilibrium conditions as
the “forces of reaction.” They are not taken as determinate forces, but as the forces which
balance out the forces applied to the system.
To summarize, Lagrange supplies a treatment for static systems that resolves the prob-
lems constraint equations pose for vectorial mechanics. Lagrangian mechanics is formulated
in a generalized configuration space, which allows an entire system to be treated as a single
point. The foundation of Lagrange’s treatment of static problems is the principal of virtual
work, which states that a system is in equilibrium when the sum of the work done by the
effective forces on the system is equal to zero. However, this work is only virtual because the
displacements are virtual displacements; any actual displacement to the system would create
a loss of effective force, making the calculations of the equilibrium conditions significantly
more complex.
3.3 A CLASSIFICATION OF STATICS
At this point, I want to take a slight detour and discuss the historical significance of La-
grange’s statics, before moving on to Lagrangian dynamics.
Lagrange did not invent the principle of virtual work — it was originally formulated by
Bernoulli4. Lagrange did not discover the law of the lever — it was uncovered thousands of
years ago by Archimedes. Lagrange did not postulate that a point is in equilibrium when the
sum of its effective forces are equal to zero; this had been rigorously formulated by Newton.
What makes Lagrange’s work so important is his ability to create a unified treatment of
statics: he used the principle of virtual work to unite the previously disparate discoveries in
equilibrium problems such as the law of the lever and the composition of forces by classifying
them as different instances of a single principle.
Scientists already possessed experimental facts about how particular systems are kept in
3The reason why they are theoretically impossible is that such forces violate Newton’s Third Law. For a
clear explication of this problem see [Wilson2012].
4For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the Principle of Virtual Work, see [Capecchi2012].
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equilibrium. They knew the experimental truth of the law of the lever, they knew that a
system was in equilibrium when the sum of effective forces applied to the system was zero,
etc. Additionally, there were a great number of facts about fluids in equilibrium that applied
to specific conditions but could not be unified.
In Analytic Mechanics, Lagrange is able to generalize the principle of work to continuous
bodies simply by exchanging the summation of the virtual work for an integral. Concerning
Lagrange’s work in fluid mechanics, Duhem writes
From this the laws of equilibrium of filaments and flexible membranes take a singular clarity
and generality; but above all it is the study of the equilibrium of liquids which tests the
breadth and penetration of Lagrange’s mechanics [Duhem1980, 30].
For example, scientists had long noticed that when a fluid is at rest, the force it exerts
at any point in any direction has a single magnitude. Pascal was the first to attempt to
bring some rigorous definition to this notion of hydrostatic pressure. Lagrange not only
gave a rigorous treatment of the laws of hydrostatic pressure5, he also managed to unify the
treatment of hydrostatic pressure with the treatment of other problems concerning equilibria.
Hydrostatic pressure is the pressure on a particular section of a fluid when all of its parts
have ceased to flow. Therefore, if you take any cubic section in the fluid, that particular
section has also ceased to flow. We can think of the hydrostatic pressure as the force that
keeps this cube in place. The force is applied to all sides of the cube, as the cube does not
flow in any direction. While mechanicians were aware of the laws of fluid flow for some time,
a rigorous formulation of these laws eluded them prior to Analytical Mechanics.
. . . everything was not clear and rigorous in the theory of the equilibrium of fluids; the
nature of hydrostatic pressure remained quite obscure; it was admitted that this pressure
existed, that it was always normal to the surface element to which it referred, that its
magnitude did not vary when this surface element turned about one of its points; but
of these propositions one had not proof, and even no precise definition of the pressure
[Duhem1980, 31].
As Duhem points out, although mechanicians recognized the existence of hydrostatic
pressure, and were aware of its properties, they were unable to unify this knowledge with their
knowledge of, say, the law of the lever. Lagrange’s amazing feat was to bring these seemingly
5It turns out Lagrange’s work could not actually handle hydrostatic pressure, but Duhem (reasonably)
thought it did. The confusion has to do with the proper understanding of infinitesimals.
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distinct areas of experimental knowledge together under a unified, rigorous mathematical
principle.
Here we see the beginnings of Duhem’s distinction between an explanation and a natural
classification. Lagrange’s mechanics do not provide us with some “behind the veil” descrip-
tion of the behavior of bodies “in themselves.” Nor do they provide us with information
about the “essence” of bodies or the “essential structure” of a fluid or a rod. In fact, it
intentionally disregards the microstructure of the systems in order to focus instead on the
role played by effective force. However, this ignorance allows Lagrange to unify and classify
multiple areas of scientific research beneath a single principle.
Not only did Lagrange introduce a way to classify disparate experimental laws, he also
provided a unified method for the treatment of equilibrium problems. Lagrange describes
this aspect of his work in Analytical Mechanics.
The authors who have written on the Principle of Virtual Velocities in the past have con-
centrated on proving the veracity of this principle by demonstrating the congruity between
solutions obtained using this principle with those obtained from the ordinary principles
of statics rather than to demonstrate its application to solve directly the problems of this
science. We propose to fill this latter task with all possible generality and to deduce from
this principle analytical formulas which contain the solution of all the problems of the
equilibrium of bodies [Lagrange, Boissonnade, and Vagliente2010, 60].
Lagrange was not satisfied with showing that the principal of virtual work was often
equivalent to alternative methods used to derive the equilibrium conditions of varied systems;
instead he develops a method for deriving the equations of equilibrium for any system directly
from the general principle of virtual work. He refers to this technique as the “Method of
Multipliers,” and these multipliers have since become known as Lagrange Multipliers.
Lagrange’s method of multipliers relies on the basic principles of calculus of variations
— a branch of mathematics to which Lagrange was a significant contributor. The calculus
of variations deals with minimizing and maximizing specific functions and their constraints.
For example, suppose we want to find the lowest point of a well. What do we know about
this point? Imagine two marbles: one is sitting at the lowest point in the well, and the
other positioned halfway down one side of the well. One major difference between these two
marbles pertains to the regions surrounding their location. If we slightly displace the marble
sliding down one side of the well in a direction consistent with the constraints of motion,
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we know the marble will either move to a higher location or a lower location. By constrast,
consider the tiniest displacement of the marble resting at the lowest point. If we think of
the well as being “continuous,” then the height of the marble will not increase or decrease.
The bottom of the well is flat.
Translating this into the language of mathematics, the well is a well-defined, continuous
curve such as f(x) = x2. Think of our lowest-point-marble. We discovered that when
our marble is infinitesimally displaced, the rate of change (with respect to height) that it
experiences is zero. The same would be true, say, if our marble were at the top of a mountain.
Therefore, if we want to find the minima or maxima of our function, we should look for the
points where the rate of change of our function is equal to zero. To do this we set derivative of
our function, f ′(x) = 2x, to zero, and solve. It turns out that the only stationary point of our
function is (0,0). Next, we need to determine if this point is actually a maxima, a minima,
or a saddle point. A saddle point is a point where the maxima of one curve intersects with
the minima of another curve, similar to what is displayed at the center of a saddle. In order
to test and see if a stationary point is a saddle point, we take the second derivative of the
function and run a secondary test. This second test tells us about the rate of change of the
rate of change. If it is consistently increasing or consistently decreasing we have discovered a
true extremum point. If the second derivative increases in some directions and decreases in
others, we have discovered a saddle point. However, in problems of mechanics, rarely does
it matter if a point is an actual minima or maxima:6 our primary interest is in stationary
states.
Let’s reconsider these “tiny” displacements of our marble, referred to as “explorations of
the infinitesimal neighborhood of a point” [Lanczos1964, 38]. Such explorations are called
variations, and the principles that depend on them are variational principles (e.g. the
principle of virtual work). The variations are infinitesimal displacements — displacements
that are so small they cannot be measured, but are not equal to zero. One example of an
infinitesimal displacement is the variation of Jill on the seesaw. Another common use of
infinitesimals in calculus are the ds used to denote the width of the tiny rectangles that
divide the area under a curve. However, the infinitesimals represented by the d-process in
6Except when looking for the stability of equilibria.
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calculus are thought of as actual divisions of the area, while the displacements considered
in variational principles are virtual displacements — mathematical experiments. We can
hypothesize such displacements according to the laws of mathematics, but they are often
physically impossible. Lagrange focused on the virtual character of these displacements, and
was the first to create a unique symbol to denote the process of variation: the symbol δ.
Now we can be a bit more rigorous in defining Lagrange’s method of multipliers 7.
Suppose we begin with a continuous, differentiable function of arbitrary variables
F = F (u1, u2, . . . , un) (3.10)
and apply infinitesimal displacements to each coordinate of F. The transformed coordinates
become
δu1, δu2, . . . , δun (3.11)











Equation (12) is known as the “first variation” of our function. In order to operate with
finite quantities, we can introduce  as a parameter that approaches zero and then let
δu1 = a1, δu2 = a2, . . . , δun = an (3.13)
where an corresponds to the direction cosine of the virtual direction each parameter was













If F has a stationary value, then the sum of the first variations for any arbitrary dis-





ak = 0. (3.15)
7The derivation of the multiplier method follows Lanczos [Lanczos1964, 39-42].
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Here ak is an index of all the possible directions in which we might evoke a virtual
displacement. However, because the displacements are virtual, they are arbitrary, and we
can invoke them in whichever direction we wish. Therefore
∂F
∂uk
= 0, (k = 1, 2, . . . , n). (3.16)
To summarize, if a function F of n variables has a stationary value at some point, P, it
follows that the partial derivatives of F with respect to each of the n variables will vanish at
P.
The variation that we have just discussed is called a “free variation,” because it describes
how a system behaves without constraints. But suppose we evaluate the variation of the
function
F = F (u1, u2, . . . , un) (3.17)
along with some constraint
f(u1, u2, . . . , un) = 0 (3.18)
.
The intuitive idea is that at least one of our uk is constrained in such a way that it cannot
be displaced. Although we can handle this by trying to get rid of the constrained variable,
that is, rewrite it in terms of the other variables, that procedure can become difficult when
multiple constraints are in place. This is where Lagrange’s method of multipliers shows its







δu2 + . . .+
∂f
∂un
δun = 0. (3.19)







δu2 + . . .+
∂F
∂un
δun = 0. (3.20)
We know that in the case where the variables in F are independent, ∂F
∂uk
vanishes; however,
the constraint equation makes the variables dependent on one another. Lagrange’s idea was
to introduce a multiplier of some undetermined factor, λ, to δf and then add it to δF .
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Because we have set δf = 0 in (19), multiplying δf by λ and adding then adding it to δF















δu2 + . . .+
∂f
∂un
δun) = 0 (3.21)
On the one hand, we have added 0 to 0 — a rather trivial move. On the other hand, the
move is not at all trivial because we have added a sum. Just because the sum is equal to
zero does not mean that each individual term equals zero. In fact — we know there is some
term that does not equal zero, the term we have constrained.









)δuk = 0 (3.22)
Remember, there is some term we want to eliminate: the term that is constrained. Let’s
name this term un. We can choose λ to be the factor such that it causes our problematic








We can now treat our problem as a free variation with one less term. For all of our other
terms, we know that the coefficient of each δuk will vanish, so multiplying it by λ will not
effect the overall sum.
I have here shown how Lagrange multipliers work for a problem with a single constraint,
but the method can be generalized to handle an arbitrary number of constraints. This dis-
plays the further power of Lagrange’s mechanics. Not only did Lagrange develop a principle
which unified and classified experimental laws, he developed a systematic way of solving
problems that involve variational principles. By showing that the equations for any equi-
librium problem can be derived from a variational principle, he managed to unify in both
principle and practice the whole of statics.
It is helpful to pause for a moment and consider just how different the structure of
Lagrange’s mechanics is from the dynamic laws picture and the vectorial approach to equi-
librium. Lagrange provides us with a general principle from which we can derive some
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equations that need to be solved, along with an algebraic method for handling the con-
straint equations. What he does not tell us is anything about the nature of matter itself. He
relies on generalized coordinates and a generalized notion of force — none of which need to
correspond to the “essential properties” of matter. In contrast, the point-mass formulation
suggests we ought to understand equilibrium from the bottom up: a system is in equilibrium
when each individual point mass is in equilibrium. There is no talk of a general, unifying
principle; instead the point-mass setting focuses on “fundamental bits of matter” and the
“laws” that apply to them.
Lagrange does not give us a dynamic law of nature so much as he provides a principle.
A principle is a general, fundamental truth from which an experimental law can be derived.
These principles allow us to unify our theory, and even tell us something about how the
world is classified, but they don’t reveal the sort of information appropriate for admission
into an ideal DN text.
The difference in structure between the use of variational principles and the point mass
setting will continue to crystallize as we turn to consider Lagrange’s approach to dynamics.
3.4 LAGRANGE’S DYNAMICS AND D’ALEMBERT’S PRINCIPLE
While statics is the treatment of systems in equilibrium, dynamics is the study of objects
in motion. One of the most famous laws of classical dynamics is Newton’s second law of
motion
F = ma. (3.24)
The mathematician and philosopher d’Alembert uncovered a way to unite this equation and
the principle of virtual work. The first step in d’Alembert’s reasoning was to point out that
Newton’s second law is equivalent to
F −ma = 0. (3.25)
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Next he substituted ma with something he called the force of inertia, I. Given that we
define I as a force vector equal to −ma, it follows that
F + I = 0 (3.26)
.
While this appears to be a trivial variable substitution of Newton’s second law, what
makes d’Alembert’s discovery a work of genius is that it allows us to treat dynamic problems
as a special class of equilibrium problems. If we treat −ma as an effective force, even a system
in motion maintains a type of “equilibrium” — the sum of the work done by the “effective
forces” is equal to zero. Concerning this discovery, Lanczos writes
Apparently nothing is gained, since the intermediate step gives merely a new name to the
negative product of mass times acceleration. It is exactly this apparent triviality which
makes d’Alembert’s principle such an ingenious invention and at the same time so open to
distortion and misunderstanding.
The importance of the equation [3.26] lies in the fact that it is more than a reformulation
of Newton’s equation. It is the expression of a principle. We know that the vanishing of
a force in Newtonian mechanics means equilibrium. Hence, the equation [3.26] says that
the addition of the force of inertial to the other acting forces produces equilibrium. But
this means that if we have any criterion for the equilibrium of a mechanical system, we can
immediately extend that criterion to a system which is in motion. All we have to do is to
add the new “force of intertia” to the precious forces. By this device dynamics is reduced
to statics [Lanczos1964, 89].
As Lanczos points out, by treating −ma as an effective force, the general principle
behind the equations of dynamics now bears a strong resemblance to the principle behind
the equations of statics. We are able to extend the criteria we have developed for equilibria
problems to the problems of motion. To determine the path of motion that a particle is
going to follow, find the path where the sum of the work done by the “effective forces” on
the particle (including the force of inertia, I) is equal to zero. Moreover, because Lagrange
had developed a rigorous, unified, algebraic treatment of equilibria problems by means of the
method of multipliers, these techniques could further be used on the problems of dynamics.
D’Alembert’s insight that −ma can be treated as an effective force, and that even the
problems of dynamics can be treated as problems of statics, led Lagrange to develop the
following formulation of d’Alembert’s principle:∑
(Fi −miai) · δri = 0 (3.27)
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When we compare this equation to equation (8), it is clear that d’Alembert’s principle just
is a special application of the principle of virtual work in the case of dynamics. Instead of
summing only the effective forces, we also subtract from the forces ma, or, in d’Alembert’s
terms, we add the intertial force −ma. Because d’Alembert showed that even systems in
motion can be thought of as instantiating a special kind of equilibria, the rigorous analysis
Lagrange developed for the treatment of statics can be extended to dynamics.
The “distortion and misunderstanding” to which Lanczos refers has to do with the way
d’Alembert’s principle is used to generate the equations of motion. First, it should be
clear that d’Alembert’s principle isn’t used to solve the equations of motion, but to provide
differential equations which also must be solved to discover the actual motion of a system.
D’Alembert’s principle is not itself the equation of motion for a system, but merely a principle
by which we can generate the equations of motion for a system. D’Alembert’s principle
provides us with a way to use the general principle of statics to derive the equations of
motion for a variety of systems.
This does not mean we can actually solve a dynamical problem by statical methods. The
resulting equations are differential equations which have to be solved. We have merely
deduced these differential equations by statical considerations. The addition of the force of
inertia I to the acting force F changes the problem of motion to a problem of equilibrium
[Lanczos1964, 89].
One application of d’Alembert’s principle that Lanczos explores is the conservation of
energy. The conservation of energy can be derived as a special consequence of d’Alembert’s
law. To do this, Lanczos begins by expressing d’Alembert’s principle as
N∑
k=1
(Fk −mkAk) · δRk = 0 (3.28)
where A is the acceleration and R is the displacement. If we assume that the effective forces
can be derived from the potential energy function, then the work of these forces will be




mkAk · δRk = 0 (3.29)
Because we can treat the work of the effective forces as variations in the potential energy, the
only work which remains to be considered is the work done by the inertial force. Therefore, if
53
we combine the virtual work done by the potential energy with the work done by the inertial
force (as is the case in equation (3.29)), the sum of the total virtual work is zero.
Remember δ denotes an arbitrary virtual displacement of some quantity which is consis-
tent with the system’s constraints. Now, we can consider a special case of equation (3.29)
where we let these arbitrary displacements be equal to actual displacements occurring during
the interval dt so that
δRk = dRk. (3.30)
Because we are now considering a special application of equation (3.29) where the vir-
tual displacements coincide with actual displacements over an infinitesimal time interval, it
follows that the virtual change δV of the potential energy will also coincide with the actual
displacement dV that occurs during dt. We can then replace the acceleration Ak with the
second derivative of Rk, so that∑
mkR¨k · dRk =
∑

















k = T. (3.32)
T is the kinetic energy of the system. Therefore, in this special case where we set the virtual
displacements to the actual displacements, equation (3.29) becomes
dV + dT = d(V + T ) = 0 (3.33)
which when integrated yields the equation
T + V = constant = E.8 (3.34)
As this example reveals, d’Alembert’s principle is not a method for solving the equations
of mechanics but instead for deriving them. Special cases of the principle can help yield
the basic laws of mechanics such as the conservation of mechanical energy. D’Alembert’s
principle is a principle — it is certainly not the kind of metaphysical law which can be fit
into a DN explanation.
8This derivation follows Lanczos pp. 94-96.
54
Recall that dynamic laws strategies expect the most basic laws in a theory to be the
laws which describe how individual objects evolve over time. But Lagrange describes the
laws of mechanics in a completely different form. Rather than stipulate dynamic laws for
the individual particles in our theory, analytical mechanics looks at the entire path traveled
and determines which way a particle will go. This way of describing a system’s trajectory
is not based in dynamic laws, but instead, these dynamic laws can be derived from general,
classificatory principles.
Lagrange’s mechanics allows us to classify numerous equations of mechanics that, prior
to classification by a principle, appear distinct. For example, not only the conservation of
energy but also the action of apparent forces (such as rotational forces) and Gauss’s principle
of least constraint can be shown to be consequences of d’Alembert’s principle.
As Duhem writes
The invention of this general principle, devoted to putting into equations all the problems
of Dynamics, was the object of long and powerful efforts, of which Lagrange has retraced
for us the history; these efforts resulted in the discovery of d’Alembert’s principle . . .
D’Alembert’s Principle reduced the reduction of equations of any problem of Dynamics to
the reduction to equations of any problem in Statics . . .
All the essential ideas introduced by Lagrange in the study of Statics were thus taken
over into the study of Dynamics, and their fertility was thereby increased immensely
[Duhem1980, 32-33].
Duhem highly praised the Lagrange’s use of d’Alembert’s principle; he saw it as a primary
example of the success of science. Many students of science, however, find it needlessly
confusing to claim that we can treat bodies in motion as if they were in equilibrium. Lanczos
points out that our ability to use the methods of statics for the the treatment of dynamic
systems is intrinsically linked to the notion of a virtual displacement.
The criterion for the equilibrium of an arbitrary system of forces is that the total virtual
work of all forces vanishes. This criterion involves virtual, not actual displacements, and
is thus equally applicable to masses at rest and to masses in motion. Since the virtual
displacement involves a possible, but purely mathematical experiment, it can be applied
at a certain definite time (even if such a displacement would involve physically infinite
velocities). At that instant the actual motion of the body does not enter into account
[Lanczos1964, 89-90].
Virtual displacements do not (and could not) occur in time. Because the idea of a virtual
displacement involves a static framing of the system, the actual motion of the body and the
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dynamical change of the effective forces do not interfere with the virtual displacements.
These displacements happen outside of time, so to speak, so the actual motion of the body
is irrelevant. Instead the inertial force is considered to be the resistance of the body to the
effective forces applied to it.
3.5 THE ROLE OF LAGRANGE
Another important aspect of Lagrange’s mechanics is its algebraic nature. As Lagrange
points out in his introduction to Analytical Mechanics:
The reader will find no figures in the work. The methods which I set forth do not require
either constructions or geometrical or mechanical reasonings: but only algebraic operations,
subject to a regular and uniform rule of procedure.
In Analytical Mechanics. Lagrange was able to combine contributions to mechanics by
his predecessors and contemporaries, such as Bernoulli, Euler, Newton and d’Alembert, into
a unified, systematic, algebraic way of solving the majority of problems in mechanics. Duhem
quotes Fourier’s praises of Lagrange for being able to achieve such simplicity and unity in
his work.
“Lagrange,” said Fourier, “was born to invent and enlarge all the sciences of calculation
. . . The distinctive feature of his genius consisted in the unity and breadth of his vision. In
everything he applied himself to simple thought, correct and very deep. His principal work,
Mecanique analytique, could be called Mecanique philsophique, for it reduced all the laws of
equilibrium and motion to a single principle; and what is no less admirable, he submited to
them a single method of calculation of which he, himself, was the inventor.” [Duhem1980,
23]
Lagrange’s formulation of mechanics allows a deep unification of the discipline, and is in
many ways more fundamental to classical mechanics than the point-mass approach. However,
it fails to reveal any special information about the nature of matter or the microlevel behavior
of atoms. Instead it arranges scientific theory from the top down — using a principle to derive
and classify the various experimental laws of mechanics.
To summarize, d’Alembert’s insight was that the quantity, −ma, can be treated as an ef-
fective force, and by doing so one could transform the problems of dynamics into the problems
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of statics. Lagrange managed to unify the treatments of statics and dynamics by extending
the principal of virtual work to dynamic systems with his formulation of d’Alembert’s prin-
ciple. Because virtual displacements are time-independent, the actual motion of the body
does not effect their applicability. His work is unique because it brought together seemingly
disparate areas of research into a unified, rigorous, algebraic treatment.
3.6 THE NEW MECHANICS: ENERGETICS
In the previous section, I have introduced the reader to the content of Lagrange’s mechanics
and some aspects of its historical development. As I mentioned previously, much of Duhem’s
work (both philosophical and scientific) was influenced by his perception of the significance
of Lagrange’s treatise. In this section, I will explicate Duhem’s supposition that a final,
unified scientific theory, in the form of Energetics, would in many ways mimic the structure
of Lagrange’s theory of classical mechanics.
3.6.1 Virtual Modifications
At the heart of Lagrange’s unified approach to mechanics lies the principle of virtual veloci-
ties, now known as the principle of virtual work. The intuitive idea, as expressed previously,
is that a system is in equilibrium when the virtual work vanishes. That is, whenever in-
finitesimal modifications to the system — which are consistent with the system’s constraints
— balance each other out, the system is in equilibrium.
Duhem suspects that Lagrange’s work in Analytical Mechanics only begins to tap the
potential held by the principle of virtual work. The heart of Duhem’s project of energetics,
which he refers to in Evolution of Mechanics as “the New Mechanics,” is the concept of a
virtual modification — a generalized conception of virtual work. A virtual modification is
an unrealizable, infinitesimal displacement of some quantity in a system. One of the most
precise formulations Duhem gives of how a virtual modification works is provided in his
Commentary on the Principles of Thermodynamics.
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He begins by stipulating that a system is composed of two different collections of magni-
tudes. One set of magnitudes, which he refers to as the “nature” of the system, and denotes
with capital sentence letters ‘A, B, . . . L’, are magnitudes which do not vary as the system
varies. These are to represent the unchanged properties of a system (e.g. the mass of a
system remains fixed while it changes position). In contrast to these fixed magnitudes, we
have magnitudes which define what Duhem calls the state of a system. The magnitudes
used to describe the state of a system are denoted by α, β . . . λ. We can imagine that the
magnitudes which represent the state of the system are independent — that is, the value of
one does not influence the value of another. Moreover, we can suppose each variable can be
increased or decreased continuously.
Regarding the notion of a virtual modification, Duhem writes
Let us therefore imagine a continuous series of different states of the system, that is to say,
a continuous series of groups of values of the quantities α, β, . . . λ. Let us successively fix
our attention on these various states, in an order which allows continuous passage from one
state to another. By designating this a purely intellectual operation, we are saying that we
impose a virtual change on the system [Duhem2011, 41].
One example of a virtual modification is a virtual displacement used in virtual work. In
the seesaw example, some magnitudes (e.g. Jill’s wait) are held fixed, while other magnitudes
(e.g. Jill’s position) are allowed to “vary in a continuous manner.” In the case of Jill, this
variation is an infinitesimal displacement in some direction consistent with constraints. This
change is “virtual” because we could not actually change Jill’s position without also changing
the force due to her weight.
Duhem considers another example, which involves the ideal gas law
PV = nRT, (3.35)
where P is the pressure, V is the volume, n is the number of moles of the given gas, R is the
ideal gas constant and T is the temperature. Both R and n remain constant for any particular
system by definition, but the pressure, volume, and temperature can vary. Duhem considers
this to be a mathematical property of the system. Our mathematical representation of an
ideal gas allows us to vary the volume from 0 to +∞, despite our inability to physically vary
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the temperature of any system over such a wide range. These mathematical experiments are
what Duhem refers to as “purely intellectual operations.” Duhem goes on to say,
All changes realisable by a system correspond to the variations of the quantities α, β, . . . λ
compatible with the definitions of these quantities. The sequence of states through which
the system passes therefore constitutes a virtual change of the system.
Conversely, can a virtual change always be regarded of the sequence of states that a system
traverses during a real change? Remember that the variables α, β, . . . , λ which can, by
their definitions, take arbitrary values, maybe be connected to one another by physical
laws, it can be seen that a virtual change maybe be compatible with the definitions of the
variables appropriate for representing the various states of the system but conflict with
certain physical laws, and, consequently, not be physically realisable [Duhem2011, 41].
Even though our mathematical representation permits us to vary the values of the tem-
perature, volume, and pressure in an unrestricted fashion, this freedom may not fully transfer
to physical variations of these quantities due to interference from other physical laws and
restrictions. For example, as was previously discussed in the case of virtual work, if we
actually displace Jill ever so slightly it will change the quantity of the effective force due to
gravity and so the displacements we consider in virtual work cannot be actualized. In the
same manner, many virtual modifications are not realizable. Duhem further discusses this
in Evolution of Mechanics.
J. Willard Gibbs has studied theoretically the dissociation of a perfect gaseous composition
into its elements, each regarded as a perfect gas. A formula has been obtained that expresses
the law of chemical equilibrium within the body of such a system. I propose to discuss this
formula. To this end, leaving unchanged the pressure that suports the gaseous mixture, I
consider the absolute temperature that appears in the formula, and I make it vary from 0
to +∞.
If to this mathematical operation one wishes to attribute a physical meaning one is pre-
sented with a veritable mob of objections and difficulties. No thermometer can be made to
recognise temperatures below a certain limit, none can determine sufficiently high temper-
atures; this symbol which we have called absolute temperature cannot, by the measuring
processes at our disposal, be translated into something that has a concrete meaning, un-
less its numerical values stays between a certain minimum and a certain maximum only
[Duhem1980, 113].
In formulating the law for ideal gasses, the mathematical reasoning used allows us to
vary the temperature independently of consideration of other physical constraints. That
is, we can represent the temperature as an independent variable, capable of taking on any
value between 0 to +∞. Not only is this implausible because of other physical laws that are
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not taken into account, as was mentioned previously, but it is difficult for us to even give a
physical definition of temperature above or below a certain range. While our mathematical
formalism allows us to vary the temperature indiscriminately, it is not clear what this even
means in terms of an actual modification. It’s true that I can heat up water on the stove and
increase its temperature, but what does it mean to increase the temperature of the water to
infinity?
However, Duhem does not think these questions are actually problematic for a scientific
theory because we assume the modifications are a virtual, mathematical experiment in the
same way we imagine the modifications in Lagrange’s mechanics to be virtual displacements.
What this means for Duhem’s take on realism I will discuss in the next chapter. Here I merely
want to explain what a virtual modification is, and highlight its importance in Duhem’s New
Mechanics.
As we see in the case of classical mechanics, sometimes these quantities are restricted
(mathematically) by constraint conditions such as inequalities. Therefore, even if the tem-
perature is normally allowed to vary, we can add an equation to our representation that fixes
the temperature at a constant value, or limits its variations to a small range. As was the case
in Lagrange’s mechanics, virtual modifications must be consistent with these constraints.
To create a virtual modification is
To impress upon the variable quantities that characterise the state of a system some in-
finitesimal alterations allowed by the constraints is to impose upon the material system a
virtual modification [Duhem1980].
Duhem’s generalized notion of a virtual modification is that it is an infinitesimal dis-
placement in one of the variable quantities of a representation of a system that is consistent
with the system’s mathematical constraints. Again, such a modification can (and almost
always does) ignore some actual physical constraints such as we saw in the displacement of
Jill on the seesaw, but these are not the same as constraint forces. Virtual modifications
help us deal with constraint forces, but they are virtual because they ignore physical changes
that effect the system when it evolves through time.
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3.6.2 The Structure of Energetics
Virtual modifications are at the core of Duhem’s reformulation of physical theory. As he
writes,
The notion of virtual modification was at the root of the Mechanics of Lagrange as it
is at the base of the New Mechanics, but how more general it is in the latter than in
the former! The only virtual alterations that were known to the Mechanics of Lagrange
were the alterations of shape and position of the various parts of the system; many other
alterations are considered by the New Mechanics [Duhem1980, 116].
Lagrange’s demonstrated that the whole of statics (and eventually dynamics) can be
derived from variational principles, based on virtual modifications. Duhem claims that the
same structure applies to the New Mechanics. The theory will be built upon a general vari-
ational principles which depend on virtual modifications of the various qualities associated
with matter. However, rather than make the foundational principle of the New Mechan-
ics the principle of virtual work, Duhem claims all of the New Mechanics is rooted in the
principle of the conservation of energy.
In an explicit comparison of the development of the New Mechanics to the growth of a
tree, Duhem claims that trunk from which all of the New Mechanics grows is the principle
of the conservation of energy. Different branches of science arise from the trunk of the tree.
The first that he considers is the theory of thermodynamics, or what he often refers to as
the theory of reversible modifications.
In his discussion of reversible modifications, Duhem considers the work of Gibbs in
thermodynamics.
The fundamental principle of the New Statics is therefore presented exactly in the form
that Lagrange gave to the principle of the Old Statics; the quantity whose existence has
been revealed to us by the axioms of Thermodynamics plays in the former the role that the
potential of the internal forces played in the latter; from this there comes the name of In-
ternal Thermodynamical Potential which we have attributed to this quantity [Duhem1980,
135].
The “potential of the internal forces” in Lagrange’s statics is what we have previously
called the “forces of reaction.” Remember, the sum of the internal forces are equal to the
sum of the impressed forces for any system in equilibrium. Duhem asserts that the same
general idea is true for thermodynamic equilibrium; however, instead of focusing on the sum
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of the forces we focus on the sum energy exchanged. The internal energy must be equal
to the impressed energy in order for the system to be in equilibrium. Duhem introduces
the term “Internal Thermodynamic Potential” to refer to what Gibbs called fundamental
functions.
The New Mechanics divides into four different branches: reversible processes, frictional
systems, permanent alterations and electric currents. Each of these branches also fork into
branches for statics and dynamics. This is Duhem’s picture of energetics, a theory he takes
to converge on a natural classification.
Beside the principal trunk of Thermodynamics, besides the Mechanics of systems without
friction or hysteresis [systems who converge on reversible modifications], we have seen rise
up two other stems, still young and the development of which is a very long way from
being accomplished: the Mechanics of frictional systems and the Mechanics of systems
with hysteresis. These two stems are not distinguished, first of all, from the principal
trunk; up to a certain height they remain knit together, identical with it. All that which
precedes the use of this notion, all that appeals to the principle of the Conservation of
Energy alone is common to the three mechanics.
Issued from the same roots, a fourth stem arises, born a long time ago and robust already;
it treats the Mechanics of the electric currents . . . [Duhem1980, 178].
Although Duhem only presents four branches of mechanics, he is open to the idea that
someday a new branch might arise. He thinks New Mechanics provides space for this — it
is not, as it stands, the ultimate and final physical theory. It merely provides a structure
within which science can continue to flourish.
To summarize, Duhem thought the New Mechanics would classify all of physical theory
in a structure quite similar to the structure Lagrange provided for classical mechanics. The
New Mechanics, often referred to by other scholars as Energetics, would have its roots in the
variational principle of the conservation of energy. The different branches of science are all
to be seen as the study of different means of energy transformations.
3.7 CONCLUSION
Dynamic laws strategists, such as Railton, Salmon, and Dowe, presuppose that science ad-
vances by providing us with laws that describe the time evolutions of objects in a set domain.
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Duhem provides us with an interesting counterexample to this approach to theory building
in his discussion of Lagrangian mechanics.
Lagrange manages to describe Newtonian laws of motion by appealing to macroscopic
rather than microscopic entities. Additionally, the principles at the heart of Lagrange’s
theory are general mathematical principles rather than dynamic laws. These principles make
use of virtual modifications — mathematical experiments which cannot be realized in the
natural world. Nevertheless, these mathematical experiments allow us to rigorously fix the
context of a system in such a way that we can ignore the problematic influence of friction.
In the next chapter, I explore the role virtual modifications play in the foundations of
thermodynamics, focusing on the discovery of entropy through the Carnot cycle.
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4.0 THE CARNOT CYCLE
4.1 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THERMODYNAMICS
Thermodynamics is a scientific theory about exchanges of heat and work. Using only a few
macroscopic parameters (pressure, temperature, and volume), thermodynamics is able to
describe stable behaviors of a wide variety of physical systems independent of the microscopic
composition of these systems. For example, there are certain relationships between the
temperature of a system and its pressure that are quite independent of the atomic make-up
of the system — these relationships persist in a variety of different materials which vary in
their microstructure.
Despite its deceptive name, Thermodynamics is not a dynamic theory. It does not
contain dynamic laws, because the only well-defined states in classical thermodynamics are
equilibrium states. Equilibrium states are states where the thermodynamic properties of the
system are at rest; we consider a system to be in equilibrium when none of it’s thermodynamic
properties are changing. For example, suppose we put a few ice cubes in a glass of water
that is at room temperature. The temperature of the water will be in flux while the ice
cubes melt: therefore, the system is not in equilibrium. However, temperature of the water
will eventually cease changing, the pressure and the volume will also remain the same, and
the system will be in a state of equilibrium.
In thermodynamics, the system is not well-defined while it is trying to reach equilibrium
(e.g. when the ice is melting), but can only be properly defined when these macroscopic
parameters have a definite value. For this reason, the configuration space of thermodynamics
contains only equilibrium states. This raises a problem for certain conceptions of scientific
theory, such as the one held by dynamic laws strategists. For example, as you may recall,
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causal process theorists argue that “processes” are basic to scientific theory. These processes
are the continuous paths of systems. However, thermodynamic theory does not tell the story
of the continuous evolutions of thermal systems. Instead, it describes quasi-static processes.
To understand both the configuration space of thermodynamics and quasi-static pro-
cesses, it helps to consider an example. Suppose we are interested in how ice melts when we
add it to a cup of water. Now, if we add two large ice cubes, it will take some time for the ice
cubes to melt. Because we can only define the state of the system when it is in equilibrium,
it seems like we will have no information about what happens to the system while the ice
melts. But suppose, rather than adding two large ice cubes, we add several small ice cubes
one at a time. We can then measure and define the state of the system when each ice cube
has melted. Now suppose that the ice cubes are infinitesimally small — and after each one
melts we measure the thermodynamic parameters of the system. This would create a series
of equilibrium states that seem to approximate a continuous process. We can assume that a
dense series of these states will approximate the actual process the water goes through when
the large ice cubes melt.
Every process described in thermodynamics is such a series of equilibrium states. Of
course, this is metaphysically problematic because an equilibrium state is (by definition)
a state where the system ceases to change. This means that if the system ever entered
into a state of equilibrium it would stay there: it cannot continuously traverse a series of
equilibrium states. Moreover, our system “jumps” from one state of equilibrium to another
and thermodynamics gives us no information about how it behaves in between these jumps.
One classic textbook describes quasi-static processes as follows:
A quasi-static process is thus defined in terms of a dense succession of equilibrium states. It
is to be stressed that a quasi-static process therefore is an idealized concept, quite distinct
from a real physical process, for a real process always involves nonequlibrium intermediate
states having no representation in the thermodynamic configuration space [Callen1985, 96].
This idealization involved in a quasi-static processes is often smoothed over by assuming
such processes proceed infinitely slowly — or, in our example, that each ice cube is infinitely
small — so that each change in the system is so minimal, it’s as if the system remains in
equilibrium throughout the process. Another example of such a process is the isothermal
expansion of an ideal gas contained in a cylinder. Suppose such a cylinder is in an infinite heat
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bath, so that the temperature of the gas remains fixed (even though, under normal conditions,
the temperature decreases when the gas expands). Now, suppose our gas is compressed by
a piston that covers the cylinder. In order for this process to be quasi-static, we suppose
that increment the piston moves is infinitesimally small and that the gas immediately moves
from one equilibrium state to the next. Because such changes are infinitesimally small, it
will take an infinite amount of time for the gas to expand a measurable amount. Moreover,
when a gas actually expands in the natural world, it surely does not pass through this series
of equilibrium states (for if it entered into one of these states its thermodynamic properties
would cease changing).
There are several prima facie reasons to believe that classical thermodynamics is an im-
poverished theory. It doesn’t tell us anything about the microstructure of thermal systems,
it relies on only a few, basic, observable quantities, the only definable states of the system are
equilibrium states, and the processes it describes are unrealizable. Nevertheless, thermody-
namics manages to describe an impressive number of constraints that effect the behavior of
a wide range of distinct systems — it seems to latch on to the world, and actual regularities
in the world — in a rather robust way. One of the clearest ways in which thermodynamics
provides us with novel, important information about the structure of the natural world is
apparent when considering the discovery of entropy.
4.2 THE DISCOVERY OF ENTROPY
While the full history of entropy is too delicate and detailed to flesh out here1, the basic
idea is that entropy is a quantity developed to explain the loss of energy observed in heat
engines. In the seventeenth century, several engineers noticed that steam has motive power
— it is able to power the mechanical motions of machines. The earliest steam engines
were incredibly inefficient, able to do only a little mechanical work for any given amount
of heat. James Watt noticed that much of this wastefulness was due to steam lost to
condensation. By minimizing the condensation, Watt was able to increase the efficiency
1For an excellent discussion of the history of entropy see [Uffink2001].
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of heat engines significantly [Mu¨ller2007, 48]. The trend of building increasingly efficient
heat engines continued. Attempts to make machines more efficient were works of engineering
genius, but did not reflect an increased understanding of the nature of heat. These discoveries
did depend on the discovery of a complex, behind the veil picture of heat transfers. As Ingo
Mu¨ller writes,
None of the engineers who invented or improved the steam engine or the air engine was
in any way distracted by any soul-searching about the nature of heat, or whether or not
there was a caloric. They proved that heat could produce work by doing it, and doing it
better and better as time went on [Mu¨ller2007, 51].
The drive of engineers to produce increasingly efficient heat engines culminated in the work
of Sadi Carnot. Carnot wondered about the limits of heat engine efficiency. He decided
to approach the problem of engine efficiency from the perspective of mathematics rather
than applied engineering. Recognizing that any actual steam engine would lose heat due
to frictional forces and complications such as vaporization, he constructed an idealized heat
engine, called a Carnot engine, which is not subject to such effects. The cycle the Carnot
engine undergoes is called a Carnot cycle.
A Carnot cycle is traversed by an imaginary system (such as a piston and cylinder filled
with fluid) that is heated and cooled. The cycle is composed of four stages. In the first
stage, the system is placed in a heat bath where the volume of the system increases while
the temperature of the substance remains fixed. Eventually the system is removed from the
heat bath. The volume of the system continues to expand, only now the temperature of the
system decreases because it can no longer absorb heat from the heat bath.
The temperature continues to decrease until it reaches the temperature of a second,
cooler, heat-bath known as the refrigerator. When the system reaches this lower temperature,
it is placed in the refrigerator. The volume of the system decreases while the temperature
is fixed at the cooler temperature. Then the system is removed from the refrigerator and
the volume continues to decrease until the system is restored to it’s initial volume and
temperature. Because the system begins and ends in the same state, we call this process a
cycle.
Although this description of the Carnot cycle sounds like a dynamical model of a sys-
tem evolving through time, it is actually represented across a dense sequence of equilibrium
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Figure 3: Pressure-volume diagram for a Carnot cycle.
states. Remember, the configuration space used to describe processes such as the Carnot
cycle consists of only equilibrium states. In effect, Carnot thinks of his machine’s shifting
conditions in the quasi-statical manner that we approached the pendulum: as a series of
gently induced pushes from one state to another.
One way to represent the Carnot cycle is on a pressure-volume diagram such as the one
in Figure 32. Points such as A and B, and all the points between them, represent equilibrium
states of the system. These are states at which the pressure and volume will eventually come
to rest. Now surely there is a time lapse in between each point on our diagram where the
pressure or the volume of the system fluctuates. These are not represented. Again we see
science employing Duhem’s concept of a virtual modification. The Carnot engine can only
virtually pass through these states.
The quasi-static processes which compose the Carnot cycle are reversible processes. Be-
cause the system remains in equilibrium the whole time, we can imagine the same process
happening in reverse (taking the final state as the initial state, and the initial state as the final
state). Duhem addresses reversible processes in his text Thermodynamics and Chemistry.
2Diagram by [Derkleinebauer2008].
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Between states 1 and 2 arrange a series of equilibrium positions α, β, γ, δ, . . . following each
other in a continuous manner. The system, placed in any of these positions, would remain
there indefinitely. This series of positions of equilibrium cannot then be passed through
by the system either in one direction or in the other; it does not correspond to a realizable
transformation of the system. . . . This series of equilibrium states α, β, γ, δ . . . which is
passed over by no modification of the system is, in some sort, the common boundary of
the real transformations that bring the system from state 1 to the state 2 and of the real
transformations that bring the system from state 2 to state 1 [Duhem2009, 69-70].
Duhem recognizes that, in representations like the Carnot cycle, the actual process is a
deviation from the process described by thermodynamic theory. He thinks of these quasi-
static processes as the boundaries between two different kinds of actual processes. For
example, consider the expansion and compression of a gas. In practice, the expansion of the
gas will not actually be reversible, because it will happen so quickly that the system does
not remain in equilibrium the whole time. The same is true for the compression of a gas.
However, if we slowed these two processes down infinitely, so that they were quasi-static,
they would each approach the same series of equilibrium states, as Duhem describes.
These static states can be partially determined experimentally, much like the case of
potential and kinetic energy. We can perform experiments to see how the pressure and
volume balance at any particular point of the system, then string these static states together
to form a quasi-static path for the system to traverse. This path is importantly devoid of
friction, which obscures the conservation of important thermodynamic quantities. Because
the state space of thermodynamics contains equilibrium states, and represents ideal, limiting
processes rather than actual processes, thermodynamic models such as the Carnot cycle
ignore the intervening and complicating effects of friction. What’s especially interesting to
the project at hand is that by reducing the effects of friction in this rather ingenious way,
we are able to uncover quantities and natural laws which are otherwise obscured.
Carnot managed to prove a theorem which states that no heat engine can be more
efficient than a Carnot engine, however, he couldn’t quantify just how efficient a Carnot
engine actually was. As previously stated, the complete path of the Carnot engine is a cycle.
For any thermodynamic system to be a process, it must be the case that all of the state
variables — thermodynamic parameters — have the same value at the beginning and the
end of the cycle. For example, the temperature, volume and pressure must all be the same.
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But to understand the efficiency of the Carnot engine required the introduction of a fourth
state variable — one that Carnot suspected was heat.
Because Carnot subscribed to the caloric theory of heat, he thought that heat was a sub-
stance (much like a fluid) which entered and exited bodies. His metaphysical presumptions
caused him to believe that the quantity of heat was conserved when a mechanical engine
traverses a cycle. However, it turns out that every time a Carnot engine completes a cycle
it gains heat. In fact, this additional heat is precisely what is converted into work, allowing
the Carnot engine to effect its environment.
It wasn’t until almost thirty years later that Clausius determined the actual efficiency of
the Carnot engine. Clausius discovered a hidden state variable of thermodynamic systems
— the quantity S (which was later called the entropy). The change in entropy as a Carnot





This means that the value for entropy is the same when the Carnot engine begins and
ends its cycle — indicating that entropy satisfies the definition of a state variable. What’s
of special interest to us, is that this ever so important and hidden state variable, entropy,
was discovered through a careful analysis of the virtual modifications at the heart of ther-
modynamic theory. It did not become evident through the production of dynamic laws.
As it turns out, entropy couples together with the quantity of temperature to define the
internal energy of a system. Much the same way the total energy of a system can be under-
stood as its kinetic energy plus its potential energy, the change in the internal heat energy of
a thermodynamic system is temperature times the change in entropy (TdS). Together, tem-
perature and entropy form a thermodynamic conjugate variable pair. In thermodynamics,
the changes in energy are understood by infinitesimal modifications within such conjugate
variable pairs. In the case of temperature and entropy, a change in the temperature creates
a change in entropy in a manner analogous to how a force applied to a point causes a spatial
displacement. In order to understand how energy is exchanged between a system and its
environment, thermodynamics appeals to changes in conjugate variable pairs. That is, these
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exchanges explain why the internal energy increases or decreases, and provide constraints on
the ways in which the energy can be transformed.
These exchanges between conjugate variable pairs are structurally similar to the modi-
fications at play in the method of virtual work. Remember, in the context of virtual work,
generalized forces cause virtual displacements, and the work is the product of the force
times the displacement. In thermodynamics, conjugate variable pairs are composed of two
types of properties: intensive and extensive. Intensive properties are such that their value
is independent of the system’s size. For example, temperature is an intensive property. A
glass of water and a swimming pool might have the same temperature, even though they
are quite different in volume. By contrast, extensive properties do depend on the size of the
system. These are properties like mass. The internal energy of a thermodynamic system
can be calculated by multiplying an intensive property like temperature (which plays a role
analogous to force) with an extensive property like entropy (which plays a role analogous to
displacements).
Not only does entropy form a conjugate variable pair with temperature, it also serves as
one of the most foundational quantities in thermodynamic theory — grounding and shaping
the earliest thermodynamic laws. The first law of thermodynamics, which is a special case of
the law of conservation of energy for thermodynamic systems, was proven by the introduction
of entropy. It was only by recognizing the relationship between temperature, entropy, and the
total internal energy of a system that Clausius was able to show energy was being conserved.
Additionally, the second law of thermodynamics states that the entropy of a system almost
always increases. It is this entropy increase that helps us to understand the irreversibility of
most thermodynamic processes, as well as explaining the observation that heat always flows
from warmer bodies to cooler bodies.
4.3 THERMODYNAMICS AS A NATURAL CLASSIFICATION
Like potential energy, entropy has proven an important, albeit abstract, scientific quantity.
For example, we understand how heat is exchanged by looking at how temperature drives
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changes in entropy. On a grander, philosophical scale, we understand why certain processes
have a direction (e.g. why a system tends towards equilibrium rather than away from it) via
the notion of entropy. Of course, we still lack the complete dynamical story of how heat is lost
and transferred when a heat engine traverses through a real-world cycle, and our discovery
about temperature and entropy does not bring us any closer to an ideal DN text. But this
does not undermine the importance of entropy or suggest that we should view explanations
which reference entropy as “explanatory sketches” which only hint towards some grander
dynamic laws picture. As we begin to understand the delicate relationship between entropy
and temperature, we are able to classify experimental data and see “hints” of the structure
of the natural world, just as Duhem suggested.
Thermodynamics, like Lagrange’s mechanics, does not rest on dynamic laws but, rather,
upon general principles. From these principles, we can derive a large number of stable,
general constraints that govern the behavior of thermodynamic systems. But rather than
“explain” how these systems work — e.g., provide some initial conditions for the system and
the laws which will move it from one state to the next, — we are able to classify different
physical phenomena according to the categories revealed by our theory. For example, we
learn that the processes in nature which are approximately reversible are those where the
system stays close to equilibrium and there is no change in entropy. We can also classify the
various states of a system according to the state variables, which include entropy. Moreover,
we can even classify different thermodynamic systems according to what kind of heat trans-
fers are possible. We know that systems which are, for example, isothermal (have a fixed
temperature) will also have a fixed entropy.
Duhem claims this classification approximates a natural classification because the groups
that it picks out are natural kinds. That is, isothermal processes are actually a unique set
of processes that are structurally similar. On Duhem’s view, if we did have access to some
true, ideal DN text (hand delivered to us by an angel), this perfect theory would classify
isothermal processes together in virtue of their structural similarity. However, because our
theory gives us only a classification and not an explanation, we don’t have a handle on why
these processes form a natural kind. In some ways, Duhem thinks that to be an isothermal
process is a symptom rather than a cause: perhaps there is some fundamental, dynamic story
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to be told about how these processes are similar. But that story is a metaphysical story, and
not a scientific story, on Duhem’s view — moreover, it’s clearly not what thermodynamics
presents us with.
Nevertheless, Duhem insists that thermodynamics helps us learn more about the struc-
ture and relatedness of the natural world. For example, thermodynamics helps us to reliably
predict the final state of thermal processes. That is, we can’t be sure how the heat is actu-
ally distributed through a glass of water while the ice is melting, but we can make reliable
predictions about what temperature the water in will be after the ice melts.
Thermodynamic constraints cannot be easily dissolved into a unified mechanical picture.
Rather than ignore these macroscopic properties when focusing on, for instance, the be-
havior of classical systems, we have to find ways to couple together thermal properties and
mechanical properties. This is why Duhem emphasizes that we need to include qualities and
not just quantities in our scientific theories. However, I will cover this issue in more detail
in the next chapter.
4.4 STATISTICAL MECHANICS
In the previous sections I have argued, on behalf of Duhem, that thermodynamics manages
to reveal novel insights about the structure of the natural world without providing any
microscopic dynamic laws. One might react to this assertion by pointing out thermodynamics
is now considered to be grounded in statistical mechanics — a probabilistic theory about
dynamic laws which govern micro-constituents of thermodynamic systems.
Statistical mechanics is used to patch together the higher level theory of thermodynam-
ics with mechanical, dynamic laws that reign over the microscopic level. Because statistical
mechanics defines rigorous relationships between the macroscopic properties of thermody-
namics, such as temperature, with microscopic properties of mechanical systems, such as the
mean kinetic energy, the relationship between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics is
often put forth as a paradigmatic case of theory reduction.
If thermodynamics can be reduced to statistical mechanics, does thermodynamics actu-
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ally provide us with any important insight? Can it stand as a counterexample to dynamic
laws strategists, if it has already been reduced to a set of dynamic laws? There are two ways
of handling this objection — both of which follow. First I will sketch Duhem’s argument
that the mechanical theory of heat is not actually a reduction of thermodynamics. Next, I
will argue that even if it were the case that this reduction went through, there is still an
important lesson to be learned about dynamic laws strategies.
4.4.1 A Brief Sketch of Statistical Mechanics
Before going much further, I want to provide a brief sketch of how thermodynamic phenom-
ena can allegedly be reduced to dynamic laws. As mentioned before, the central notion of
thermodynamics is the idea of equilibrium: all systems tend towards thermodynamic equi-
librium when left in isolation. But this is quite the opposite of, for example, Newton’s law
of inertia which states that an object (e.g. atom) in motion will remain in motion (unless
interrupted).
Boltzmann and Clausius both suggested a similar connection between observable thermo-
dynamic equilibrium and microlevel dynamic laws: the temperature of a substance is equal
to the average kinetic energy of the particles which compose it. Therefore, if a substance is
in thermal equilibrium, it doesn’t mean that the particles are also at rest, it simply means
that they are, on average, not increasing or decreasing in velocity. Similarly, the pressure of
a system is understood as the impact of these molecules on the sides of the container.
Determining the precise state of a thermal system from the standpoint of mechanics
requires us to know the exact position and velocity of each individual particle3. Because
thermodynamic systems contain large numbers of molecules, it is practically impossible to
determine the actual mechanical state of the system. Rather than work with predictions
about individual states of the system based on the dynamic laws which govern the particles,
statistical mechanics focuses on ensembles: probability distributions over all possible states
of the system. As each state of the system evolves through time, the ensemble itself also
3I have chosen to address the reduction of statistical mechanics to classical mechanics for reasons of
consistency and clarity. Similar problems arise in the case of quantum mechanics.
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evolves through time4.
The central problem with reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics was and
continues to be the arrow of time. The second law of thermodynamics asserts that the
entropy of a system almost always increases. This law is used to account for our perceived
arrow of time — the fact that certain events, such as ice cubes melting in a glass of water,
seem to occur in a specified direction: it is never the case that ice cubes develop in a glass
of water. Dynamic laws alone appear incapable of representing this directionality; dynamic
processes are always (mathematically, at least) reversible. Therefore, how can this directional
behavior emerge from purely dynamic laws?
Various solutions have been suggested to this problem, and it is still an active question
in contemporary philosophy of physics5. One way to resolve this worry is to argue there is a
yet to be formulated dynamic law which is time-asymmetric that will be able to account for
these worries. Another is to suggest that these apparently irreversible processes can really
be reduced to a certain kind of sensitivity to initial conditions. Still others have suggested
it’s not a problem with the dynamic laws but instead with the state of the world — the
world is in a certain state such that the dynamic laws consistently produce these seemingly
asymmetric processes, but it is quite possible, were the world in a different state, that they
would produce symmetric processes.
4.4.2 A Reduction or an Illustration?
Duhem was familiar with attempts to reduce thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and
addresses mechanical theories of heat in Evolution of Mechanics, claiming that said theories
illustrate rather than explain.
. . . all that is logically permissible to affirm is that it is, nevertheless, possible to construct
mechanically, at least to define by certain algebraic conditions, some ensembles of bodies
whose stationary motions are governed by formulae analogous to the equations of Ther-
modynamics. To go back to a few words which Boltzmann borrowed from Maxwell, the
Mechanical Theory of Heat does not furnish a mechanical explication of Thermodyanmics,
it gives only a dynamical illustration of it [Duhem1980, 67].
4While there is an interesting philosophical question concerning how to interpret these ensembles, I have
chosen to ignore that question here. For more information see [Sklar1993].
5See [Albert2003] or [Wallace2010]
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While we might be able to model thermodynamic observations using microlevel termi-
nology, this is quite different from deriving the laws of thermodynamics from basic, classical
laws. This is Duhem’s distinction between an illustration and an explanation: an illustration
can show how certain regularities might “look” from a dynamic laws point of view, but a
true explanation must prove these phenomena are consequences of dynamic laws. Rather
than derive thermodynamics from the dynamic laws, statistical mechanics introduced ther-
modynamic phenomena as constraints on dynamic systems.
Duhem considers Helmholtz’s work on monocyclic systems as an object lesson for how
statistical mechanics illustrates rather than explains thermodynamics. This is a reference to
Helmholtz’s 1884 paper “Principien der Statik monocylklischer Systeme6” where he provides






Helmholtz provides the following definition of the class of systems he studies:
I understand the term monocyclic systems to mean those mechanical systems in whose
interior one or more stationary, closed motions are present, but which, when there are
several, have velocities that depend upon only one parameter. I further assume that only
conservative forces act between the individual bodies that define the system, which consist
of relatively fixed constraints, while the external forces that must be added in do not
necessarily need to be conservative. I refer to the problems that I will treat as static
whenever it is assumed that the variations that the state of the system experiences come
about with such slight velocities that the system never deviates noticeably from those states
in which it can continually abide under them [von Helmholtz, 1].
To get a clearer picture of Helmholtz’s idea, it’s useful to invoke some of the concepts from
Lagrange’s analytic approach to mechanics. Essentially, Helmholtz is interested in systems
which have one macroscopic degree of freedom, even if these systems consists of multiple
particles. Additionally, the particles which compose the system are also constrained to one
dimension. For any specified energy level, each particle has one precise trajectory or cycle
it will follow. Hence the name “monocyclic.”
6Principles of Static, Monocyclic Systems
7For more information on the heat theorem, and Helmholtz’s contributions to thermodynamics in general,
see [Gallavotti1999].
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Duhem illustrates monocyclic systems by — quite literally — a “toy model” of a top
[Duhem1980, 62-63]. Imagine, for a moment, a rapidly spinning top. Although it is rotating,
the rotations happen so quickly that the top appears to be in a stationary state. These
imperceptible rotations are an example of the motions of the atoms in the system. Now,
suppose we slowly rotate the top about some axis (while the spinning continues). This
second motion would be observable. This corresponds to the one-dimensional motion of a
monocyclic system as a whole.
In a contemporary paper on Helmholtz’s work, Michele Campisi describes monocyclic
systems as “one-dimensional conservative systems in a confined potential where there is only
one periodic trajectory per energy level” [Campisi2005, 281]. He further uses the example
of a particle in a box to illustrate a monocyclic system, but a particle inside a double well
potential is not monocyclic because the particle might travel one of two different cycles at
each different energy level.
Helmholtz was successful in finding a class of monocyclic systems that could model
thermodynamic properties. In fact, he was able to prove the following theorem 8 :
Helmholtz Theorem Let H(p, q;V ) = p2/2m + ϕ(q;V ) be the Hamiltonian of a one-
dimensional monocyclic system. Let a state be characterized by the set of quantities:
E = total energy = 〈K〉+ ϕ,
T = temperature = twice the time average of the kinetic energy = 2 〈K〉t,
V = volume = the external parameter,









is exact and SH(E, V ), defined as






2m(E − ϕ(x, V )) (4.4)





where the symbols x ± (E, V ) denote the turning points of the trajectory, i.e., the roots of
the equation E − ϕ(x, V ) = 0.
8I have modeled the presentation of this Theorem after Campisi, [Campisi2005, 282].
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What Helmholtz is able to prove is that a certain class of mechanical models actually
mimics thermodynamic behavior. However, as Duhem points out, this is quite different from
deriving the laws of thermodynamics from the laws of classical mechanics. He uses two
key aspects of this example, one technical and one philosophical, as arguments against a
reductionist picture of the relationship between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics.
The technical point that Duhem makes is that Helmholtz was forced to use an analytic
(non-vectorial) approach to classical mechanics in his formulation. As Duhem writes,
Thus, to define the monocyclic systems whose properties are capable of imitating the ther-
modynamical relations, Helmholtz was obliged to submit them to conditions that expressed
certain analytic characteristics of the functions used; it is quite difficult to translate them
into mechanical language, and even more difficult to draw from them some precise informa-
tion about the assumptions that it would be useful to make, touching upon the structure of
atoms or the nature of calorific motion. From there it is permissible to ask if this analogy
between the laws of monocyclic systems and the equations of Thermodynamics has any
foundation in the nature of things [Duhem1980, 64].
Hamiltonian mechanics is an analytic version of mechanics quite similar to Lagrange’s
approach. Although it focuses on a slightly different quantity, it still makes use of variational
principles and does not track the individual motion of each particle. It is also built upon
variational principles, much the same as Lagrange’s theory. In short, Hamiltonian mechanics
is no more a dynamic laws approach to classical mechanics than Lagrangian mechanics is.
Duhem’s point then is — while Helmholtz is able to find a class of models that represents
thermodynamic phenomena, it requires the use of a non-dynamic laws formulation of classical
mechanics. If this is the case, we have good reason to doubt that Helmholtz has actually
connected thermodynamic phenomena to microscopic, dynamic behavior.
For example, Helmholtz’s theorem relies on using Volume as a constraint — and we have
already discussed the problems that constraints create for vectorial approaches to dynam-
ics. In fact, on Duhem’s picture, thermodynamic laws as a whole interact with vectorial
mechanics in just this way: as constraints. But if they are constraints, they are additional
information to be solved for which alters the course predicted by the dynamic laws, rather
than being derivable from the dynamic laws.
Besides this technical point, Duhem makes a philosophical one. That is, the class of
models picked out by Helmholtz’s theory is totally arbitrary. Helmholtz theorem does not
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even hold for all monocyclic systems, but a special class of them. But what is so special
about these monocyclic systems from a particularly dynamic perspective?
One can prove the existence of such an integrant factor on the condition of restricting
the generality of the monocyclic systems studied; unfortunately, it is difficult to interpret,
within the meaning of the Mechanical Theory of Heat, the restrictive conditions to which
one must appeal [Duhem1980, 63].
Duhem points out that the mechanical theory of heat does not classify systems in such
a way that these apparently thermodynamic models of monocyclic systems form any kind
of a unified class. It is only the classification that is provided by thermodynamic theory
that suggests we should be interested in models which behave in this way. In this sense,
our knowledge of macroscopic phenomena informs the way we pick out a relevant class of
solutions to the equations of classical mechanics. But if this is the case, it wasn’t the dynamic
laws of the vectorial approach which helped us uncover this class of models. Instead they
are found by relying on information encoded in the higher level theory of thermodynamics.
It is thermodynamics that provides us with a more natural classification than the dynamic
laws.
4.5 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
In the previous chapter, I focused on the way in which physical theories classify rather than
explain through a case study of Lagrangian mechanics. In this chapter, I have attempted
to clarify how these classifications can be natural: that is, how they provide us with insight
into the natural world.
Entropy, which is a critical quantity in physical theory, was not discovered through the
search for dynamic laws, but rather through an abstract idealization of a physical process.
Nevertheless, it was only in this frictionless environment that the delicate relationship be-
tween temperature and entropy can be discovered. Once recognized, the role of entropy in
natural processes is overwhelming: it helps to explain the irreversibility of processes like ice
melting or stirring cream into coffee. Although there have been many attempts to recreate
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the role entropy plays in these lower level laws, modeling entropy is quite different than
deriving it. Moreover, for dynamic laws to appropriately describe thermodynamic phenom-
ena, we have to factor in thermodynamic constraints that point to highly selective classes of
models within the possible worlds created by dynamic laws.
These dynamic laws do not “pick out” the relevant classes for a natural classification.
Instead, it is thermodynamics which shows us important ways to classify this lower level
phenomena. In this way, although thermodynamics is a macroscopic theory that does not




In the previous chapters, I have provided two different case studies which undergird the
general principles Duhem espouses in his philosophy of science. I have also provided a rough
sketch of Duhem’s alternative model of a “theory of everything” — his picture of the New
Mechanics.
In this chapter, I will return to some of the most difficult passages in Duhem, and use
the previous case studies to shed light on Duhem’s conception of natural classifications and
metaphysical explanation.
To most effectively execute the project at hand, I first consider Duhem’s anti-atomism.
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, Duhem often rails against atomism at a time when experimental
evidence for atomism was strong enough to convince most scientists of its veracity. I have
shown that Duhem held a top-down, non-atomic picture of scientific theory, but I have not
motivated his view. Why did Duhem reject atomism? Why did he suppose that our “final
theory” would mirror Lagrange’s mechanics and not a vectorial approach?
5.1 THE COMPLEXITY OF COUPLING
One consistent theme in Duhem’s work is the rejection of atomism. In Logical Examination
of Physical Theory he writes
The school of the neo-atomists, the doctrines of which center on the concept of the electron,
have taken up with supreme confidence the method we refuse to follow. This school thinks
its hypotheses attain at last the inner structure of matter, that they make us see the
elements as if some extraordinary ultra-microscope were to enlarge them until they were
made perceptible to us.
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We do not share this confidence. We are not able to recognize in these hypotheses a
clairvoyant vision of what there is beyond sensible things; we regard them only as mod-
els[Duhem, Ariew, and Barker1996, 238].
Some philosophers, such as Nancy Cartwright, interpret Duhem’s rejection of atomism as a
symptom of his antirealism. However, Mark Wilson has recently argued, I think correctly,
that Duhem’s anti-atomism stems from his worries about coupling. Coupling occurs when a
system is perturbed by two different effects that join together and create a unique effect on
the system — an effect that is more complicated than the application of each independent
perturbation to the system applied successively1. One example of coupling, common to
engineers, is that of thermomechanical coupling, the interaction of the mechanical features
of a system with the temperature-related features of a system. Wilson describes one example
of thermomechanical coupling in “Two Cheers for Anti-Atomism”.
Consider an iron bar. If we strike one end with a mallet, we will send a pulse of compressive
stress through its interior, a process that is governed, to first approximation, by the familiar
wave equation. Likewise, if we heat an extremity, we will send a parcel of heat across
the bar, in rough accordance with Fourier’s celebrated heat equation. But, surely, these
two effects will couple to each other greatly complicating the detailed flow, because the
compressive effort supplied to the bar will gradually elevate the temperature of the bar
beyond our simple Fourier’s law expectations. Likewise, locally heightened temperatures
will dilate the bar’s length, spoiling the simple patterns of the standard wave equations.
In many industrial settings, coupling effects are sufficiently strong that one needs to find a
framework in which they can be jointly treated [Wilson2013, 5].
As can be seen from Wilson’s example, even if we know how an iron bar will behave
when we strike it with a hammer or if we heat it, we cannot necessarily predict (without
any additional mathematical machinery) what is going to happen to the bar if we do both of
these things at the same time. To understand how these two interventions on the system will
couple together, it is often important to introduce an entirely new theoretical framework.
Wilson suggests that the pursuit of such a framework, where coupled systems can be
treated jointly, is the real motivation for Duhem’s Energetics. Much disagreement arose
between Duhem and scientists such as Maxwell and Kelvin concerning the treatment of
coupled systems. Maxwell also accepted the use of the virtual modifications that Duhem
outlined in his New Mechanics, but he believed these variational techniques could ultimately
1This is meant as an intuitive definition of coupling. The formal definition states that coupling occurs
when a system stores energy by at least two different means.
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be reduced to merely mechanical knowledge. That is, if we had all the information about
the tiniest bits of matter (say, atoms), and we knew all the rules that the atoms obeyed,
then we would be able to directly deduce the behavior of coupled systems. In fact, were
such speculations true, on this “most fundamental” level, the idea of coupling itself would
disintegrate, as there would not be two different kinds of stored energy working together but
only the motion of one kind of substance. Thermal notions, such as temperature or pressure,
would no longer be applicable on this fundamental level. Instead, we would be able to say
all that needs to be said using only the notions of classical mechanics2.
Although Duhem adamantly denies such a reduction is possible, what he does not say,
Wilson points out, is that atoms do not (or cannot) exist.
Observe that Duhems animus towards “molecular hypotheses” (understood as efforts to
escape into thermally free realms) needn’t coincide with a general opposition to the postu-
lation of minute entities below the scale of, e.g., microscopic observation. There is nothing
in his writings or interests that precludes (insofar as I am aware) the study of, e.g., suspen-
sions of very minute particles, such as contaminants in the atmosphere. It is merely that
one should sometimes expect to employ thermal tools in these settings as well [Wilson2013,
6].
Wilson’s point is that Duhem was not against the existence of atoms, but against the
idea that all phenomena, e.g. coupled systems, could be appropriately formally represented
without any reliance on the concepts of theories such as thermodynamics. A key point in
the structure of thermodynamics is that it does not attempt to reduce all of the various ways
that energy can be observed into a single mechanical picture.
Not only does Wilson charitably illuminate Duhem’s anti-atomistic rants, he also provides
important observations concerning the history of science that provide credibility to Duhem’s
view. One such observation pertains to problems of conceptual closure that occur if we
attempt to eradicate thermal (or other non-mechanical) notions from our scientific theories.
Wilson uses the example of shockwaves to illustrate this problem.
Shockwaves are high pressure wave fronts that can develop when the source of a sound
is moving as fast as (or faster than) the speed of sound. The effects of shockwaves were
observed in WWII when fighter pilots noticed additional drag when they descended at close
to sonic speeds. The build up of the sound waves near the sound source create a high
2Wilson refers to classical mechanics as the “old mechanics,” in contrast to Duhem’s New Mechanics.
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pressure front known as a “sound barrier.” When the sound barrier is crossed by the sound
source, a famous “sonic boom” is emitted. An important feature of shockwaves is, due to
their compressed wave front, their behavior is nonlinear.
Shockwaves can also be created by injecting a high pressure pulse to a moving gas. The
example Wilson uses concerns a blast of air traveling in a tube. If we administer a high
pressure pulse to this gas, we will create a barrier much like the sound barrier created by
planes traveling at sonic speed. Now, if we apply the standard gas dynamics for classical
systems (that is, systems that can be modeled in terms of position, velocity, and density)







where u is the velocity and x is the position.
However, Wilson points out that our pulse will cause a “piled up singularity,” which is
the shock front, “that leaves us with no ‘mechanical’ criterion for deciding how the gas will
distribute itself over a fan-like region lying behind the shock front” [Wilson2013, 8]. In order
to understand how the gas will distribute, we have to import the thermal notion of entropy.
Thermodynamics tells us that the entropy of the gas will expand, and by appeal to this
thermodynamic principle we are able to predict how the gas will distribute across the region.
Hence, our solely mechanical model fails and must rely on the principles and concepts of
thermodynamics.
Escaping to a more “fundamental” approach, in this case, will not help either. That is,
one might try to avoid the introduction of entropy by moving to a smaller-scale framework
than the one at which the gas was initially modeled. However, empirical reasons suggest that
we must model these smaller-scale “atoms” as non-rigid, flexible bodies. If that is the case,
then we will still make use of continuum modeling (such as the inviscid Burger’s equation) to
describe how these molecules behave when they are impacted. But pulses in the molecules
will still be transmitted in a manner that is non-linear, thereby allowing shock fronts to
build up inside of our atoms just like the initial shock fronts that we were trying to avoid by
moving to this smaller scale length. Should we go “lower” to escape these shock fronts, the
same thing will happen. Eventually we will have to introduce thermal notions in order to
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model the distribution of the gas caused by the shockwave. If this is the case, then the “old
mechanics” with its purely mechanical notions are not sufficient to describe all observable
phenomena.
As Wilson points out, worries like this are what motivate Duhem to search for a frame-
work where thermal notions, mechanical notions, magnetic notions, etc. can co-exist in
peaceful harmony.
These difficulties, and plenty of others it would take too long to enumerate, tell us that it is
time to stop; that it is not necessary to follow any further these attempts made to decrease
more and more the number of primary notions upon which Physics rest [Duhem1980, 94].
Duhem’s opposition to “atomism” is really an opposition to attempts to eradicate non-
mechanical notions (e.g. thermal, magnetic, electric notions) from physical theory.
To attempt to reduce all the properties of substances to the properties of shape and motion
seems a chimerical enterprise, either because such a reduction would be obtained at the
price of complications that would scare our imagination away, or even because it would be
in contradiction with the nature of material things.
And so we are now obliged to accept into our Physics something other than the purely
quantitative elements treated by geometers, to admit that matter has qualities [Duhem1980,
103].
Duhem’s pursuit of energetics was an attempt to unify disparate areas of research according
to their grounding in the conservation of energy. Whether or not atoms exist was not the
question of interest to Duhem; likewise, the success of atomic modeling to solve problems
like Brownian motion was not problematic on his view. Duhem was perfectly comfortable
with admitting mechanical notions — and even atomic ones. What he was uncomfortable
with was the elimination of these non-mechanical notions from the realm of physical theory.
Duhem thought that mechanical systems exist, but most real systems are coupled systems
and their behavior cannot be captured by the old mechanics alone.
5.2 DISGUISED APPEALS TO VARIATIONAL PRINCIPLES
So far I have provided some of the scientific background which influenced Duhem, along
with sketching both his reasons for rejecting the atomism of the “old mechanics” and his
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expectations for the New Mechanics. Now, in light of these developments, let us return to
the previously discussed tension between natural classifications and explanations.
Duhem denies that science aims at explanation, where an explanation is a metaphysical
theory about the ontology of the world. Simultaneously, Duhem insists science aims to
reflect a natural classification — a “behind the veil” peak at the true ontological ordering of
physical phenomena.
In this section I will argue that Duhem’s disavowals of explanation are best understood
as resisting the claim that science permeates the appearances of a particular phenomena in
order to give us a detailed description of the dynamic laws from which it can be derived,.
Nevertheless, Duhem maintains the belief that scientific theory provides us with novel phys-
ical insight — suggesting he is not antirealist, as many have argued. In fact, many of the
passages used to suggest that Duhem is antirealist can alternatively be read as accounts of
virtual modifications in physical theory.
For example, in his description of how theories are formed, Duhem writes
Among physical properties which we set ourselves to represent we select those we regard as
simple properties, so that the others will supposedly be groupings or combinations of them.
We make them correspond to a certain group of mathematical symbols, numbers, and mag-
nitudes, through appropriate methods of measurement. These mathematical symbols have
no connection of an intrinsic nature with the properties they represent . . . Through meth-
ods of measurement we can make each state of a physical property correspond to a value
of the representative symbol, and vice versa . . . The diverse principles or hypotheses are
then combined together according to the rules of mathematical analysis . . . The magnitudes
on which his calculations bear are not claimed to be physical realities, and the principles
he employs in his deductions are not given as stating real relations among those realities;
. . . The various consequences thus drawn from the hypotheses may be translated into as
many judgments bearing on the physical properties of bodies [Duhem1954, 19-20].
At face value, Duhem paints a pragmatic picture of the philosophy of science. We pick
a few measurable quantities and stipulate that they correspond to specific mathematical
symbols. We then exercise mathematical freedom in combining these quantities, bound only
to the laws of mathematical analysis and without any consideration of physical laws. He even
specifically states that these magnitudes are not “physical realities” and these principles are
not real relationships.
However, there is a strong similarity between what Duhem describes here and the method
used for forming theories based on variational principles, specifically the role played by
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generalized coordinates. As was discussed in Chapter 3, handling constraint forces in classical
mechanics requires the introduction of generalized coordinates. These coordinates form a
generalized configuration space, which cannot be said to directly map on to the physical
world. However, these quantities are still believed to exist, despite the fact that the machinery
we use to specify our system involves the introduction of purely mathematical coordinates.
There is a strong resemblance between the aforementioned excerpt from Aim and Struc-
ture Lanczos’ text on the role of variational principles in mechanics.
Analytical mechanics is a completely mathematical science. everything is done by calcula-
tions in the abstract realm of quantities. The physical world is translated into mathematical
relations. This translation occurs with the help of coordinates. The coordinates establish
a one-to-one correspondence between the points of physical space and numbers. After es-
tablishing this correspondence, we can operate with the coordinates as algebraic quantities
and forget about their physical meaning. The end result of our calculations is then finally
translated back into the world of physical realities [Lanczos1964, 7].
Perhaps Duhem’s claim that magnitudes are not physical realities is a reference to formal
features associated with the use of generalized coordinates in mathematized physical theories,
rather than a defense of antirealism. When we employ generalized coordinates, we are bound
to an abstract configuration space that does not directly correspond to the physical world.
Likewise, many of the mathematical procedures we perform are not physically conceivable,
let alone realizable. But this problem permeates both the observable and unobservable
aspects of our theory, rather than privileging the former over the latter, in the antirealist
vein of van Fraassen does,
The same can be said regarding Duhem’s notion of truth in a theory. Just as Lanczos
points out that the end result of our calculations is translated back to the physical world in
order to compare our predictions by experiment, Duhem writes
Thus a true theory is not a theory which gives an explanation of physical appearances in
conformity with reality; it is a theory which represents in a satisfactory manner a group of
experimental laws. A false theory is not an attempt at an explanation based on assumptions
contrary to reality; it is a group of propositions which do not agree with the experimental
laws. Agreement with experiment is the sole criterion of truth for a theory [Duhem1954,
20-21, emphasis his].
In contemporary contexts, the aforementioned quote appears to assert that the unobserv-
able entities in our theory don’t really exist but are mere instruments of predictive success.
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However, with respect to virtual modifications, this quote takes on an entirely different
meaning. Duhem is arguing that theories that rely on virtual modifications are in fact true,
even though the calculational machinery they rely on describes unrealizable modifications.
As I pointed out in Chapter 1, Cartwright accuses Duhem of antirealism about theoretical
laws. I am suggesting the opposite is true: Duhem defends physical theories even when they
include models that are not physically realizable. When Duhem claims that agreement
with experiment is the sole criterion for the truth of a theory, he is not suggesting that
theories merely agree with experiment. Instead, he is claiming that true theories may contain
highly abstract models that describe unrealizable processes. Nevertheless, we shouldn’t take
theories built on these types of principles to be any less true or “fundamental” than theories
that attempt to give microscopic modelings of particles.
As for theoretical laws, Duhem states that they are neither true or false, strictly speaking,
but always approximate. To unpack this, he compares physical laws with what he calls
“common-sense laws” such as “All men are mortal.” Duhem suggests that the labels true
or false make sense in the case of common-sense laws, because the interpretation of such
laws is effectively fixed by the terms they use and the scope of such laws is always universal.
However, he does not think physical laws can be simply classified as either true or false.
Such is not the case with the laws that a physical science, come to full maturity, states
in the form of mathematical propositions; such laws are always symbolic. Now, a symbol
is not, properly speaking, either true or false; it is, rather, something more or less well
selected to stand for the reality it represents, and pictures that reality in a more or less
precise, a more or less detailed manner. But applied to the a symbol the words “truth”
and “error” no longer have any meaning; so, the logician who is concerned about the strict
meaning of words will have to answer anyone who asks whether physics is true or false, “I
do not understand your question” [Duhem1954, 168].
To Duhem, a physical theory is a kind of representation — similar to a statue such as
Michelangelo’s David. It does not make sense to ask if Michelangelo’s representation of David
is “true,” because statues are not the sort of things that can be true or false. Occasionally,
we refer to a work of art as being “true to life,” but what we mean by this idiom is that
the artwork very closely approximates the aspect of the world it attempts to represent.
The real means for evaluating representations is a comparison between the representation
and the represented — and this comparison occurs along a continuum of similarity rather
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than a binary function. Additionally, Duhem does not limit the scope of representations to
“entities” in physical theories; he claims that physical laws are themselves representations.
Mathematical formulated theoretical laws are actually representations of the regularities
which govern the world in which we live.
Although Duhem attempts to clarify how the laws of physics can be more or less approx-
imate, his explanation only serves to confuse the issue.
The experimental method, as practiced in physics, does not make a given fact correspond
to only one symbolic judgment, but to an infinity of different symbolic judgments; the
degree of symbolic indetermination is the degree of approximation of the experiment in
question. Let us take a sequence of analogous facts; finding the law for these facts means to
the physicist finding a formula which contains the symbolic representation of each of these
facts. The symbolic indetermination corresponding to each fact consequently entails the
indetermination of the formula which is to unite these symbols; we can make an infinity
of different formulas or distinct physical laws correspond to the same group of facts. In
order for each of these laws to be accepted, there should correspond to each fact not the
symbol of this fact, but some one of the symbols, infinite in number, which can represent
the fact; that is what is meant when the laws of physics are said to be only approximate
[Duhem1954, 169]
. This difficult passage is best unpacked by drawing on some of the points about variational
principles, specifically the example of virtual work.
First, the treatment of physical problems by the variational method is full of the inde-
terminacy to which Duhem alludes. This indeterminacy begins with the scientist’s choice
of coordinates. Remember, Lagrange’s approach to mechanics requires any specific physical
problem to be represented in generalized coordinates. These coordinates allow the scientist
a freedom in his choice of representation, as the system does not directly determine which
set of coordinates a scientist must use. Lanczos writes
We are allowed sovereign freedom in choosing our coordinates, since our processes and
resulting equations remain valid for an arbitrary choice of coordinates. The mathematical
and philosophical value of the variational method is firmly anchored in this freedom of choice
and the corresponding freedom of arbitrary coordinate transformations [Lanczos1964, xxv].
Lagrange’s mechanics makes use of generalized coordinates, which allow a practitioner
to choose from a variety of possible methods to specify the state of the system; given any
particular system, we are free to represent it in a multitude of ways. Hence, as Duhem says,
a given fact does not correspond to one symbolic judgment but to an infinity of them.
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Another type of indeterminacy, which pertains to laws, concerns the accuracy of exper-
imental measurements. After the aforementioned passage, Duhem describes an example of
scientists trying to determine the path of the sun as it rotates around the Earth. First,
they represent the sun as a perfect sphere (knowing this is partially inaccurate), and then
attempt to construct the trajectory of the center of the sphere. Next, the scientists try to
fill in details about the path of the sun by means of a great deal of measurements, many
of which contain various degrees of inaccuracy. While experimenters intend to measure the
location of the center of the sun as it travels along its trajectory, their instruments might
only allow them to pinpoint the center of the sun within the range of an inch. But if this
is the case, any law which describes the arc of the sun within an inch of its actual path will
agree with our data. But surely there are a great number of laws which can agree with the
data at this level of proximity. Hence, Duhem claims we can make an infinity of different
formulas or physical laws to correspond to the same group of facts.
The concerns Duhem expresses here appear to be rather run of the mill worries about
accuracy, with no specific realist or antirealist implications. His primary point is that our
mathematized laws are actually representations of physical laws, and thereby more or less
accurate depending on the precisions of measurement and the strength of the instruments
we use. He emphasizes this point by claiming
Any physical law, being approximate, is at the mercy of the progress which, by increasing
the precision of experiments, will make the degree of approximation of this law insufficient;
the law is essentially provisional. The estimation of its value varies from one physicist to the
next, depending on the means of observation at their disposal and the accuracy demanded
by their investigation [Duhem1954, 174].
Our laws are limited by the instruments we use to collect data. Science is heavily
dependent on observation, and observation allows some degree of indeterminacy into our
laws.
I think Duhem is also worried about another, deeper sort of indeterminacy that arises
from the nature of the variational method. To understand this kind of indeterminacy, it is
helpful to focus for a moment on the example of Jack and Jill on the seesaw.
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Recall that the Principle of Virtual Work is formulated as
δW =
∑
Fn · δqn = 0. (5.2)
where W is the work done, F is the force, q is some generalized coordinate, and δ represents
a virtual infinitesimal displacement.
A seesaw is in equilibrium when the virtual work vanishes — when any infinitesimal
displacement consistent with the constraints is “balanced” by the other forces acting on
the system. Recall that the relevant consequence of the principle of virtual work in this
particular case is the law of the lever, which states that the seesaw will be in equilibrium
when
m1gl1 = m2gl2. (5.3)
Now suppose that just when Jill figures out where to sit on the lever to balance the
seesaw, Jack gets distracted and decides to go play video games. Jill sinks to the ground
moping, wondering how she can return the seesaw to a state of equilibrium. Lucky for Jill,
Jack’s little brothers come outside, and Jill manages to convince them to sit on the seesaw
with her. The two brothers can now shift their position on the beam to bring the seesaw
back into a state of equilibrium. Although the actual forces on the seesaw are now quite
different (there are two boys instead of one, they will have to sit at different locations along
the lever), it still follows that for any infinitesimal, virtual displacement of Jill, the virtual
work will vanish.
We replace Jack with his two brothers without causing a noticeable difference to the
system, at least not from the standpoint of the coordinates used in virtual work, because
we can represent the system in several different ways — either by Cartesian coordinates,
or coordinates which represent the angle between the lever and the fulcrum and the length
of the lever, etc. There are numerous generalized coordinates we might pick to symbolize
our system. Notice the difference between this and the point-mass formulation, where it
is crucial to know each specific force at work on the individual atoms which compose the
system.
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Because Lagrange’s mechanics does not individuate particular forces at work in a system,
the equations for equilibrium when Jack and Jill sit on the seesaw are identical to the
equations when Jill and Jack’s brothers sit on the seesaw. As Duhem points out,
It is therefore not too important to know in detail each of the forces applied to the various
bodies of the system, its point of application, its magnitude, its direction; provided that
the information given about the set of forces allows the calculation of the virtual work done
over a virtual displacement, enough is known; all other additional data are superfluous . . .
Thus it is that for the various forces applied to a solid body one can substitute a certain
set of two forces, either a force and a couple, or yet other combinations of forces; all these
combinations which appear distinct to a geometer, provide the same work for a virtual
displacement of the solid body; a mechanician does not therefore distinguish the one from
the other [Duhem1980, 25-26].
Not every geometric difference is an algebraic difference. While it might be clear to a
geometer — or one interested in a detailed picture of our system — that different forces are
at work when Jill sits with Jack than when Jill sits with Jack’s brothers, from the standpoint
of a mechanician — one who is concerned with the working structure of the system — these
two systems are indistinguishable. It is perfectly fine to substitute a single force with three
forces in the same direction as long as the total of the forces is the same.
To connect this with the language Duhem previously used to describe physical laws, we
see a high degree of indeterminacy in the principle of virtual work because this principle
does not represent a system with a high level of detail. Therefore, if we were to ask the
question of how similar is the representation to the system (in the way we might ask how
much a portrait reflects its subject), it seems that the principle provides only a chalk outline
of the system it models. But this is not to say the law is false — only to say that it is not a
complete representation of the seesaw.
It is important to point out that Duhem does not take the abstraction or indeterminacy
of Lagrange’s mechanics to be a flaw. In fact, he thinks this is just how physical theory works.
Theorists aim to create a representation of a system that will provide the groundwork for
developing mathematical laws which describe experimentally observed regularities. It’s quite
natural that the representation is incomplete, because it is only representative of a particular
data set gathered under highly restricted experimental conditions. The world is complex,
and so are its laws. We are, however, able to form symbolic laws which are approximate
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to these within a restricted domain. As our experimental context grows more complex, and
begins to reflect the complex interrelationships of systems in the real world, we see how our
physical laws are incomplete.
This becomes apparent when we witness the phenomena of coupling as previously dis-
cussed. On the provisionality of symbolic laws, Duhem states
Physical law is provisional not only because it is approximate, but also because it is sym-
bolic: there are always cases in which the symbols related by a law are no longer capable
of representing reality in a satisfactory manner . . .
Let the physicist place some oxygen between the plates of a strongly charged electrical
condenser; let him determine the density, temperature, and pressure of the gas; the values
of these three elements will no longer verify the law of compressibility and expansion of
oxygen. Is the physicist astonished to find his law at fault? Not at all. He realizes that the
faulty relation is merely a symbolic one, that it did not bear on the real, concrete gas he
manipulates but on a certain logical creature . . . too simple and too incomplete to represent
the properties of the real gas placed in the conditions given now. He then seeks to complete
this schematism and make it more representative of reality . . . [Duhem1954, 174].
As for the first portion of this quote, when Duhem claims that the law is provisional
because it is symbolic, he is emphasizing that the law is a representation. Therefore, the
approximate nature of representation plays a role in the provisionality of physical law.
To explain how this occurs, Duhem considers the effects of an electric field on the com-
pression or expansion of an ideal gas. Under normal conditions, oxygen behaves similar to
an ideal gas, close enough for its behavior to be described by the ideal gas law
PV = nRT (5.4)
where P is the pressure, V is the volume, is the amount (number of moles) of the gas, R is the
ideal gas constant, and T is the temperature. However, when a gas such as oxygen is placed
between the plates of a strongly charged electrical condenser, the electric field will affect the
internal energy of the system. Therefore, the traditional means of tracking the expansion of
the gas will fail due to the coupling of the thermodynamic system with an electric system.
But this “failing” of the ideal gas law will not trouble the physicist, insists Duhem,
because he knows the “faulty relation is a symbolic one.” The model he was using to predict
the behavior of the gas was too simple for this particular physical situation. Other properties
of the gas are relevant to understanding its behavior in an electric field. Or, perhaps, other
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environmental features of the system apart from the gas are relevant. Does this mean the
ideal gas law is false? Not at all.
Consider, for a moment, facial composites that are created by criminal sketch artists.
Victims and witnesses of crimes attempt to describe perpetrators, and sketch artists fill in
the details with a sketch. These sketches (and the descriptions they correspond to) can be
used to eliminate certain suspects. Imagine that a victim was assaulted in a night club. The
night club has a large number of cameras, including cameras at every entrance and exit, so
the police have a means to compile a list of who was in the bar that night. The assault did
not happen on camera, but was witnessed by several patrons of the club (in addition to the
victim). Suppose that when the victim describes the perpetrator, he is able to report to the
criminal sketch artist that the assailant was a blonde, white male — and nothing else. The
victim is in shock and the assault is a bit of a blur. The sketch artists attempts to draw a
generic picture of a white male, emphasizing the blond hair color. Let’s say that our sketch
artist is careful and doesn’t want to misrepresent the victim’s testimony, so they leave the
facial features (eyes, nose, mouth, facial shape) out of the drawing.
What can we say of this representation? Is it false? Let’s assume that everything the
victim said was true — the assailant was a blonde, white, male. It’s not that the picture is
false or even inaccurate, it simply doesn’t represent enough information to sufficiently pick
the suspect out on security tapes. Surely the police will be able to eliminate some suspects
on the basis of this information, but it won’t justify any search warrants.
Later, the sketch artist speaks to one of the witnesses. She is quite sure the assailant was
in his forties, with a rounded face and strong nose. The specific type of strong nose is left to
the imagination of the sketch artist. Even if the artists properly represents the perpetrator’s
nose, the sketch still lacks sufficient detail to pick out our assailant.
We can imagine this story wandering down several different paths. It’s possible that
our sketch artist will accurately represent all of the data she gathers, but the drawing still
does not contain enough data to eliminate the majority of the bar patrons. Even worse, it’s
possible that she will create a sketch that eliminates the perpetrator, because she misrepre-
sents some detail. Perhaps the nose she creates looks crooked to the detectives, and they
eliminate a man with a strong straight nose. Even in this case, I don’t believe we would
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call the representation itself false. To say the drawing is false is, as Duhem points out, a
category mistake. What we would judge instead is that the representation, however well it
fits the data collected, lacks the appropriate detail to eliminate suspects in this particular
context. Had the crime happened in a small convenience store, where there were only a few
suspects, perhaps the drawing would successfully pinpoint the perpetrator. Unfortunately,
the potential suspect pool was too large — there were too many white males in their forties
at this particular bar for the criminal sketch to serve its purpose.
Of course, police detectives do not rely heavily on criminal sketches, and they certainly
don’t count as admissible evidence in court, in part for the reasons mentioned. Nevertheless,
we do think such sketches can be accurate when they contain the right amount of detail for
an appropriately sized pool of suspects. This is analogous to Duhem’s point about the role
of representation. Even when representations lack some detail that is relevant for making a
particular prediction, it does not follow that they are false or inaccurate. They simply do
not approximate our system closely enough in order to adequately describe its behavior. On
the other hand, some representations that do lack a great deal of detail are able to predict
the behavior of a system in certain contexts. This is what we witness by the success of
Lagrangian mechanics.
While Duhem does express concerns about the truth of scientific theories or the inaccu-
racy and approximate nature of science, I have argued that such claims are actually references
to the use of variational principles in the building of physical theory, rather than “antirealist”
worries about unobservables, etc. Additionally, I have argued that Duhem’s worries about
“approximation” have more to do with representations lacking detail than representations
being “false.” Duhem does not think representations can be true or false. To say physical
law is a representation is to say that it models some regularity in the phenomenal world.
This does not mean the law lacks truth or accuracy — it might only lack detail.
5.2.1 Dissolving the Tension
In the previous section I have presented some of the difficult passages from Duhem, in an
effort to show how worries about variational principles underlie many of his comments about
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the philosophy of science. In this section, I take up the question of how a theory can fail to
explain but still be considered a natural classification. The clearest answer to this question
comes from a look back at the examples of analytic mechanics and thermodynamics.
5.2.1.1 Physical Theories do not Explain First I will argue that neither Lagrangian
mechanics nor thermodynamics provide an explanation, according to Duhem’s use of expla-
nation:
Duhemian Explanation (DE): A scientific theory provides an explanation if it presents
us with a non-sensual (“behind the veil”) description of the physical bodies which cause
the phenomena we observe.
Duhem asserts that science does not aim to reach behind the veil and provide us with
information about the essence of bodies. This certainly seems true in the case of Lagrangian
mechanics. Instead it makes use of a generalized configuration space, where we select our
coordinates according to the degrees of freedom of some macroscopic system. For example,
to represent a rigid body, we are able to select six different coordinates to denote the state
of the system. But these coordinates tell us about the body’s spatial location and degree of
rotation. They tell us nothing about the nature of the body or its essence. On the contrary,
generalized coordinates allow us to ignore the microscopic features of the system in order
to make predictions. Reflecting on this aspect of Lagrange’s mechanics, and the role it will
play in the New Mechanics, Duhem writes
The New Mechanics is organised, not for the speculative contemplation of the essence of
things, but for the practical necessity of acting upon the bodies of the external world and
modifying them according to our needs [Duhem1980, 118].
The same can be said for thermodynamics. Although thermodynamic theory describes
very general and stable constraints that apply to a wide range of materials, it doesn’t give us
insight into the essence of heat or the nature of matter. In fact, one of the most interesting
things about thermodynamics is that it picks out classes of thermal phenomena that can be
realized in an assortment of materials with varying microscopic structure. Thermodynamic
laws are true independently of the microstructure of the systems which instantiate them.
We learn nothing about the essence of matter from the application of Lagrange’s me-
chanics or thermodynamics. We do, however, learn all about the behavior of matter. When
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Duhem asserts that science is not for speculative contemplation but for practical necessity,
I don’t think he is intimating that science is solely pragmatic. Rather, he is thinking of
concrete cases in physical theory in which we need not know a substance’s metaphysical
essence in order to understand the laws it obeys.
For example, bodies are represented in Lagrange’s mechanics according to observations
about their degrees of freedom rather than their essential nature. There is a great amount
of detail in the system that we are able to ignore. In this sense, our theoretical laws are
approximate because they do not reveal the underlying microstructure is in our system, or
provide a dynamic laws type story of how bodies manage to evolve. Concerning the question
of how bodies are able to move and how work is able to be done, Duhem comments
What is the nature of this contribution [of work done on a system] and how is it carried
out? A difficult problem, whose clear solution seems to be quite beyond the bounds of
human reasoning. But this problem of the communication of substances is the object of
Metaphysics, not of Physics. Physics does not attempt to elucidate it . . . [Duhem1980, 119].
According to Duhem, physical theory does not reveal precisely how energy is exchanged
— it only tells us that energy is exchanged. It gives us some information about the causal
chains in physical processes, but fails to give us enough detail for this description to count
as a metaphysical picture. Likewise, thermodynamics does not give us a clear story of the
continuous, dynamic evolution of heat. Instead it reports that heat is gained in a Carnot
cycle and converted into work. But how this process occurs remains a mystery. There is no
“picture theory” of heat in classical thermodynamics, such as the porous sponge described
by caloric theory.
Duhem further claims that
When a physical theory is taken as an explanation, its goal is not reached until every
sensible appearance has been removed in order to grasp the physical reality . . .
Thus, it follows that in order to judge whether a set of propositions constitutes a physical
theory or not, we must inquire whether the notions connecting these propositions express,
in an abstract and general form, the elements which really go to make up material things,
or merely represent the universal properties perceived [Duhem1954, 9].
An explanation, on Duhem’s view, must represent the elements which compose material
things. In contemporary terms, explanations are built upon microstructures. Explanations
include the most “basic” components of the world, and describe their interactions. But
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this is clearly not what analytic mechanics or thermodynamics aim to describe. Both fail
Duhem’s criteria for an explanation because they do not include details about a system’s
microstructure.
Interestingly, at times Duhem seems to think parts of science can achieve “explanations.”
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, Duhem presents the theory of acoustics as the paradigmatic
case of an explanation. Reflecting on the theory, he writes
The explanation which acoustic theories give of experimental laws governing sound claims
to give us certainty; it can in a great many cases make us see with our own eyes the motions
to which it attributes these phenomena, and feel them with our fingers . . .
Most often we find that physical theory cannot attain that degree of perfection; it cannot
offer itself as a certain explanation of sensible appearances, for it cannot render accessible to
the senses the reality it proclaims as residing underneath those appearances . . . [Duhem1954,
8].
This quote suggests that Duhem thinks the acoustic theory of sound might be an actual
explanation of sound. Sound might really behave like a wave. However, he these instances of
explanation provide us with the basic objects and laws unify all of the disparate phenomena
we perceive. He denies that these explanations (such as the one for sound) are “fundamental.”
It is clear that neither Lagrange’s mechanics nor thermodynamics is an explanation
in Duhem’s sense of the word. Lagrange’s theory does not tell us about the essence or
true nature of matter. The New Mechanics, which Duhem believed was the final form of
physics, was to be grounded in the laws of thermodynamics with a structure quite analogous
to Lagrange’s mechanics. When Duhem claims “physical theory” does not explain, he is
referring to a physical theory structured like the New Mechanics.
5.2.1.2 Convergence on a Natural Classification After arguing that science does
not aim to give explanations, Duhem provides a new definition of a physical theory.
A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions,
deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely,
and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws [Duhem1954, 19].
For Duhem, a theory begins with principles. Lagrange begins his theory with the Princi-
ple of Virtual Work, which is later generalized to d’Alembert’s Principle. From these two
principles, we are able to deduce differential equations (or, in Duhem’s terms, mathematical
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Figure 4: An example of a pith ball electroscope.
propositions) whose solutions accurately describe observable patterns of motion. Notice the
contrast between this concept of a physical theory, which begins with general principles, and
a theory which begins with a basic ontology and set of dynamic laws.
In order to understand Duhem’s distinction between a principle and an experimental
law, I will take a brief detour to explicate some of Duhem’s terminology. Experimental laws
are the generalizations of facts. Facts are propositions that describe the results of individual
experiments.
Placed in contact with the external world in order to understand it, the human mind first
encounters the domain of facts. It sees that a piece of amber, rubbed by a silk rag, attracts
a pith ball suspended from a silk thread, at a distance; that a piece of glass, rubbed with
a woollen rag, does the same thing; that a piece of copper, rubbed with the same woollen
rag, also does the same thing, provided that the piece of copper and the woollen rag are
both carried by a glass sleeve, etc. Each observation, each new experiment, presents a new
fact [Duhem, Ariew, and Barker1996, 1].
Duhem considers a scientist performing experiments by means of a pith ball. A pith
ball electroscope, illustrated in figure 43, was one of the first instruments used to measure
electricity. Pith balls are lightweight objects covered in metal that are easily moved by an
electric charge. When a scientist observes that a piece of amber rubbed by a silk rag attracts
a pith ball, she obtains particular knowledge about the results of the specified experiment.
3Drawing of the pith ball electroscope by Morten Bisgaard, [? ].
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The fact demonstrated in the experiment is that this particular piece of amber rubbed by
this particular piece of cloth attracted that pith ball.
One might wonder how the scientist knows that the object is amber or that the rag
is silk, as these terms imply classifications made available by scientific theory. Although
Duhem notoriously worries about holism in experiments, he sets those issues aside in this
context. I intend to follow suit and take for granted that when the scientist observes a
particular experiment, she is warranted in believing a particular fact about what she has
observed. Perhaps we can say, at the most basic level, that she observes “when that thing
is rubbed by that thing it attracts that thing,” replacing terms like amber and silk with
ostensive definitions. Nevertheless, Duhem is unconcerned with such details at this point.
After a scientist repeats an experiment (and variations of that experiment) over and over,
she begins to generalize the facts she has observed by means of induction. These generaliza-
tions, which occur in a non-formal language, are what Duhem considers experimental laws.
For example, a scientist might observe that a particular rock falls when dropped. She might
drop the rock several times until she make the induction that this particular rock always falls
when dropped. She might vary the experiment by dropping many different kinds of rocks
and eventually come to the generalization that all rocks fall when dropped. These universal
statements about particular data sets are what Duhem calls experimental laws.
The mind arrives at the understanding of experimental laws through induction, transform-
ing the facts it has come to understand. Thus, the facts we have just mentioned, and other
similar facts it is possible to observe, leave the mind, through induction, to this law: When
similarly rubbed, all bodies become capable of attracting a pith ball suspended on a silk
thread. Creating a new word to express the general property that this law asserts, the mind
says: Through suitable rubbing, all bodies are electrified [Duhem, Ariew, and Barker1996,
1-2].
Duhem continues his example of the pith ball experiments, showing how scientists form
experimental laws about electricity. Duhem suggests these laws are generalizations of the
experimental facts formed by the use of induction. Facts are the first level of understanding
the external world, and the generalizations of these experimental facts are the second.
In Aim and Structure, Duhem considers a third level of understanding. This third level of
understanding is the condensation of experimental laws into principles — what Duhem con-
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siders the formation of a physical theory. In the same way that experimental laws generalize
facts, principles generalize experimental laws.
From these principles we can always, through regular and sure calculation, extract the law
we wish to use. It is no longer necessary, therefore, to keep watch over the knowledge of
all these laws; the knowledge of the principles on which they rest is sufficient [Duhem1954,
23].
According to Duhem, principles are the foundations of physical theories, and they provide
us with a means of calculating experimental laws. We find a concrete example of this when
we consider analytic mechanics and thermodynamics.
Lagrange found a way to derive the experimental laws of statics, such as the law of
the lever, from the more general Principle of Virtual Work. The Principal of Virtual Work
cannot be thought of as a physical law, because it requires a decent amount of abstraction
and relies on mathematical experiments performed outside of time. But it does give us a
way of deriving the experimental laws and the laws of experience. As I pointed out in §3.3,
the amazing feat of Lagrange was to unify other experimental force laws (e.g. the law of the
lever, or the force summation law) into separate applications of the same principle. In this
way, the foundational principles of physical theory condense experimental laws.
The same can be said for the basic principles of thermodynamics. Thermodynamics does
not rest on dynamic laws — which tell us how our system evolves — but instead provides
general rules for how the motion of systems will be constrained. These principles help us
create representations, and even approximate dynamic laws, for different systems. Still, the
principles are not themselves dynamic laws — and the representations in thermodynamics
are quasi-static processes rather than continuous time evolutions.
However, Duhem is quick to point out that physical theory doesn’t only condense the
laws, it also classifies them.
Theory is not solely an economical representation of experimental laws; it is also a classi-
fication of these laws . . .
Theory gives, so to speak, the table of contents and chapter headings under which the
science to be studied will be methodically divided, and it indicates the laws which are to
be arranged under each of these chapters [Duhem1954, 24].
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We can see an example of how theories classify by considering Duhem’s picture of the
New Mechanics. Recall that Duhem claimed the New Mechanics was like a tree rooted in
the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, which then divides into systems with reversible
modifications, frictional systems, systems with permanent alterations, and systems that
contain currents. From these branches grow different experimental laws. These laws are
classified according to the principles from which they can be derived.
We can also see how Lagrange’s theory helps classify experimental laws. By use of
d’Alembert’s suggestion that we can define the quantity −ma as the inertial force, and
set the sum of the applied force and the inertial force to zero in classical dynamics, La-
grange showed that the laws of dynamics could be classified with the laws of statics. Once
d’Alembert’s principle proved that dynamic systems can be classified as special cases of equi-
librium conditions, then the tools Lagrange had developed for the treatment of statics could
be extended to treat dynamics. As Duhem writes,
These classifications make knowledge convenient to use and safe to apply. Consider those
utility cabinets where tools for the same purpose lie side by side, and where partitions
logically separate instruments not designed for the same task: the worker’s hand quickly
grasps, without fumbling or making a mistake, the tool needed. Thanks to theory, the
physicist finds with certitude, and without omitting anything useful or using anything
superfluous, the laws which may help him solve a given problem [Duhem1954, 24].
Lanczos echoes Duhem’s thoughts concerning the use of d’Alembert’s principle.
The importance of [d’Alembert’s principle] lies in the fact that it is more than the expression
of Newton’s equation. It is the expression of a principle. We know that the vanishing of a
force in Newtonian mechanics means equilibrium. Hence [d’Alembert’s principle] says that
the addition of the force of inertial to the other acting forces produes equilibrium. But
this means that if we have any criterion for the equilibrium of a mechanical system, we
can immediately extend that criterion to a system which is in motion [Lanczos1964, 89,
emphasis his].
Scientific theories classify different experimental laws by showing what mathematical
tools can be used to describe varying sorts of phenomena. By classifying dynamics along with
statics, Lagrange shows that our methods for statics (in this case, the Lagrange multipliers)
can also be applied to dynamic systems. Therefore, the fruitfulness of scientific theory goes
beyond condensing experimental laws — it also classifies them.
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Still, Duhem suggests the tree growing from physical theory produces more than prag-
matic fruits. Duhem insists that these classifications converge on what he calls a natural
classification. In an essay titled “The English School and Physical Theories,” Duhem in-
troduces the idea of a natural classification by discussing what he calls a perfect theory as
I discussed in the first Chapter. He uses this notion of a perfect theory to illustrate what
makes a classification natural.
We must evidently judge the degree of perfection of a physical theory by the greater or
lesser conformity which that theory offers to the ideal and perfect theory . . . [T]his ideal and
perfect theory . . . would be the complete and adequate metaphysical explanation of material
things. This theory, in fact, would classify physical laws in an order which would be the
very expression of the metaphysical relations that the essences that cause the laws have
among themselves. It would give us, in the true sense of the word, a natural classification
of the laws [Duhem, Ariew, and Barker1996, 67-68].
A natural classification is an ordering of the laws that expresses the relations between
the essences that cause the laws. For example, if all matter turned out to be wave-like,
then a natural classification would place laws that are grounded in the amplitude of a wave
increasing in one category, and laws that are grounded in the distance the wave travels in
another category. It would classify together laws that reflect a common metaphysical cause,
and separate them from laws that pertain to a different feature of matter.
However, Duhem thinks a perfect theory is out of our reach.
Such a theory, like everything that is perfect, infinitely surpasses the scope of the human
mind. The theories which our methods permit us to construct are no more than a pale
reflection of it. The metaphysical method gives us only information that is too general, too
lacking in detail, and too paltry about the essence of material things to be able to serve in
classifying physical laws [Duhem, Ariew, and Barker1996, 68].
A perfect theory is a metaphysical system. Duhem expresses deep concern about the
move from metaphysics to physics — such as Descartes’ attempts to derive the laws of physics
from the geometry of extended matter in Euclidean space [Duhem, Ariew, and Barker1996,
70]. Descartes’ concept of matter proved to be an insufficient explanation of many exper-
imental laws. This is why Duhem thinks our ideas about metaphysics are “too paltry” to
classify physical phenomena.
The experimental method, on the other hand, has problems of its own.
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The experimental method, the only one to which we are to have recourse in pursuit of
this goal, does not capture the essence of things, but only the phenomena through which
things manifest themselves to us. It does not allow us to reconcile the laws with one
another except through exterior and superficial analogies which translate the true affini-
ties of the essences from which the laws emanate [and] perhaps frequently betray them
[Duhem, Ariew, and Barker1996, 68].
Duhem claims that our only chance of capturing the physical laws is by means of the
experimental method. However, this method does not reveal the true nature of bodies, as I
argued in the previous section, but instead allows us to organize and classify the experimental
laws. We do not classify these laws according to “the true affinities of the essences.” That
is, our laws are not classified according to the true causal structure of their physical nature,
because science does not fully reveal this information to us. Our classifications will never
be natural classifications, because we do not ascertain the deep metaphysical structure that
would allow us to see the true relations between laws.
Nevertheless, we are not without hope.
But however imperfect physical theories are, they can and they should tend toward perfec-
tion. No doubt they will never be anything but a classification, stating analogies between
laws but not capturing the relations between essences. We can and should always seek
to establish them in such a way that there would be some probability that the analogies
brought to light by them would not be accidental agreement, but true relations, showing
the connections that really exist among essences. In other words, we can and should seek
to render these classifications as far from artificial, as natural as possible [Duhem1954, 68].
And so, to converge on a natural classification, a scientific theory ought to classify laws
in a way that is parallel to the true “natural” classification of laws. This doesn’t mean that
a theory will reveal the true essence of bodies, but it will be able to group together similar
laws in the same way that similar laws are grouped together according to their metaphysical
essences. This is best illustrated by an example.
Let’s assume (contrary to Duhem) that our knowledge of the periodic table of the ele-
ments is actually a “perfect theory,” and provides us with knowledge of the metaphysical
nature of matter. Let’s further assume the following classification of matter is the natural
classification provided by a perfect theory.
Suppose that scientists who are not in possession of this “perfect theory” view a set of
substances for the first time — they are given samples of Hydrogen, Iron, Water, Ammonia,
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Figure 5: Example of a classification from chemical theory.
Silver, Sulphur, Arsenic, Helium, Salt, and a Salt solution. How might they classify these
various substances?
On Duhem’s view, the scientists aim to classify the substances in a way that the perfect
theory would classify these substances. Nevertheless, we can imagine an infinite number of
logical classifications. For example, they might classify silver and wood together because
they are both solids and water with alcohol because they are both liquids. Or they might
classify salt with salt water because they both taste similarly. All of these classifications
will be based on the ways the scientists experience the substances rather than the nature of
the substances themselves. Duhem suggests that if the scientists continue their pursuit long
enough, the hope is that even though their classification is built on the observable properties
of these substances, it will reflect the natural classification of the substances according to
their nature.
One important disanalogy between my example and Duhem’s is that I have described
a classification of substances and he is interested in a classification of laws. For example,
Lagrange determined that the laws of classical statics ought to be classified together with
the laws of classical dynamics. Therefore, laws that govern an object remaining at rest can
be derived from the same principle as the laws that govern an object in motion. On Duhem’s
picture, the success of Lagrange’s theory suggests that it mirrors the natural classification
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of laws. In other words, if we understood the true causal structure of the world, it would be
true that the laws which govern classical statics share something in common with the laws
that govern classical dynamics. Moreover, these laws, which are all instances of reversible
modifications, lack something in common with the laws that govern irreversible modifica-
tions. This is what it means to claim that a theory converges on a natural classificaiton —
that it orders the laws in the same way a perfect theory of metaphysics would classify the
laws. However, in order to do this, a theory need not reveal the essential nature of matter.
A theory can classify laws independent of knowledge about the microstructure of matter.
5.2.2 Summary
Duhem’s disavowals of explanation are not at odds with his claim that successful theories
reflect a natural classification. An explanation requires the exposure of the constitutive
nature of matter and a revelation of the metaphysical causal structure of reality. Duhem
denies that physical theory always aims to provide this sort of information. Sometimes,
scientists unify disparate laws by appeals to variational principles — principles which ignore
the fundamental constitution of matter and focus instead on its phenomenal qualities. These
variational principles are mathematical experiments which occur in an abstract configuration
space that is not meant to mirror the metaphysical structure of the world.
Duhem is not a contemporary antirealist. He does not have worries about the observ-
able and unobservable entities in theories. Instead, he is concerned with defending abstract,
mathematized formulations (such as Lagrange’s mechanics and thermodynamics) as can-
didates for true, fundamental theories despite the ignorance of microstructure that such
theories convey. Duhem’s main purpose is to create a model of a fundamental scientific
theory that breaks the mold of the dynamic laws strategists. He shows us that science can
classify phenomena, and provide insight into the natural world, without specifying a set of
dynamic laws.
Even though Duhem thinks we should employ variational principles in the composition
of a general scientific theory, and the use of such principles avoids peeking into the essence
of matter, he still believes that the classification of laws the theory provides mirrors the
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classification of laws provided by a perfect metaphysical theory. Thus, science does not
merely economize the data collected in a lab, it also tells us something about the relations
between laws and the metaphysical structure of the world.
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS
This project began as an investigation into a particular tension in the work of Pierre Duhem:
what is the difference between a scientific explanation and a natural classification? I have
explicated several case-studies that were central to the development of Duhem’s thought,
and argued that we can only understand the distinction outside of the dynamic laws picture
of scientific theory. Duhem’s conception of scientific theory is quite different from ours; he
suspects that science progresses by developing general principles from which we could derive
specific equations of evolution for particular systems. On the dynamic laws picture, science
progresses by specifying equations of evolution that hold for the most fundamental level of
matter, and then explaining how observable phenomena is reducible to these laws. While it’s
true that on a dynamic laws picture of science natural classifications and explanations are one
in the same, Duhem’s ideal theory — which rests on variational principles and quasi-static
processes — provides classifications without explanations.
Having resolved the historical tension, I would like to both summarize and expand on
some of the general points of application for contemporary philosophy. Duhem emphasizes
several morals which are still relevant to current philosophical trends, and our current un-
derstanding of scientific theory can greatly benefit from the lessons Duhem teaches.
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6.1 CONSEQUENCES FOR CONTEMPORARY THEORY
6.1.1 An Alternative Model of Scientific Theory
Perhaps the most significant contribution Duhem makes to contemporary philosophy is the
sketching of an alternative model of scientific theory. Most philosophers assume that science
is obviously progressing towards some version of a dynamic laws model. Duhem challenges
this assumption by providing historically accurate examples of science progressing away from
such a model by grounding itself in variational principles rather than dynamic laws.
Non-dynamic theories, such as analytic mechanics and thermodynamics, focus on the
role of equilibrium in physical phenomena. Rather than seek out ordinary differential equa-
tions which describe the actual motion of a system over time, these theories are based in
information concerning how systems come to rest. The processes at the core of such theo-
ries are quasi-static — processes which jump from one static state to the next. Although
such theories appear limited and idealized, they are actually able to provide us with quite
accurate, applicable information about a wide range of systems. Moreover, these theories
continue to be embraced in many areas of physical research.
Although these theories are based on general principles rather than dynamic laws, Duhem
does not take the anti-realist position of philosophers such as Nancy Cartwright, who argue
that this idealization implies the laws of physics are not real laws. Instead, Duhem thinks
these abstract principles are laws which are never perfectly instantiated because of the messy
complications which occur from friction.
Philosophers such as Cartwright think that true physical laws must describe the actual
motion of, for example, a pendulum through space. Because the laws we use to describe
the pendulum usually describe an “ideal” pendulum which is isolated in space, rather than
an ordinary pendulum in the world and the frictional forces which influence its path, they
are not actually laws. By contrast, Duhem suggests that these idealizations are the laws
which govern systems, but because the laws are instantiated in a messy world with much
complexity (such as friction), we never see systems perfectly obey them. Still, this does not
imply that they are not the laws which govern the system.
109
Perhaps Duhem’s point is best illustrated by an analogy from football1. The game of
football is played, in part, by the execution of a series of “plays.” Plays are detailed strategies
a team intends to deploy in order to move the ball towards the end zone. The execution of
such plays is influenced by all sorts of factors: the ability and training of the competitors, the
conditions of the field, the coach’s relationship with his players, the mindset of the athletes
during the game, the weather, etc. To provide a detailed causal description of the sequence
of events which occur in any actual play would include information about how all such
factors directly effect the play. This type of description would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to provide. More importantly, the possession of such an elaborate story would
fail to give us the formulation of a team’s intended play as it is written in their playbook.
Actual plays always deviate from intended plays, even if the deviation is very slight. A
dynamic laws picture provides a description of the deviation, but it cant tell us anything
about the the form of the team’s strategy.
But surely the form of the play has an important, reliable role in explaining the execution
of each instance of the play, even if such instances never go quite according to plan (due to
the interference of other players, slips on the field, etc.). Knowledge about the structure of
the intended play is, in many ways, more insightful than knowledge about the details of its
many executions.
Duhem provides several cases where, historically, science did not progress in a manner
consistent with the dynamic laws approach. In fact, Duhem at times seems to argue quite
dogmatically that science will not ever reveal true dynamic laws. I think this aspect of
Duhem’s philosophy is perhaps too strong. Nevertheless, I think he’s right to question the
assumption of many philosophers that scientific progress always follows a particular route.
We can’t be sure how scientific theory is going to evolve — it is an empirical question
how scientific theory will progress and what it will or will not be able to tell us. However, it is
a mistake to suppose that science “obviously” progresses towards mechanical, fundamental,
dynamic laws which all phenomena can be reduced to. One of the most important lessons in
Duhem, is that many of these paradigmatic cases of reduction, are not actually reductions
(as in the case of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics) or cannot be formulated purely
1Thanks to Sean Kelsey for first drawing this analogy.
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by dynamic laws (as is the case of classical mechanics).
This being said, it’s both an open question how scientific theory will progress, and so we
must take caution when exploring the metaphysical implications of physics.
6.1.2 Theories of Causation
In Chapter 2, I discussed several theories of causation in contemporary philosophy of science
which suggest scientific theories depict “causal processes.” Such views assume that our most
fundamental scientific theory will contain processes described by dynamic laws, and it is
the philosopher’s job to determine why some of these processes are considered causal. For
example, Salmon and Dowe have argued that certain processes count as causal because we
can track the conservation and exchange of critical quantities.
However, Duhem’s alternative picture of science presents several worries for such views.
First of all, continuous processes cannot be depicted within thermodynamic state space.
While thermodynamics admits state variables, and is built on the concept of the conser-
vation of energy, we cannot track this energy through any kind of dynamic process. Still,
thermodynamics is able to inform us about entropy, which plays a significant causal role in
the behavior of thermal systems. How can we describe this notion of causation when our
theory does not permit us access to the kind of processes Salmon and Dowe describe?
Additionally, consider the virtual modifications that lie at the heart of Lagrange’s me-
chanics. Again we do not see causal processes, but systems which aim for an equilibrium that
is defined by virtual modifications. Because these modifications necessarily occur “outside
of time,” it doesn’t make sense to try and describe them with dynamic laws.
Although causal process theorists aim to accurately represent what science tells us about
causation, rather than understand the notion of cause through a type of armchair analysis,
these views fail to take into account a wide range of physical theory that is central to scientific
practice. Not only do Duhem’s observations call into question the basic assumptions of these
causal process theories, they also seem to point towards a second conception of causation in
science.
Not all accounts of causation are causal process theories. Since the mid twentieth cen-
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tury, there has been a rather unorthodox analysis of causation by manipulability theorists2.
Manipulability theories, sometimes called interventionist approaches, focus on the practical
connection between the notion of cause and an agent’s ability to manipulate circumstances.
Early arguments in this vein suggested a connection between causation and agency. For
example, von Wright claims “ . . . to think of a relation between events as causal is to think
of it under the aspect of action” [von Wright1971, 74].
Many objections have been raised against manipulability theories because they appear
too anthropomorphic. Our conception of causation appears to stipulate that causal relations
are “out in the world” and not entirely dependent on us or our abilities. Plenty of relation-
ships we view as causal, such as the moon and the tides, are certainly not anything an agent
would be capable of manipulating.
An interesting and effective response to this objection is to define the manipulability
relationship in a non-agentive way. One popular champion of this approach is Judea Pearl,
a computer scientist turned philosopher, who associates the causal relationship with prop-
erties of directed graphs [Pearl2000]. James Woodward follows this approach, providing a
counterfactual analysis of causation which is also deeply connected to models of directed
graphs.
This more objective interventionist approach suggests that causes are related to potential
interventions on the nodes of directed graphs. Causal relationships can be defined based on
how a change in one node of the graph would have an effect on the other nodes. Loosely
speaking, Woodward claims that X causes Y if and only if an intervention on X causes a
change in Y (where these interventions are defined by counterfactual relationships between
quantities)34.
Interestingly, the virtual modifications that Duhem defines strongly support these inter-
ventionist approaches to causation in physical theory. Causal process argue that their view
of causation is grounded in science, while interventionist theories focus too strongly on a
2For an excellent treatment of manipulability theories, see [Woodward2013].
3Interventions need not be humanly possible, a mere theoretical intervention does the trick
[Woodward2003, 91].
4It should also be noted that Woodward very carefully articulates his conception of intervention and
spends much time explaining how his theory effectively distinguishes causes from correlations, allows for
partial and direct causes, etc., all of which I here gloss over [Woodward2003, 47-61].
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subjective approach to the notion of cause. However, virtual modifications, such as those at
the core of analytic mechanics and thermodynamics, fit much better with a manipulationist
account of causation.
Recall how Duhem defines a virtual modification:
To impress upon the variable quantities that characterise the state of the system some
infinitesimal alterations allowed by the constraints is to impose upon the material system
a virtual modification [Duhem2011].
Virtual modifications are infinitesimal “wiggles” that theoreticians can apply to the
mathematical representation of a system in order to determine how a change in one quantity
effects the other. In analytic mechanics, these virtual modifications are used to determine
equilibrium states, which allows for a unified treatment of statics. The mathematical exper-
iments which serve as a foundation for theories based on variational principles exemplify the
type of counterfactual dependencies that Woodward and Pearl describe.
To summarize, not only do Duhem’s insights raise serious worries for causal process
theories, they also point towards a scientific underpinning for interventionist accounts of
causation.
6.2 MIXED LEVEL THEORIES
Another interesting conclusion we can draw from Duhem, which is quite relevant to contem-
porary philosophical debate, is the dependence of microlevel theories on macrolevel theories.
Dynamic laws strategists suspect that we can reduce all phenomena to information about
fundamental pieces of matter and the dynamic laws which describe their motion. But, at
least in the case of the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, it does not
appear that these dynamic laws are wholly independent of constraints provided by macro
level information such as temperature and entropy.
Robert Batterman has argued on several occasions that this standard, reductionist pic-
ture of philosophy fails to account for the way microlevel theories interact with macro con-
cepts. In his book The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Re-
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duction, and Emergence, Batterman argues that seemingly fundamental theories often rely
on concepts which are defined by higher level theories. For example, he argues that the
explanation of rainbows based on the wave theory of light still relies on certain geometrical
concepts from the classical theory of light in order to explain why we are interested in certain
asymptotic behavior [Batterman2002].
This type of dependence can be seen in the relationship of thermodynamics and statistical
mechanics. Recall Helmholtz’s work on monocyclic systems. It was Helmholtz’s goal to
pick out a class of models which could, on a fundamental level, represent thermodynamic
behavior. Although Helmholtz succeeds in finding this class of models, it is unclear what
makes this class significant from a dynamic laws perspective. Were we to view the world from
a strictly dynamic laws perspective, without any knowledge of thermodynamic phenomena
or the concept of entropy, we would have no reason to define this class of models as a class
at all. It is only by reflecting this higher level information back into our lower level theory
that we are able to describe thermal phenomena from a dynamic laws perspective.
Moreover, as Duhem points out, Helmholtz’s “reduction” is based in concepts from an-
alytic mechanics — such as the energy — which do not appear in a strictly dynamic laws
approach to vectorial systems. Additionally, Helmholtz’s theorem takes into account macro
properties — such as the volume — treating them as constraints on the system of interest.
In fact, the notion of a constraint in classical mechanics is quite helpful in illuminating just
what sort of dependency exists between thermodynamics and classical mechanics.
On Duhem’s picture, which he illustrates through Helmholtz’s models, higher level theo-
ries factor into lower level theories as “constraints.” We use information about what happens
higher up to constrain which models in a theory that we are interested in. It is not the case
that these higher level theories are straightforwardly reduced — their results still play a role
in determining which solutions of the classical equations are relevant. As Duhem says, these
macro concepts are “illustrated” by our lower level theories — we incorporate higher level
results into our lower level theories, in the same way we might, at times, factor lower level
information into our higher level theories5.
To summarize, Duhem challenges the dogmatic assumption that fundamental theories are
5For further treatment of the role played by scales see [Wilson2011].
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theories which describe the smallest bits of matter and the laws which govern their motion.
On his picture, macro level theories like thermodynamics are a type of fundamental theory
because they provide information that must be incorporated into our lower level theories in
order to appropriately model experimental results.
6.3 PHYSICAL INSIGHT
Classifying Duhem as an anti-realist unfortunately glosses over his insightful comments about
the way in which science reveals deep physical insight. While it’s true that Duhem denies the
dynamic laws strategy, claiming that our human limitations prevent us from getting down
to the bottom of things, and asserts that scientific theories are not metaphysical theories, he
also insists that our best physical theories converge on natural classifications; such theories
are reflections of the classificatory order that would be provided by a “perfect theory” or
explanation. What’s especially novel in Duhem is his characterization of how science latches
on to the world.
In contemporary philosophy, the notion of scientific progress is heavily influenced by
strong commitments to dynamic laws views. In the first Chapter I discussed Railton, who
argues that scientific explanations approximate an ideal DN text. This suggests that science
only progresses when it approximates such a text: theories are more or less fundamental
depending on how closely they emulate the ideal DN text. On this view, science advances
linearly, by digging deeper and deeper into the material nature of things; we learn more
about the world as we learn about how its smallest pieces work.
Yet one of the most interesting and influential discoveries in scientific theory — entropy
— breaks the mold of what scientific progress looks like. Entropy was not discovered through
an understanding of the nature of heat. Thermodynamic theory does not probe the essential
nature of heat, telling us what it is composed of or what sort of metaphysical status it has.
Instead, Carnot formulated a highly abstract model of an ideal heat engine which models
the behavior of heat in actual systems. Through a study of this model, Clausius formulated
the quantity known as entropy, in order to understand why the machine was so efficient.
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Of course, in the vein of Reichenbach, one might argue that this insight conflates context
of discovery with context of justification. While it’s true that we discovered entropy by
means of an abstract model, insofar as we discovered some interesting fact about the world,
what we discovered was a fact about dynamic laws and the behavior of lower level systems.
But based on our current knowledge, this is just false. Entropy, like temperature, is a
property that can only apply to complex systems rather than individual atoms. Although
it is sometimes possible to reflect our macro level understanding of entropy back down to
constrain the behavior of lower level particles, this by no means suggests that entropy can
be a property of an atom. In this sense, physical theory points towards the importance of
macro properties of systems. Additionally, the fact that entropy always increases is multiply
realizable. Systems obey entropic constraints independent of their microscopic constitution.
If this is the case, it seems strange to say that entropy is a fundamental property of atoms.
Moreover, entropy is impossible to observe from a dynamic laws perspective. Though
entropy is a difficult quantity to understand, it is roughly considered a measure of ther-
modynamic work that a system is capable of doing. For example, if a glass of water is at
thermodynamic equilibrium, it cannot engage in any thermodynamic processes (unless it
is disturbed). If we drop ice in the water, however, the system is capable of performing
thermodynamic work (i.e. the melting of the water).
Entropy is a reflection of the energy that cannot be used to perform work. When Clausius
originally introduce the quantity, he understood it as the “waste heat” of the system, or the
heat of the system that was not available to be used as energy. More specifically, he took it
to be a measure of heat loss. Entropy was originally formulated as the heat lost by a Carnot
engine — an idealized engine which moves through a series of equilibrium states. Were it the
case that we described, according to dynamic laws, the behavior of an actual heat engine,
this engine would surely lose a great deal of heat and energy to frictional forces. All engines
lose a great deal of energy to friction. As machines become more and more efficient, they
lose less and less energy. This is why Carnot suspected that his engine would not lose any
heat whatsoever — it was fully isolated from the effects of friction. However, as Clausius
articulates with his formulation of entropy, it turns out that even without friction there is a
certain amount of energy that cannot be converted into work — and that “unusable work”
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is the entropy. But from a dynamic laws point of view, it is impossible to distinguish the
energy lost due to entropy from the energy lost due to friction — another reason why the
thermodynamic perspective is indispensable.
Of course, it is possible that at some later time we will discover regular behaviors at
an even lower level of matter than is currently accessible to us. And, of course it’s possible
that this lower level of matter will obey laws which explain the nature of entropy. Perhaps
this lower level of matter will not experience frictional effects, and it will be quite clear how
and why entropy comes in to play. However, this hypothesis, albeit theoretically possible,
seems more like an unsupported conjecture than an accurate prediction based on the way
science has evolved so far. While few philosophers presume that the micro mechanical laws
we currently possess (e.g. quantum mechanics) are the final story, many suppose that we
are “on the right track,” and that when we find a lower level theory, we will be able to
cleanly build up our macro level physical theories. This belief is based on the observation
that science always progresses by discovering smaller bits of the universe and general laws
which describe them.
But Duhem’s examples radically challenge this view of scientific progress. He points
towards theories which are able to become more unified and more general by ignoring mi-
croscopic details. He even shows us how, in the case of thermodynamics, we gain important
physical insights such as entropy by ignoring the micro level models of our system. Ad-
ditionally, he shows us that scientific theory often engages in abstraction in order to get
around the muddling effects of frictional forces. It is only by looking at these abstract,
general regularities that we can see “beyond the veil” to how systems would behave if they
weren’t consistently attacked by the difficulties of frictional forces. Considering what Duhem
emphasizes in the history of physical theory, it is unclear what basis we have to expect that
scientific theory will ultimately reveal to us the basic building blocks of the universe and the
simple laws which govern them, and then go on to explain how our other theories can be
reduced to this micro foundation.
Of course, one can reasonably object by pointing out that science often does manage to
successfully uncover dynamic laws, and I have here ignored all such case studies. I certainly
don’t want to deny that in certain branches of science, practitioners do aim and at times
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successfully uncover the dynamic laws which describe a particular phenomena. However, I
want to emphasize that this is not always the case, and there are plenty of other methods
which scientists employ in their development of scientific theory.
As I have previously noted, even Duhem describes the wave theory of sound as an example
of a theory that provides an “explanation.” What Duhem denies, I think, is not that
theories can ever provide apparent explanations, but that one single theory will provide
a straightforward and unified explanation of everything. Now, I think even this might be too
strong — given that we really have no idea what nature is going to tell us or in what direction
science will proceed. Instead, I want to argue that we have no idea what structure scientific
theory will take next, and the theories that we have now are not clear, straightforward
dynamic laws models. Instead, many of the most central pieces of physical theory involve
variational principles and quasi-static processes.
Nevertheless, our physical theories do provide us with genuine insight, even if they do
not always provide us with straightforward dynamic laws.
6.3.1 An Objection Based on Equivalent Formulations
Another possible objection for this line of argumentation is as follows: The vectorial de-
scription of classical mechanics and the Lagrangian formulation of classical mechanics are
equivalent theories. Therefore, it’s wrong to think Lagrange’s theory is “superior” to, or
an advancement from, the point-mass formulation. Why not just suppose that Lagrange’s
mechanics is true because the point-mass formulation is true? Sure, Lagrange provides us
with methods to help make calculations simpler, but we can show that it’s mathematically
equivalent to the vectorial approach. If this is the case, the vectorial approach is clearly the
more “metaphysically accurate” theory, and Lagrange’s theory is only superior with respect
to its usefulness, but not in terms of its physical insight.
One way to respond to this objection is to argue that Lagrange’s formulation is in fact
superior to the vectorial approach. I have already argued something like this — or, I have at
least argued that Duhem had good reasons for believing something like this — in Chapter
3. Here, I respond to this objection in a different way. While I certainly think it’s a mistake
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to take the mathematical equivalence of the vectorial approach and the analytic approach
as full physical equivalence, let’s suppose, for the sake of argument, that these two theories
are completely equivalent.
Now, the vectorial approach to mechanics suggests that classical behavior is derived
from the basic laws of motion which govern the discrete, rigid, extensionless points we call
atoms. By contrast, Lagrange’s theory suggests that a particle will always travel the path
of minimum energy: that is, a particle’s path is determined not by some dynamic laws
which govern it but by nature’s insistence to conserve energy. The point then is, these two
equivalent theories offer radically different metaphysical perspectives. If the theories are
genuinely equivalent, what reason do we have to assume the metaphysical content of one is
more significant than the metaphysical content of another.
For example, why should we assume that particles always take the path of least energy
because that is what is stipulated by the dynamic laws, rather than assuming that the dy-
namic laws are what they are because they model nature’s strict rule that particles must
always travel the path of least energy? On what basis can we argue that the vectorial ap-
proach is “more fundamental,” or that the analytic approach is grounded in the point-mass
formulation? Given that the theories are equivalent, and each one offers a “metaphysical rea-
son” why particles behave as they do, how do we bestow one or the other with metaphysical
priority?
One way to reconcile this metaphysical incongruity is by suggesting that the different
formulations offer different perspectives of the same metaphysical phenomenon. While ana-
lytic mechanics provides us with a global approach to the laws of classical motion, which is
based on the overall energy used by the system rather than dynamic laws which govern its
parts, the vectorial approach is a local approach, describing the behavior of the individual
atoms. But insofar as we use this sort of reasoning to ease the philosophical tension between
the two views, we must concede that neither theory provides a full metaphysical explanation
of classical motion. Both might provide physical insight, and both might tell us different
ways of conceiving of the laws of classical motion, but neither gives an outright explanation
of what causes physical motion. Even if we assume these theories are entirely physically
equivalent, Duhem’s worry still stands.
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6.4 FINAL THOUGHTS
In this dissertation, I have considered the distinction Duhem makes between natural classi-
fications and explanations. I have argued that much of the exegetical confusion surrounding
this distinction arises from our current conceptions of how scientific theories are structured.
A large number of contemporary philosophers assume that physical science adheres to a
dynamic laws model: it provides us with laws that describe how the basic bits of matter
evolve over time. However, many important pieces of physical theory do not follow the dy-
namic laws model. Instead, they invoke what I have called “quasi-static reasoning,” a type
of abstract modeling based on information about various equilibrium states of systems. I
have shown that Duhem was quite familiar with this alternative model of science, and that
such models provide the undergirding for the seemingly contradictory claims he makes about
scientific theory.
I have further argued that Duhem’s project is not antiquated: the issues at stake are
not of merely historical interest. Duhem provides an alternative prototype for how scientific
theory latches on to the natural world and provides us with genuine physical insight. I
began by suggesting that different philosophers have placed Duhem all over the realism/anti-
realism continuum. Perhaps this is because our understanding of scientific realism is difficult
to interpret outside of the dynamic laws model of physical theory. The realism/antirealism
debate, along with much of the discussion of grounding in metaphysics, relies on a dynamic
laws conception of physical theory.
But, in truth, we have no idea how physical theory will shape up. Thermodynamics
and Analytic Mechanics are at least two examples of how science can progress by moving
away from a dynamic laws strategy or ideal DN text. Of course, there have been plenty
of important discoveries in the history of science which came in the form of dynamic laws.
Given that science moves in such mysterious ways, it’s an empirical question how scientific
theory will evolve and what, if anything, our theories will reveal about a “fundamental level”
behind the veil of appearances. Nevertheless, it is important for philosophers to look at these
cases in detail, in order to develop an understanding of the different ways scientific theories
articulate natural insights. Only by a serious, careful examination of the history of science
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and the technical intricacies of physical theory — the sort of study modeled for us by Pierre
Duhem — can we be begin to sketch a portrait of how nature reveals herself.
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